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An orthodox view in epistemology holds that propositional knowledge is an 
absolute ‘yes or no’ affair, viz, propositional knowledge is ungradable. Call 
this view epistemic absolutism. This thesis purports to challenge this 
absolutist orthodoxy and develop an underexplored position—epistemic 
gradualism, which was initially proposed by Stephen Hetherington. As 
opposed to epistemic absolutism, epistemic gradualism argues that 
propositional knowledge can come in degrees.  
 
This thesis will examine motivations for endorsing absolutism and then, 
drawing on Hetherington’s original objections to absolutism, prove that 
absolutism is ill-grounded. In particular, I will explain why the primary ground 
for insisting absolutism, to wit, linguistic evidence from ordinary English 
language, fails to entail that knowledge-that is an ungradable concept. After 
that, I will revisit Hetherington’s two versions of gradualist theories—both will 
be revealed to be defective. Moreover, the current model of the debate 
between absolutism and gradualism constructed by Hetherington will give 
rise to an equivocal attitude towards the gradability of knowledge. That is, 
there is a prevailing equivocal view which agrees that knowledge can be 
improved by virtue of better justification but denies that knowledge is, by and 
large, a gradable concept.  
 
This thesis proposes to remodel the debate between absolutism and 
gradualism by basing it on a dispute about whether knowledge has a cut-off 
point distinguishing knowledge from everything that falls short of knowledge. 
Succinctly put, whether propositional knowledge has a threshold. It will be 
argued that gradualism, so interpreted, should deny that knowledge has a 
threshold, and treat knowledge as a spectrum concept analogous to ‘red’, 




The theoretical merits of this new model of the debate and the reconstructed 
gradualism will be shown. With a better-constructed gradualist account of 
knowledge in play, I will demonstrate how gradualism enjoys advantages 
over absolutism by illustrating gradualism’s potential applications in solving 
epistemological issues that absolutism finds difficult to address. For example, 
issues related to epistemic luck, faultless disagreements, scepticism, and the 




























Is knowledge of a proposition as gradable as beliefs or justification? In 
ordinary language, we usually do not use ‘knows’ as a gradable term. This 
motivates epistemic absolutism, a standard view in the contemporary 
epistemology that propositional knowledge is an absolute ‘yes-or-no’ affair. In 
other words, propositional knowledge is ungradable. This thesis will reveal 
that this absolutist view is ill-grounded, and I will defend a relatively 
underexplored view, namely, epistemic gradualism. As opposed to epistemic 
absolutism, epistemic gradualism argues that propositional knowledge admits 
of different degrees.  
 
The first chapter will unpack the notions of epistemic absolutism and 
epistemic gradualism. It will be clarified that this thesis aims to defend a 
gradualist view that a proposition can be known better or worse. I will also 
introduce three main arguments for absolutism, in particular, the one 
grounded in our ungradable daily usages of ‘knows’. All those arguments will 
be refuted in the second chapter. The conclusion reached in this chapter will 
be that absolutism is not as well supported by arguments as the standard 
view has it.  
 
The third chapter is about the most prominent advocate of gradualism—
Stephen Hetherington. His two different gradualist proposals will be critically 
scrutinised. It will be revealed that Hetherington’s two gradualist proposals 
are both problematic, and hence a new form of gradualism is required to be 
constructed. This task will be accomplished in the fourth chapter. I will argue 
that a better model of the debate between gradualism and absolutism should 
focus on whether knowledge is a concept that has a threshold, just like 
‘empty’, ‘extinct’, or ‘die’. Absolutism answers that ‘no’, while gradualism 
should argue that ‘yes’. To be more specific, gradualism should interpret 




The benefits of reconstructing the debate in this way will be illustrated in 
chapter 5 & 6. I will argue that the remodelled gradualism can be applied to 
address many epistemological issues that absolutism cannot solve. I will 
show that gradualism can provide us with a unified account of various types 
of knowledge. In addition, gradualism can satisfactorily explain the 
compatibility problem of environmental luck and knowledge, and the 
phenomenon of faultless disagreement. Finally, we can have a better solution 
to the long-held sceptical problem by appealing to gradualism. In conclusion, 

























Epistemic absolutism1 is an orthodox view in the contemporary epistemology 
holding that propositional knowledge is an absolute ‘yes-or-no’ affair, viz, 
propositional knowledge is ungradable (see Hetherington 2001). This thesis 
will reveal that this absolutist orthodoxy is ill-grounded, and I will defend a 
relatively underexplored view, namely, epistemic gradualism. As opposed to 
epistemic absolutism, epistemic gradualism argues that propositional 
knowledge admits of different degrees.  
 
Epistemic gradualism was prominently advocated by Stephen Hetherington, 
who developed two different gradualist proposals. It will be revealed in this 
thesis that Hetherington’s two proposals are both problematic, and hence a 
new form of gradualism is required to be constructed. A new method to argue 
for the gradability of propositional knowledge will be developed in this thesis. 
Moreover, this thesis will reconstruct the model of the debate around the 
gradability of knowledge2. It will be argued that the remodelled debate should 
focus on whether knowledge is a concept that has a threshold, to wit, a cut-off 
point distinguishing knowledge from everything that falls short of knowledge. 
Gradualism should argue that knowledge is not a concept that has a threshold. 
Instead, knowledge is best to be viewed as a spectrum concept (analogous to 
‘red’, ‘bright’, and ‘cold’). This relates to what Hetherington calls ‘external 
gradualism’—a view that he did not choose to defend. Rather, Hetherington 
(2001) only aimed to advocate what he called ‘internal gradualism’—a view 
that knowledge can be better or worse in terms of the justificatory strength. 
According to Hetherington (2001), the central divergence between absolutism 
and gradualism is whether internal gradualism holds water. This thesis will 
                                                          
1 This definition of ‘epistemic absolutism’ is inherited from Hetherington (2001). It should be 
distinguished from the view claiming that there are absolute facts about what belief a 
particular item of information justifies – which is sometimes also called ‘epistemic absolutism’ 
and is usually seen as the opposite of the so-called ‘epistemic relativism’ or ‘epistemic non-
absolutism’ (see, for example, Boghossian 2006). 
2 Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, the term ‘knowledge’ in this thesis usually refers to 




show that this is a misdiagnosis, which will give rise to an equivocal attitude 
towards knowledge’s gradability. That is, the idea of internal gradualism is not 
as unorthodox as Hetherington presents it to be. Quite the opposite, many 
people would be glad to admit that, on the one hand, knowledge is gradable in 
the sense that justification can be better or worse. Notwithstanding, on the 
other hand, knowledge is by and large ungradable in some other (perhaps 
more important) senses (to be elucidated).  
 
In this thesis, I will attempt to reject this equivocal attitude by advocating a 
remodelled gradualist account of knowledge. I will demonstrate that the 
remodelled gradualism enjoys significant advantages over absolutism. That is, 
gradualism can be applied to address many epistemological issues that cannot 
be satisfactorily solved within the standard absolutist picture. Given that 
absolutism is also not as well supported as the orthodox view has it, 
gradualism is ultimately preferable to absolutism, and thus the equivocal 
attitude can be discarded for good reasons.  
 
This thesis will proceed as follows: 
 
In Chapter One, the concept of epistemic absolutism and epistemic gradualism 
will be introduced. I will show that the gradability of knowledge can be 
measured along two orthogonal scales: the quantitative scale and the 
qualitative scale. Correspondingly, there can be two types of epistemic 
gradualism: 1) quantitative epistemic gradualism, which holds that a 
proposition can be known more or less; and 2) qualitative epistemic 
gradualism, which claims that a proposition can be known better or worse. This 
thesis only purports to defend qualitative gradualism. In addition, 
Hetherington’s distinction between external and internal gradualism will be 
elaborated. After this, the prevailing equivocal attitude towards the gradability 
of knowledge will be spelt out. The second half of Chapter One will introduce 
three mainstream arguments for epistemic absolutism. The primary argument 
for absolutism is what I call the argument from linguistic evidence, according to 
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which the fact that we usually do not use ‘knows’ in a gradable way indicates 
that knowledge is ungradable. In addition, the argument from object (see 
Hetherington 2005) argues that the object of knowledge-that-p is the truth of p. 
Now that the truth of p is ungradable, knowledge-that-p is also ungradable. 
Finally, the argument from contextualism claims that gradualism is rooted in 
contextualism, and hence it should be rejected along with contextualism as 
contextualism is implausible.  
 
These arguments for absolutism will be debunked in Chapter Two. The first 
section of this chapter will argue against the linguistic argument for absolutism 
in three ways. Firstly, linguistic data lending support to gradualism in the 
English language will be provided and analysed. Secondly, I will demonstrate 
that the linguistic intuition that absolutists resort to is too English-centred by 
exhibiting linguistic evidence supporting gradualism in non-English languages, 
in particular, the Chinese language. Thirdly, it will be argued that the 
conceptual nature of some epistemic terms (e.g., knowledge) will sometimes 
conflict with their daily usages in the ordinary language. Therefore, the 
linguistic argument for absolutism is untenable due to the methodological 
mistake. The second section of this chapter will block the argument from object 
for absolutism by rejecting the premise that the object of an item of knowledge-
that-p is just the truth of p. Furthermore, it will be argued that one cannot entail 
the ungradability of an epistemic concept C from the ungradability of C’s 
object. Finally, the objection from contextualism will be disarmed in section 
three by showing that epistemic gradualism can be independent of 
contextualism. The conclusion reached in this chapter is that epistemic 
absolutism is ultimately an ill-grounded view. As a result, we shall give its 
opposite, i.e., epistemic gradualism, a more serious consideration.  
 
Chapter Three will critically scrutinise the two versions of gradualism proposed 
by Hetherington. It will be summarised that there are two notable traits of 
Hetherington’s first gradualist proposal: firstly, Hetherington (2001) advocates 
a strong anti-justificationism view insisting that justification is unnecessary for 
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knowledge—mere true belief can suffice to constitute the so-called ‘minimal 
knowledge’. Secondly, Hetherington insists that there is a clear distinction 
between knowledge and non-knowledge. The second gradualist proposal of 
Hetherington weakens his radical anti-justificationist stance but appeals to his 
theory of how-knowledge, which is inspired by Armstrong’s ‘truthmaker theory’ 
(see Hetherington 2005, 2011). It is argued that ‘knowing how it is that p’ is a 
sufficient and necessary condition of ‘knowing that p’, and hence how-
knowledge that p is equal to knowledge that p. Since how-knowledge that p is 
gradable, knowledge that p should be seen as gradable as well. The two 
proposals will both be called into question. It will be argued that the anti-
justificationist position of Hetherington’s first proposal is unacceptable as it fails 
to capture the idea that knowledge is incompatible with mere epistemic-luck 
and the intuition that knowledge is distinctively more valuable than true belief. 
In addition, I will argue that Hetherington’s commitment to external absolutism 
is not only unnecessary but also harmful for a satisfactory gradualist account 
of knowledge. After that, a crucial logical lacuna of Hetherington’s argument for 
his second version of gradualism will be revealed. That is, the equal sign 
between how-knowledge that p and knowledge that p is drawn too rashly. Now 
that both of Hetherington’s two versions of gradualism are problematic, we 
need a new gradualist theory. 
    
Chapter Four will remodel the current debate between gradualism and 
absolutism. As we have noted before, Hetherington misdiagnoses the central 
divergence between gradualism and absolutism. In contrast, this chapter will 
argue that a better way to characterise the debate should be concentrated on 
whether knowledge is a threshold concept (analogous to ‘die’, ‘pregnant’, and 
‘empty’) or a spectrum concept (analogous to ‘red’, ‘bright’, and ‘spicy’). The 
distinction between a threshold concept and a spectrum concept will be 
articulated. Also, I will discuss the relation (in particular, differences) between a 
spectrum concept and a vague concept. The advantages of this reconstructed 
model will be illustrated. With a new model of the debate in play, the second 
half of this chapter will start rejecting the equivocal attitude by demonstrating 
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gradualism’s first theoretical virtue. That is, it can provide a better solution to 
the putative asymmetry problem—why is knowledge-that ungradable while 
knowledge-how and knowledge-wh are widely recognised as gradable? By 
directly denying the existence of this alleged asymmetry, gradualism can 
provide us with a unified account of different types of knowledge. 
 
The theoretical merits of gradualism will be further displayed in Chapter Five. 
There are two conflicting (but both reasonable) intuitions regarding whether 
knowledge is compatible with the fake-barn-county-style environmental luck.                          
With these two uncompromising intuitions in play, the relevant discussion 
seemed to reach an impasse. How can we resolve this impasse? I will first 
examine Sanford Goldberg’s proposal that appeals to his new account of 
epistemic luck which is based on his notion of ‘epistemic entitlement’ and 
‘adequate explanation’ (see Goldberg 2015). It will be shown that Goldberg’s 
entitlement-based account of luck would not only fail to accommodate the 
knowledge-ascribing intuition, but also eliminate the concept of environmental 
luck. After this, I will argue that a gradualist variation of Goldberg’s entitlement-
based account of epistemic luck can reconcile the two conflicting intuitions in a 
more satisfactory manner. The second application of gradualism that this 
chapter will discuss relates to the puzzle of faultless disagreements. It is widely 
endorsed that there are faultless disagreements on knowledge ascriptions, but 
the existence of genuine disagreements and the faultlessness of epistemic 
peers seem to contradict each other. How can we account for the seemingly 
inconsistent notion of faultless disagreements? This chapter will show that 
gradualism can offer us a better explanation that avoids defects of extant 
mainstream proposals such as contextualism and relativism. 
 
In closing, Chapter Six will introduce gradualism’s application in solving the 
sceptical paradox. A diagnosis of the sceptical problem will show that the 
sceptical paradox is premised on an intuitively appealing claim that one’s belief 
that ‘I am not a BIV’ does not meet the threshold for knowledge. Trading on 
our commitment to that claim, sceptics are able to get the sceptical argument 
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off the ground. An absolutist anti-sceptical approach will attempt to reject this 
claim by proving that there is a threshold that is met. In contrast, a gradualist 
approach will straightforwardly deny that knowledge has a threshold. It will be 
argued that the absolutist approach succumbs to the difficulty of finding a 
qualified threshold for knowledge and the problem of petitio principia. On the 
contrary, by interpreting knowledge as a spectrum concept, gradualism can 
block the sceptical argument in a more undercutting way without giving rise to 
those problems that absolutism is subject to. Therefore, knowledge is best to 
be viewed as a spectrum concept, which enables a more satisfactory reply to 
scepticism. 
 
The final conclusion reached in this thesis will be that the reconstructed 
gradualism is preferable to absolutism in light of those theoretical advantages 
introduced. Nevertheless, there are still much more issues that can be 
discussed in regard to the debate between gradualism and absolutism. This 





























Chapter One: Epistemic Absolutism and Epistemic 
Gradualism 
 
Abstract: This chapter will provide a state of the art review of 
the current debate between epistemic absolutism and 
epistemic gradualism. The first section will unpack the notion 
of gradualism and absolutism by elaborating various readings 
of the two conflicting views. It will be introduced that the 
gradability of propositional knowledge can be measured 
along at least two pairs of scales, namely, the 
quantitative/qualitative scale and the threshold/beyond-
threshold scale. I will clarify that the version of gradualism 
that this thesis aims to defend is a sort of qualitative 
threshold and beyond-threshold gradualism. The second 
section will give a brief sketch of three attitudes that people 
might hold in regard to the absolutism/gradualism debate. It 
will be revealed that, without being noticed by Hetherington, 
the majority of epistemologists might be holding an equivocal 
attitude. The last section will summarise three mainstream 
approaches to argue for absolutism. They are the argument 
from linguistic evidence, the argument from the object, and 
the argument from contextualism. 
 
1. Absolutism and Gradualism 
 
1.1: Taxonomy  
 
There are various categories of knowledge. For example, there is knowledge 
of persons, e.g.: 
 




It is natural to accept that knowledge of persons can have degrees, e.g., it is 
permissible to say: 
 
(1a) Mary knows John better than Jane does, as John is 
Mary’s best friend. 
 
There is also knowledge of things, for instance: 
 
(2) Jonny knows rock music very well as he is a renowned rock 
star. 
 
Again, it is commonly admitted that knowledge of things can be better or 
worse. Nothing is infelicitous if one says that: 
 
(2a) Jonny knows rock music better than his 3-year-old daughter.  
 
Both knowledge of persons and knowledge of things fall into the category of 
a more general phenomenon, namely, objectual knowledge (see Bengson & 
Moffett 2011; Chappell 2014; Kvanvig 2009; Brogaard 2016). It is normally 
granted by epistemologists that objectual knowledge admits of degrees.  
 
Another important category of knowledge is the so-called ‘knowledge-how’3, 
for example: 
 
(3) As one of the best pro-wrestlers in the world, 
Bryan knows how to wrestle. 
 
                                                          
3 Some philosophers argue that knowledge-how can also be understood as a peculiar sort of 
objectual knowledge. For example, Bengson & Moffett (2011) suggest that knowing how to 
ф something means standing in a non-propositional objectual understanding relation to a 
way of ф-ing. Trading on this point, Bengson & Moffett construct their so-called 
‘nonpropositional intellectualism’.   
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It is widely endorsed by most of the epistemologists nowadays that 
knowledge-how can be gradable4 . Linguistic evidence can be felicitous 
expressions as follows: 
 
(3a) As one of the best pro-wrestlers in the world, Bryan 
knows how to wrestle far better than Cena does. 
 
In addition, there are also different types of knowledge-wh, for example: 
 
(4.1) Amy knows where the Italian restaurant is. 
(4.2) Tommy knows why they eventually decided to dine 
at that Italian restaurant. 
(4.3) Jimmy knows what the name of the Italian 
restaurant is. 
 
Similar to those sorts of knowledge introduced above, the gradability of most 
types of knowledge-wh is commonly recognised as well (see, e.g., Sgaravatti 
& Zardini 2008)5. For instance, the following expressions are grammatical: 
 
(4.1a) Amy knows better where the Italian restaurant is 
than Jimmy, because Jimmy only knows that the 
restaurant is located in Vic Street, but Amy knows it is at 
101 Vic Street. 
 
(4.2a) Tommy knows why they eventually decided to 
dine in that Italian restaurant better than Amy does, 
because Tommy knows more details about how the 
decision was made. 
                                                          
4 Exceptions see Pavese (2017), where Pavese argues that knowledge-how, as well as 
knowledge-that, does not have degrees. 
5 It is worth noting that Stanley (2011) rejects the gradability of know-that on one hands, 
while on the other hand, he argues that know-wh can be reduced to know-that, the former of 
which is typically granted as gradable. Sgaravatti & Zardini (2008) take this as an 




However, whether the following expression is felicitous or not is more 
ambiguous: 
       
(4.3)??6Jimmy knows what the name of the Italian 
restaurant is better than Tommy does. 
 
A similar type of knowledge is knowledge-whether, whose gradability is also 
doubtful: 
 
 (4.4) Jeremy knows whether the name of that 
restaurant is Locanda De Gusti or not. 
 (4.4a)??Jeremy knows better whether the name of that 
restaurant is Locanda De Gusti or not than Tommy 
does7. 
 
In contrast, when it comes to the most-discussed type of knowledge in 
contemporary epistemology, viz, propositional knowledge (aka ‘knowledge-
that’), the orthodox view is seemingly unanimous that knowledge-that does 
not admit of degrees (see Stanley 2005, 2011; Dutant 2007; Ryle 1949; 
Dretske 1981; Pavese 2017; Sgaravatti & Zardini 2008; Crane 2012; etc.). 
This orthodox view is named epistemic absolutism (see Hetherington 2001). 
For absolutists, a proposition can neither be known less or more, nor better 
or worse. Knowing a proposition is an absolute yes-or-no affair rather than a 
                                                          
6 In this thesis, when reporting sentences as ungrammatical, I will use the amount of question marks 
to represent to which degree a sentence is infelicitous. That is, sentences starting with two question 
marks are more linguistically suspicious than sentences staring with one. Sentences preceded by 
three question marks are more clearly infelicitous than those preceded by two or one. 
7 Unless otherwise stated, linguistic judgments in this thesis are made largely on the basis of my own 
linguistic intuition. Admittedly, my intuition and judgments might not be agreed by all of the readers, 
however, this should not affect my main argument which does not hinge on people’s linguistic 
intuition. Here, these linguistic data are only used to help to set the stage for introducing the idea of 
epistemic absolutism and epistemic gradualism—these data do not play any substantial role in my 
main argument.  
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matter of degrees. Given absolutism, expressions such as (5.1a) and (5.2a) 
are untoward: 
 
(5.1) Mike knows that Trump won the 2016 US election. 
(5.2) Mike knows that the name of the victor of the 2016 
US election is Trump. 
(5.1a)???Mike knows that Trump won the 2016 US 
election better than James does8. 
(5.2a)???Mike knows that the name of the victor of the 
2016 US election is Trump better than James does. 
 
The platitude that propositional knowledge is absolute/ungradable seems can 
be used to explain why the gradability of some other sorts of knowledge is 
doubtful. For example, the infelicitousness of (5.2a) may partially explain the 
infelicitousness of (4.3b), as it is seemingly natural to interpret ‘S knows what 
the name of X is …’ in terms of ‘S knows that the name of X is …’ 
Analogously, as ‘S knows whether p or not’ can usually be interpreted as ‘S 
knows that p’ or ‘S knows that not-p’ (see Groenendijk & Stokhof 1982; 
Karttunen 1977; Hintikka 1976; Stanley 2011 ch.2; etc.), it seems no wonder 
that the gradability of knowledge-whether is sometimes as unacceptable as 
that of knowledge-that—just as shown by (4.4a) and (5.1a).  
 
This traditional view that propositional knowledge cannot come in degrees is 
what Hetherington refers to as epistemic absolutism: ‘Knowledge is absolute, 
in the sense that it is impossible for a person to have better, or to have 
worse, knowledge of a fact’ (Hetherington 2001: 3). The perspective of 
                                                          
8 These examples are inspired by similar cases provide by Jason Stanley, such as ‘John knows that 
Bush is president better than Mary does’ (2005: 40). Stanley reported that himself and every non-
philosopher informants that he asked found these sentences acceptable. Note that, here, I put three 
question marks in front of those utterances to indicate that they are clearly infelicitous in 
accordance with the absolutist orthodoxy. However, gradualists might argue that the oddness of 
these utterances can be reduced once we spell out the context in which there are sufficient 
evidential room for these utterances to be known better or worse (see Hetherington 2011: 212-213).   
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epistemic absolutism has been taken for granted by many epistemologists for 
a long period, for example, Sgaravatti & Zardini claim that: 
 
‘It’s a well-known fact that knowledge-wh enjoys some 
forms of gradability while knowledge-that plausibly does 
not.’ (Sgaravatti & Zardini 2008: 255)  
 
However, few philosophers have seriously developed systematic arguments 
for epistemic absolutism, which causes Hetherington to call absolutism a 
‘dogmatism’. Perhaps that is because absolutism has been taken to be too 
uncontroversial to be worth seriously defending. Nevertheless, claims or 
expressions supporting epistemic absolutism can be broadly found in the 
literature. For instance, when commenting on Michael Tye’s theory of 
‘knowledge by acquaintance’, Tim Crane remarked that:  
 
‘[K]nowing things in the ordinary sense admits of 
degrees. I know Michael Tye fairly well, but not as well 
as some other people do. Although I have been to 
Athens a few times, I do not know it as well as Tye 
does. This contrasts with propositional knowledge, 
which (on most conceptions) does not admit of 
degrees.’ (Crane 2012: 149) 
 
Crane distinguishes knowledge of things and propositional knowledge in 
terms of their gradability—knowledge of things/persons admits of degrees, 
while propositional knowledge does not. Similar opinions can be found in 
Carlotta Pavese’s remarks on Bertrand Russell’s theory of knowledge by 
acquaintance. According to Pavese (2017), this difference in gradability also 
constitutes the primary reason why Russell held that knowledge-by-
acquaintance cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge. Apart from 
these, Stanley (2005), Dutant (2007) both argued for epistemic absolutism 
from the aspect of linguistics.  
 
Apart from these recent remarks, the most well-known loci classici as regards 
epistemic absolutism are from Ryle (1949) and Dretske (1981). When 
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discussing the difference between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, Ryle 
argues that: 
 
‘We never speak of a person having partial knowledge 
of a fact or truth, save in the special sense of his having 
knowledge of a part of a body of facts or truths. A boy 
can be said to have partial knowledge of the counties of 
England, if he knows some of them and does not know 
others. But he could not be said to have incomplete 
knowledge of Sussex being an English county. Either he 
knows this fact or he does not know it. On the other 
hand, it is proper and normal to speak of a person 
knowing in part how to do something, i.e. of his having a 
particular capacity in a limited degree.’ (1949: 59) 
  
Ryle famously argues for anti-intellectualism—a view that knowledge-how 
cannot be exhaustedly reduced to knowledge-that. The quotation above 
shows that an important reason lending support to Ryle’s anti-intellectualist 
view is that knowledge-how has degrees while knowledge-that does not. Ryle 
does not explain much why propositional knowledge cannot have gradability 
in this quoted paragraph. The most salient reason that he mentions is that 
propositional knowledge cannot be partially known, and thereby a 
proposition/fact/truth cannot be known more or less, and therefore 
knowledge-that cannot be graded. It is not hard to find out that there is 
something subtly different hidden in Ryle’s understanding of gradability of 
knowledge-that. Cases introduced before conclude that propositional 
knowledge is ungradable because it seems infelicitous to say that ‘S1 knows 
better/worse that p than S2’, while Ryle concludes that propositional 
knowledge is ungradable because it seems infelicitous to say that ‘S1 knows 
more/less that p than S2’. This distinction between the better/worse sense 
and the more/less sense of gradability suggests that we ought to unpack 




Firstly, we can at least make a distinction between quantitative gradability 
and qualitative gradability. Pavese (2017) characterises ‘quantitative 
gradability’9 as follows: 
 
‘The phenomenon of quantitative gradability is the 
phenomenon whereby ascriptions of the form “S knows 
how to –” can be sensibly modified by so-called 
proportional modifiers such as “in part”, “for the most 
part”, “partly”, “partially”.’ (Pavese 2017: 5) 
 
Pavese then argues, in line with Ryle and numerous other epistemologists, 
that it is awkward to accept that knowledge-that admits of quantitative 
gradability. The idea is that it does not make sense to say something like ‘I 
know in part that Sussex is in England’ or ‘Jack knows partly that today is 
Friday’. Similarly, Dutant (2007) divides paradigmatic degree modifiers into 
two categories: quantitative modifiers (e.g., very/much/more than) and 
qualitative modifiers (e.g., good/well/better than). The measure of qualitative 
modifiers, according to Dutant, ‘is a degree of goodness’ (2007: 3). Dutant 
holds that ‘know-that’ can rarely be modified by quantitative modifiers, 
however, propositional knowledge attributions can be built with qualitative 
modifications properly. Moreover, in order to challenge Stanley’s conclusion 
that ‘know-that’ cannot occur with genuine qualitative comparatives, Dutant 
also lists many cases (see Dutant 2007: 7 & 25, appendix 8.4) where 
propositional knowledge attributions are genuinely10 and felicitously built with 
qualitative comparatives (e.g., ‘better-than’)11.  
 
                                                          
9 See also Berman (1987), Lahiri (1991; 2000), Beck & Sharvit (2002), and Williams (2000). 
Bierwisch (1989) also makes a similar distinction between dimensional and evaluative 
gradable adjectives. 
10 Stanley concedes that propositional knowledge attributions can sometimes occur with 
qualitative-comparatives in some idiomatic constructions such as ‘… knows that … better 
than anyone’. However, because ‘better than anyone’ is just an idiomatic construction, 
Stanley refuses to admit that comparative construction containing such an idiom can prove 
the genuine gradability of ‘knows’ (see Stanley 2005: 40). 
11 However, Dutant still refuses to admit that propositional knowledge can have qualitative 
gradability; his reasons will be introduced later. 
25 
 
By far, we can roughly differentiate at least two kinds of absolutism in terms 
of the quantitative/qualitative distinction: 
 
[Quantitative Epistemic Absolutism] 
Propositional knowledge is absolute, in the sense that a 
fact or truth cannot be known in part; one’s knowledge 
of a given proposition cannot be augmented; it is 
impossible for a person to have more, or to have less, 
knowledge of a fact. 
 
[Qualitative Epistemic Absolutism] 
Propositional knowledge is absolute, in the sense that a 
fact or truth cannot be known with higher quality; one’s 
state of knowing-that-p cannot be improved; it is 
impossible for a person to have better, or to have worse, 
knowledge of a fact. 
 
On the contrary, there can be two sorts of gradualism 
correspondingly: 
 
[Quantitative Epistemic Gradualism] 
Propositional knowledge is gradable, in the sense that a 
fact or truth can be known in part; one’s knowledge of a 
given proposition can be augmented; it is possible for a 
person to have more, or to have less, knowledge of a 
fact. 
 
[Qualitative Epistemic Gradualism] 
Propositional knowledge is gradable, in the sense that a 
fact or truth can be known with higher quality; one’s 
state of knowing-that-p can be improved; it is possible 
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for a person to have better, or to have worse, 
knowledge of a fact. 
 
It is worth noting that, the quantitative scale and the qualitative scale are not 
contradicting each other. One who accepts quantitative epistemic absolutism 
can also be committed to qualitative epistemic absolutism (likewise, one can 
endorse both quantitative and qualitative epistemic gradualism). Alternatively, 
one is permitted to defend quantitative absolutism meanwhile reject 
qualitative absolutism, and vice versa. 
 
Now, with the two distinctive sorts of absolutism in play, it is not hard to find 
that the absolutist view presented in Ryle’s remark is mainly a sort of 
quantitative epistemic absolutism. In contrast, Hetherington (2001) challenges 
the absolutist orthodoxy mainly along the qualitative scale. He clarifies that he 
discusses the absoluteness of knowledge-that in a particular sense—that is, 
‘the sense of its being impossible for a piece of knowledge to be better or 
worse qua knowledge, to be more or less clearly knowledge’ (2001: 6). Notice 
that, the ‘more or less’ in this quotation does not imply quantitative gradability, 
but is used to modify the ‘clearly’ after, viz, to modify the degree to which a 
piece of knowledge can qualify as knowledge. Accordingly, Hetherington 
urges us to embrace epistemic gradualism—a view that knowledge-that is 
gradable in the sense that we can have better or worse knowledge of a 
proposition. Hetherington argues that propositional knowledge can be graded 
in terms of the failability12 (see Hetherington 2001: 49). The more failable 
one’s knowledge that p is, the worse one knows that p. Given the close 
connection between failability and justificatory strength, a succinct corollary of 
Hetherington’s gradualism is that the weaker one’s justification for p is, the 
worse one knows that p. Following Hetherington, this thesis will focus on the 
qualitative gradability of knowledge-that. I will manage to develop a new 
                                                          
12 In brief, for Hetherington, ‘knowing failably’ is a broader concept than ‘knowing fallibly’ – 
the latter means that S knows that p but S’s belief that p could have been false, while the 
former means that S knows that p but S could have failed to do so. Chapter 3 will introduce 
this distinction in more detail. 
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qualitative gradualist account of knowledge and leave it open whether 
propositional knowledge is also quantitatively gradable13. 
 
After clarifying this, we can now move forward to Dretske’s frequently-cited 
remarks: 
 
‘When talking about people, places and topics (things 
rather than facts), it makes sense to say that one person 
knows something better than another—But factual 
knowledge, the knowledge that something is so, does 
not admit of such comparisons. If we both know that 
today is Friday, it makes no sense to say that you know 
this better than I. In this respect factual knowledge is 
absolute. It is like being pregnant: an all or nothing 
affair.’ (Dretske 1981: 363)  
 
Dretske agrees that there can be better or worse knowledge of a person, a 
place or a topic, but he denies that knowledge of a fact can be equally 
gradable. What is the essential difference between knowledge of a topic and 
knowledge of a fact that leads to such an asymmetry here? A possible 
explanation is that a fact is just a fact—an absolutely true fact. In light of this, 
there is no ambiguous gradient ramp between knowledge and not-
knowledge—the distinction is sharp and clear. Therefore, to know a fact is to 
know it absolutely, clearly and perfectly.  
  
In response, Hetherington comments that Dretske confuses the absoluteness 
of ‘the cut-off point/threshold between knowledge and not-knowledge’ with 
the absoluteness of ‘knowledge per se’. The distinction between these two 
kinds of absoluteness is made clear by Hetherington as he is committed to 
the former while rejecting the latter. Hetherington clarifies that:  
 
                                                          
13 It strikes me that quantitative gradualism is even more unpopular than qualitative 
gradualism for the majority of epistemologists. After all, it seems to be hard to conceive how 
a proposition can be known more or less. Besides, it is far from clear what it means by 
saying that one partially knows a proposition. Given that the extant literature mainly focus on 
discussions around the qualitative gradability of knowledge-that, the central domain of 
discourse of this thesis will also be limited to the qualitative scale.   
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‘In denying that knowledge need be absolute (as I will 
be doing in this chapter and beyond), I will not be 
denying that there is a cut-off point—and an absolute 
one at that—between knowing and not knowing.’ 
(Hetherington 2001: 6) 
 
Also, Hetherington argues that: 
 
‘We can be absolutists about the difference between 
knowing and not knowing, without our also having to 
deny that some knowledge that p can be better as 
knowledge than some other knowledge that p.’ (2001: 7) 
 
With these being said, Hetherington admits that he is committed to a form of 
local gradualism that consists of two views: 
 
‘(i) Knowledge is to be absolutely distinguished from 
whatever is not knowledge (whatever is external to 
knowledge). This is because there is an absolute cut-off 
point between knowing and not knowing, 
(ii) But within the category of knowing, non-absolutism is 
true. That is because it is possible that some cases of 
knowledge that p are better as knowledge that p, or 
more clearly knowledge that p, than other cases of 
knowledge that p.’ (2001: 7) 
 
Hetherington names view (i) as ‘external absolutism’ and calls view (ii) 
‘internal gradualism’. A central notion that defines the internal/external 
distinction is the ‘cut-off point’ between knowing and not knowing. This cut-off 
point is also interpreted as the threshold or boundary of knowledge (see 
Hetherington 2006; Hannon 2017; etc.). External absolutism is external in the 
sense that the threshold distinguishing knowledge from everything that is 
external to the category of knowledge is absolute. In contrast, internal 
gradualism is internal in the sense that beyond the threshold for knowledge, 
to wit, within the category of knowledge, an instance of knowledge cannot be 
better or worse than another instance. Accordingly, we can rephrase 





[Threshold Epistemic Absolutism] 
Propositional knowledge is absolute, in the sense that 
the threshold between knowledge and not-knowledge is 
absolute and clear. 
 
[Beyond-Threshold Epistemic Absolutism] 
Propositional knowledge is absolute, in the sense that 
even beyond the threshold (no matter being absolute or 
not) between knowledge and not-knowledge, knowledge 
cannot be better or worse. 14 
 
Threshold epistemic absolutism reflects an intuition that knowledge is 
absolute in terms of the absoluteness of its threshold. It is just like when 
saying ‘truth is absolute’, we mean that there is a clear cut-off point between 
truth and falsehood. A proposition is either true or false, there is no 
penumbral buffer zone between truth and falsehood. Similarly, ‘being 
pregnant’, ‘defeat’, ‘jump’ are all absolute terms in the same sense. Beyond-
threshold epistemic absolutism analyses the absoluteness of knowledge in a 
different sense, that is, once the standard of knowledge is met, nothing can 
contribute any more to an instance of knowledge’s being knowledge. It is 
analogous to say one’s death is absolute, as once one dies, he/she cannot 
‘die more’—being dead for a longer time does not contribute to the fact that 
one is dead. On the contrary, ‘jump’, albeit being of an absolute threshold, is 
not as much beyond-threshold-absolute as ‘die’, because the increase of 
height of leaping can make one’s jump a ‘higher jump’.   
 
Correspondingly, there are two sorts of gradualism: 
 
                                                          
14 Notice that, this threshold/beyond-threshold distinction assesses the gradability of 





[Threshold Epistemic Gradualism] 
Propositional knowledge is gradable, in the sense that 
the threshold between knowledge and not-knowledge is 
not absolute and clear. Instead, the distinction between 
knowledge and not-knowledge can be gradient. 
 
[Beyond-Threshold Epistemic Gradualism] 
Propositional knowledge is gradable, in the sense that 
beyond the threshold (no matter being absolute or not) 
between knowledge and not-knowledge, knowledge can 
be better or worse.15 
 
According to Hetherington’s interpretation, Dretske is just advocating a 
version of threshold epistemic absolutism, which is compatible with 
Hetherington’s own beyond-threshold epistemic gradualist view. Moreover, 
Hetherington does not plan to argue for threshold epistemic gradualism, 
because he is also a threshold absolutist just like Dretske.  
 
Let me further elaborate on what it means by saying that a threshold is 
‘absolute’ (we will revisit this issue and unpack this notion again in Chapter 
4). Admittedly, it seems to be too demanding to locate an absolutely clear 
cut-off point between any two concepts, and hence threshold epistemic 
gradualism might seem to be implausible in light of this. Furthermore, 
Hetherington does argue somewhere else that it is impossible to find out an 
exact threshold for knowledge that can answer the boundary problem of 
knowledge16 (see Hetherington 2006). This seems to contradict his 
commitment to threshold epistemic absolutism. It can even be argued that 
                                                          
15 Just like quantitative gradualism is compatible with qualitative gradualism (so is 
quantitative absolutism and qualitative absolutism), threshold epistemic gradualism is 
compatible with beyond-threshold gradualism. One can defend both threshold and beyond-
threshold epistemic gradualism – that is what I will do in this thesis. 
16 The boundary problem is ‘the epistemological problem of knowing what is the maximum 




the boundary of any concept is vague, thus so is knowledge. So is threshold 
gradualism advocating the gradability of knowledge in this trivial manner? No. 
Rather, I suggest that when rejecting the idea that knowledge has an 
absolute threshold, threshold epistemic gradualists ought to prove at least 
two things: 
  
(T1) There is not, and doesn’t need to be, a reductive 
analysis of knowledge that comes in the form of 
sufficient and necessary conditions (cf. Williamson’s 
anti-analysis17 stance). 
 
(T2) There is no absolute and non-arbitrary boundary for 
how a necessary component of propositional knowledge 
can be counted as good enough to constitute 
knowledge (e.g., there is no absolute cut-off point 
between a ‘firm-enough’ and a ‘not-firm-enough’ or a 
‘justified-enough’ and a ‘not-justified-enough’ belief for 
constituting knowledge). 
 
The aforementioned trivial understanding of the non-absoluteness of 
knowledge’s threshold mainly reflects the gist of (T2). Hetherington also 
argues for the non-absoluteness of knowledge in a similar sense. However, 
Hetherington’s rejection of (T1) makes him a threshold epistemic absolutist. 
As I will introduce in the third chapter of this thesis, Hetherington endorses 
that there is an absolute sufficient and necessary condition for knowledge, 
viz, true belief, which constitutes what he refers to as ‘minimal knowledge’. 
The denial of (T1) represents a typical understanding of ‘absolutism’ in 
philosophy. For example, moral absolutism is generally understood as a view 
holding that there is a fixed universal sufficient and necessary condition of 
being morally right (otherwise, morally wrong); truth absolutism generally 
means there is a fixed universal sufficient and necessary condition of being 
                                                          
17 In this thesis, I will mainly discuss reductive analysis of knowledge. 
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true (e.g., corresponding to the fact). Therefore, contra Hetherington, 
threshold gradualists should also take (T1) into consideration, as it is 
supposed to be an essential part of the debate between threshold gradualism 
and threshold absolutism. 
 
In contrast, beyond-threshold epistemic gradualism seems to be much less 
controversial than threshold epistemic gradualism, because it is widely 
granted that one’s epistemic support (justification, evidence, reliability, etc.) 
for one’s knowledge-that-p can be stronger than someone else’s. It seems to 
be a highly plausible idea that the better one’s knowledge-that-p is justified 
(even beyond the threshold), the better one’s knowledge is. Hetherington 
might also be aware of this, so he constructs an alleged dilemma for 
epistemic absolutists: 
 
‘1. Knowledge is absolute, non-gradational. That is, 
knowledge that p cannot be better or worse as knowledge 
that p. 
2. Each part of one’s justification for a belief which is 
knowledge is contributing somehow to the belief’s being 
knowledge, to how it is the knowledge it is.’ (Hetherington 
2001: 21) 
 
Hetherington argues that, due to the absolutist credo, absolutists have to 
accept 1, which must be done at the cost of denying 2. But denying 2 seems 
to be an unpalatable upshot for absolutists, given the intuitive plausibility of 2. 
Hetherington thus concludes that absolutism is subject to a dilemma.  
 
However, I suspect that absolutists may easily disarm this dilemma by 
accepting 2 and denying the incompatibility between 1 and 2, and thus 
embrace a somewhat ‘equivocal’ stance of the gradability of propositional 
knowledge. This attitude will be further discussed in the next section. In order 
to avoid this equivocal attitude, differing from Hetherington’s local gradualism 
(i.e., beyond-threshold gradualism + threshold absolutism), the version of 
gradualism that I plan to advocate in this thesis is a global one. That is to 
say, I propose to defend both threshold and beyond-threshold epistemic 
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gradualism and reject both threshold and beyond-threshold epistemic 
absolutism.  
 
1.2:   Literature on Gradualism 
 
Now we have analysed some representative remarks supporting epistemic 
absolutism in the current literature. Although absolutism is the orthodox 
understanding of propositional knowledge endorsed by most epistemologists, 
there are still voices from the minority of epistemologists arguing for 
gradualism explicitly or implicitly. For example, from the perspectives of 
contextualism, Unger (1975) argues that ‘know’ is analogous to context-
insensitive gradable adjectives18 that denote a limiting point on the relevant 
scale (e.g., ‘flat’ and ‘empty’), and Cohen (1999) holds that ‘know’ is 
analogous to context-sensitive gradable adjectives (e.g., ‘tall’ and ‘large’).   
 
Apart from that, Sosa sometimes displays his gradualist tendency on the 
basis of his theories of virtue epistemology. For instance, his notable cross-
kind hierarchical theory of knowledge distinguishing ‘animal knowledge’, 
‘reflective knowledge’ and ‘knowledge full well’ can be regarded as an (albeit 
somewhat peculiar) version of qualitative epistemic gradualism. When 
discussing the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective 
knowledge, Sosa wrote that ‘[k]nowledge seems a matter of degree in a 
variety of respects’ (2001: 194). In his 2007 book, Sosa emphasised again 
that ‘our distinction between two sorts of knowledge, the animal and the 
reflective. Any full account would need to register how these are matters of 
degree.’ 19 (Sosa 2007: 32) These snippets of quotations, of course, are not 
sufficient to reflect the position of Sosa’s view takes in the 
gradualism/absolutism debate. We will revisit Sosa’s theory and the relation 
between gradualism and virtue epistemology in Chapter 4. 
 
                                                          
18 See also Dutant (2007) for relevant discussions. 
19 Moreover, Sosa (p.c.) pointed out that Stanley’s linguistic objection to gradualism failed to 
notice that knowledge can be graded in terms of quality. 
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Influential as contextualism and virtue epistemology are, the most renown 
and prominent advocate of epistemic gradualism in the current literature, as 
aforementioned, is still Stephen Hetherington20. In his 2001 book Good 
Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology, Hetherington 
argues for the gradability of propositional knowledge explicitly by rejecting 
what he calls as ‘two dogmas of epistemology’, i.e., absolutism and 
justificationism. His interpretation of absolutism has been introduced before. 
And with regard to another ‘dogma’ he refers to as ‘justificationism’, which 
represents the doctrine that justification is necessary for knowledge, 
Hetherington argues that knowledge can be achieved without justification and 
contends that ‘minimalism’ (mere true belief can sometimes suffice to 
constitute the minimal knowledge) should be accepted instead. This anti-
justificationist view is perhaps even more radical and unorthodox than his 
gradualist position. While in another paper on gradualism which was 
published in 2005, Hetherington softens his position and tries to argue for 
gradualism without insisting his anti-justificationism stance so firmly. Instead, 
Hetherington (2005) turns to develop gradualism on the basis of his theory of 
how-knowledge21 (i.e., ‘knowledge of how it is that p’), which is heavily 
influenced and motivated by the ‘truthmaker theory’ of Armstrong (2004)22. 
This idea is further developed in his 2011 monograph ‘How to Know’ along 
with a ‘practicalist account’ of gradualism (we will return to these points in 
Chapter Three). It is argued that ‘knowing how it is that p’ is a sufficient and 
necessary condition of ‘knowing that p’, so how-knowledge that p is 
equivalent to knowledge that p. Since how-knowledge that p is gradable, 
knowledge that p ought to be deemed gradable as well. Both versions of 
                                                          
20 For a helpful summary of other explicit and potential proponents of anti-absolutism, see 
Hetherington (2011: 51-62). 
21 For Hetherington, ‘how-knowledge’ is slightly different from ‘knowledge-how’. The former 
basically means ‘knowing how it is that p’ rather than ‘knowing how to …’—although the two 
concepts are closely related. 
22 According the truthmaker theory, knowledge is ordinarily taken to be knowledge of a truth, 
and every truth has at least one truthmaker, i.e., ‘something in the world that necessitates 
that truth’s being true’ (Hetherington 2005: 137). Those most discerning truthmakers are 
‘minimal truthmakers’ for a truth. For example, minimal truthmakers for ‘Stephen is a male 
basketball player’ are ‘Stephen’s being male’ and ‘Stephen’s being a basketball player’. 
According to Hetherington (2005), one’s how-knowledge that p can be graded in terms of 
how many parts of (a) minimal truthmaker(s) for p are known by the subject.  
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Hetherington’s epistemic gradualism are closely related to his innovative and 
controversial theory about knowledge-how, which is known as ‘radical anti-
intellectualism’, or, in Hetherington’s own terminology, ‘practicalism’ (see 
Hetherington 2011). Intellectualism, succinctly put, holds that knowledge-how 
is a kind of knowledge-that, while Hetherington’s radical anti-intellectualism 
argues quite the opposite: knowledge-that is a kind of knowledge-how. For 
example, in his 2001 book, Hetherington writes that ‘Knowing-how can be 
better or worse; that is clear. Knowing-that is a kind of knowing-how; that is 
also true, even if less obviously so’ (2001: 12). The two versions of 
Hetherington’s epistemic gradualism will be further analysed in Chapter 3. At 
this stage, we can summarise some traits of his gradualist position:  
 
(i) Hetherington is a qualitative epistemic gradualist 
rather than a(n) (explicit) quantitative epistemic 
gradualist; 
  
(ii) Hetherington is a beyond-threshold epistemic 
gradualist, rather than a threshold epistemic gradualist;  
 
(iii) Hetherington used to be an anti-justificationist, while 
he seemed to have weakened his radical anti-
justificationist view later;  
 
(iv) Hetherington’s gradualism is closely connected to 
his theory of knowledge-how/how-knowledge.  
 
Correspondingly, the gradualism that I will propose in this thesis is alike to 
that of Hetherington in regard to (i). That is to say, I will be defending the 
qualitative epistemic gradualism rather than the quantitative one. However, 




Firstly, I will defend both beyond-threshold and threshold gradualism (in 
contrast to (ii));  
 
Secondly, I do not accept Hetherington’s anti-justificationism and would not 
develop my account of gradualism on the premise that justification is 
unnecessary for knowledge (in contrast to (iii)); 
 
Thirdly, in contrast to (iv), I do not accept Hetherington’s radical anti-
intellectualism and would develop my gradualism without appealing to any 
specific theory of knowledge-how or how-knowledge (in particular, I will 
neither conclude that knowledge-how can be exhaustively reduced to 
knowledge-that, nor that knowledge-that can be exhaustively reduced to 
knowledge-how).            
 
Now we have roughly gone through voices that support absolutism and those 
supporting gradualism in the current literature respectively. These can 
provide us with a brief sketch of the extant picture of debate around the 
gradability of propositional knowledge. Nevertheless, do people’s attitudes 
towards the current debate actually stand in such a sharp contrast? 
 
2. Minimal Gradualism and the Equivocal Intuition  
 
As stated before, those voices advocating gradualism are just the minority. 
Most epistemologists have never explicitly or implicitly argued for gradualism. 
Perhaps it is this impression that motivates Hetherington to describe 
absolutism as a commonly-granted ‘dogma’ and conclude that ‘the standard 
acceptance of knowledge-absolutism remains, for most epistemologists, an 
unshakeable assumption’ (2005:130). However, one phenomenon that he 
might overlook is: despite the rife intuition for absolutism, most 
epistemologists should at least readily be able to be in sympathy with (if their 
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sympathy has not been explicitly uttered23) ‘gradualism’ in some peculiar 
senses, e.g., an item of knowledge can be better justified than another one. 
For example, it was pointed out that:  
  
‘It is therefore rather uncontroversial that some items of 
knowledge can be better justified than others. And if one 
wants to say that knowledge that involves better 
justification is better knowledge, then that strikes me as 
rather benign. I do not see what exactly denying this 
would imply.’ (Feldman 2002: n.s.)  
 
This remark is echoed by Romy Jaster, who shares the impression that 
knowledge can be graded in a loose sense (e.g., in terms of the justificatory 
strength), but strictly speaking, ‘knows’ is not a gradable predicate:  
 
‘We can say that the property of being tall enough is 
satisfied to a higher degree the taller the subject is. And 
we can say that the property of being sufficiently flat is 
satisfied to a higher degree the flatter the subject is. In the 
same derived sense we can grade knowledge relations. 
We can say that they are realized to a higher degree the 
stronger the required epistemic position is. But we should 
keep in mind that this is just a very loose formulation of 
what is really claimed.’ (Jaster 2013: 320-321)  
 
Hetherington notes that most epistemologists take justification to be 
necessary for knowledge and thus reject the minimalism that he advocates. 
This is true. He also holds that opponents of minimalism deny that better 
justification yields better knowledge, and thus they would be unable to 
address the phenomenon of epistemic improvement. This point is called into 
question by Brower (2004):  
 
‘In any case, the core problem at the intuitive level is 
that epistemologists who reject minimalism may grant 
that knowledge can be better or worse from an 
epistemic perspective.’ (Brower 2004: 107) 
                                                          
23 This is understandable that few epistemologists have articulated their support for internal 
gradualism, as issues regarding the gradability of knowledge are seldom debated in the 
literature. Nevertheless, as we will see later, there are still some passages sympathetic to 




In presenting internal gradualism as unorthodox, Hetherington implies that 
absolutists are committed to an implausible view that the quality of one’s 
knowledge is fixed—it cannot be improved by better justification once one’s 
epistemic position starts counting as ‘knows’. In other words, one’s 
knowledge that p can only have one possible epistemic quality. However, it is 
unclear why absolutists have to share this commitment. In replying 
Hetherington’s criticism, Adam Leite delivers a similar point: 
 
‘Hetherington is wrong to charge me with sharing the 
skeptic’s commitment to “qualitative absolutism”, the 
view that “all possible instances of knowledge that p 
share only one possible epistemic quality ... as cases of 
knowledge that p” (p. [308]). For my purposes here (and 
in my original paper) I don’t have to share this 
commitment’. (Leite 2006: 317) 
 
In fact, I think absolutists have reasonable grounds to reject this commitment. 
They could accept that the quality of knowledge can be improved by better 
justification just like the quality of a ‘home run’ can be improved by, say, a 
larger distance the ball travels. Nonetheless, ‘hitting a home run’ is still an 
absolute yes-or-no affair, and so is ‘knowing’. Feldman, Jaster, Brower, and 
Leite are all sceptical about the idea that knowledge is ultimately a gradable 
concept. However, while sticking to their absolutist position, they are glad to 
admit that knowledge can be better or worse in what Hetherington calls the 
‘internal’ sense. Their somewhat hybrid and equivocal attitude displays a 
natural option for absolutists to swiftly evade Hetherington’s charge (i.e., that 
absolutism fails to accommodate the idea that each part of one’s justification 
contributes to one’s relevant knowledge, as introduced in section 1.1). The 
idea is, knowledge can be improved in the peculiar sense that better 
justification yields better knowledge, but knowledge itself is ultimately 
ungradable. Just as Feldman notes, it is unclear why absolutists have to 




Admittedly, not many philosophers have reported their attitudes towards the 
gradability of knowledge, especially towards the question of whether a piece 
of better-justified knowledge counts as a better piece of knowledge. So it 
might be improper to assert that epistemologists already accept internal 
gradualism. However, pace Hetherington, I think it will be reasonable to 
predict that Feldman’s (as well as Jaster’s, Brower’s, and Leite’s) attitude is 
representative. And thus internal gradualism, at least in a loose sense, might 
not be as unorthodox as Hetherington takes it. It would not be surprising if 
most people’s attitudes towards absolutism and gradualism turn out to be 
ambiguous, equivocal and, to some extent, inconsistent. That is because, as 
far as I can tell, most epistemologists more or less share intuitions as follows:  
 
(I1) One cannot properly say that X knows that p better 
than Y does. 
 
(I2) There is an absolute threshold for knowledge, 
especially, the condition of truth is absolute. 
 
(I3) One cannot know that p more or less. 
  
(I4) The strength of one’s epistemic support (evidence, 
justification, reliability, fallibility, etc.) for knowledge-that-
p can be gradable. 
 
Those intuitions could lead to different verdicts about whether knowledge is 
gradable. Accordingly, people might be committed to these claims: 
 
(I1’) In light of (I1), propositional knowledge is 
ungradable. 
 





(I3’) In light of (I3), propositional knowledge is 
ungradable. 
 
(I4’) In light of (I4), X’s knowledge-that-p can be better 
than Y’s (in that sense).   
 
Being committed to (I4’) means accepting a form of minimal gradualism in the 
weakest sense. However, accepting (I1’), (I2’) and (I3’) means being 
committed to some certain sorts of absolutism as well. This invites a 
seemingly self-conflicting attitude about the gradability of propositional 
knowledge. Analysing this phenomenon more intensively, we can find that 
people’s attitude can be further subdivided:  
 
[Attitude 1]  
Some people hold that the absolutism that they accept 
is incompatible with the minimal gradualism, so they do 
not even accept the minimal gradualism and turn to 
reject (I4’) or even (I4). I guess this group of 
epistemologists (if any) should be the minority. 
 
[Attitude 2]  
Alternatively, people may think (I4’) per se is not 
incompatible with absolutism. But they cannot tolerate 
the equivocation to the effect that ‘knowledge is 
gradable in this sense but ungradable in that sense’—
they are keen on a ‘final judgment’ of the gradability of 
knowledge. Therefore, even though they could accept 
the minimal gradualism, they would eventually deny 
gradualism and embrace absolutism on balance. For 
them, the minimal gradualism cannot suffice to derive a 
persuasive acceptance of epistemic gradualism 
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simpliciter. Especially, it cannot lead to the acceptance 
of threshold epistemic gradualism. People who hold this 
attitude might believe that linguistic evidence can reflect 
truths about the nature of epistemological concepts—
this linguistic methodology is broadly adopted in the 
discussion around contextualism and pragmatic 
encroachment. People who value the linguistic 
methodology much more than the significance and the 
force of persuasion of (I4’) may accept this attitude. In 
addition, as we will see in what follows, (I1), (I2), and 
(I3) each represents a mainstream motivation for 
embracing absolutism. People who value these three 
intuitions more than (I4) might also be committed to an 
overall absolutist stance. 
 
[Attitude 3]  
The third kind of attitude does not treat (I4’) as 
incompatible with absolutism, neither. People who hold 
this attitude do not even think it necessary to have a 
‘final judgment’ of whether knowledge-that is gradable 
or not. But they just accept the minimal sense of 
gradualism in virtue of (I4’)—beyond this, they are not 
open to any other form of gradualism. They are 
committed to (I1’), (I2’), and (I3’) as well. Hence they are 
actually arguing for an equivocal hybrid stance: they are 
absolutists—in most cases; but they are gradualists 
too—just in the minimal sense. 
 
Here is my stance: in this thesis, I will argue against all the three attitudes 
introduced above. Precisely put, firstly, I will certainly defend (I4’) and thereby 
the minimal gradualism. Moreover, I will argue that (I4) is not incompatible 




Secondly, I am in opposition to [Attitude 2] as I will not only defend the 
minimal gradualism. Instead, I will defend a stronger gradualism by rejecting 
(I1’), (I2’), and (I3’). I will reject (I1’) by proving that (I1) only holds in some 
languages, while in some other languages, it doesn’t. In addition, I will argue 
that the linguistic methodology is problematic so it cannot suffice to entail an 
overall-absolutism (see ch.2). I will reject (I2’) by directly rejecting (I2) by 
arguing that knowledge should be seen as a spectrum concept that does not 
have a threshold at all (see ch.4). Moreover, (I3’) will be denied by making 
the distinction between quantitative absolutism and qualitative absolutism. I 
will block the entailment from (I3) to (I3’) by cutting off the connection 
between quantitative and qualitative absolutism (see ch.2). 
 
Thirdly, as opposed to [Attitude 3], I will debunk the equivocal stance on the 
gradability of propositional knowledge. [Attitude 3] accepts merely the 
minimal gradualism, but I will propose a stronger form of gradualism. [Attitude 
3] grants (I1’) (I2’) and (I3’), while I reject all of the three claims. Accordingly, I 
will demonstrate that the equivocal stance is ill-grounded. 
 
Now it should be clear in what sense I am going to argue for gradualism and 
against absolutism. As we have noted before, absolutism has been seen as 
the orthodoxy for a long time. So why is absolutism so appealing? What are 
motivations for accepting absolutism? The following section will provide three 
representative arguments for epistemic absolutism. 
 
3. Arguments for Epistemic Absolutism 
 
The idea that knowledge-that is ungradable is deeply entrenched in standard 
epistemological thinking. Nevertheless, few philosophers have seriously 
developed systematic arguments for epistemic absolutism, which causes 
Hetherington to call absolutism a ‘dogmatism’. Although there are few 
systematic arguments for absolutism in the history of epistemology, which 
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makes absolutism dogmatic to some extent, some motivations for absolutism 
can still be summarised or conceived. Here, three typical ways to argue for 
epistemic absolutism will be given.  
 
3.1: Argument from Linguistic Evidence 
 
The most straightforward motivation for people to reject gradualism might be 
various linguistic evidence in our ordinary language revealing the oddness of 
using ‘know’ as a gradable verb, just like what is shown at the beginning of 
this chapter. Those linguistic data displayed before have to some extent 
revealed that epistemic gradualism goes against our linguistic intuition (at 
least in English). Hetherington (2001) starts his defence of gradualism by 
listing several expressions involving gradable uses of ‘knows that’ that he 
takes to be consistent. For example: 
 
‘I know very well that I have hands; I know less well that 
I have a brain. (A neurosurgeon could know much better 
than I do that I have a brain. I do not want such good 
knowledge of my having a brain!)’ 
‘I know that I feel pain. I know that you do, too. But I 
know better that I do than that you do—whereas you 
know better that you do than that I do!’ 
‘I know fairly well that the earth is round, although many 
other people know this much better than I do.’ (2001: 1-
2) 
 
Hetherington argues that these gradable uses of ‘know that’ can serve as 
counterevidence to the linguistic support for absolutism. To summarise, these 
expressions involve two indicators of gradability: degree modifiers such as 
‘very well’ or ‘fairly well’, and comparative constructions such as ‘know better 
that’ or ‘know less well that’. Although Hetherington’s linguistic objection to 
absolutism barely received direct challenges, we can still find competing 
arguments in the literature which could be seen as indirect but unneglectable 
replies to him on behalf of absolutists. In what follows, I will introduce two 
linguistic arguments for absolutism from Stanley (2005) and Dutant (2007) 
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respectively, and illustrate how these arguments can threaten Hetherington’s 
alleged linguistic counterexamples. 
 
Jason Stanley 
In the second chapter of his 2005 book, Stanley famously argued that 
knowledge ascription is not gradable. By comparing the uses of ‘knows’ in 
our daily language that those of other paradigmatic gradable adjectives or 
verbs (e.g., ‘tall’ ‘flat’ and ‘like’ ‘regret’), Stanley concluded that ‘knows’ 
cannot pass the two linguistic tests for being a gradable predicate: 1) 
allowing for degree modifiers like ‘very’ and ‘really’; 2) being conceptually 
related to felicitous comparative constructions. Although the opponents that 
Stanley aimed to defeat were contextualists such as Cohen and DeRose, it is 
noteworthy that the way Stanley argued for absolutism was exactly 
diametrically opposed to Hetherington’s defence of gradualism.  
 
Firstly, the degree modifiers test. As Hetherington (2001) points out, there 
are prima facie consistent statements like ‘John knows very well that Trump 
is the president’, which apparently indicates that ‘knows’ allow for modifiers. 
Stanley denies that the phrase ‘very well’ here is modifying the knowledge 
relation. The idea is, if it is ‘knows’ that is felicitously modified by ‘very well’, 
then the statement’s negation should also be felicitous. However, by 
comparing expressions like ‘John does not know very well that Trump is 
president’ with expressions like ‘John does not like Trump very much’, 
Stanley argues that while the latter sounds natural, the former turns out to be 
untoward. This indicates that ‘knows’ significantly differs from typical 
gradable predicates such as ‘likes’. Stanley thus concludes that the phrase 
‘very much’ is not a way to modify ‘knows that’, but rather a pragmatic 
indicator similar to its occurrence in sentences like ‘2 is very much an even 
number’ (2005: 38). In addition to ‘very well’, modifiers such as ‘really’ are 
also examined by Stanley. For contextualists, it seems to be natural to utter 
claims like ‘I guess I don’t really know that the bank is open’, where ‘know’ 
naturally occurs with ‘really’. Stanley rejects these prima facie cases for 
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gradualism by arguing that the negations of modified knowledge ascriptions 
cannot consistently be conjoined with assertions of the unmodified forms. For 
example, it seems self-conflicting to say that ‘S knows that p, but does not 
really know that p’. On the contrary, it is fairly consistent to say ‘S is tall, but 
not really tall’ (see 2005: 37). Stanley’s diagnosis of this asymmetry is 
straightforward: ‘tall’ is gradable, while ‘knows’ is not. The use of ‘really’ in 
knowledge ascriptions, for Stanley, is just a hedge, of which the linguistic 
function ‘is to comment on the appropriateness of asserting the embedded 
sentence … in so using “really”, one concedes the infelicity of asserting that 
one knows the proposition in question.’ (Stanley 2005: 46) 
 
When it comes to the test of comparative constructions, Stanley also denies 
that ‘knows’ can naturally occur with comparative constructions. Stanley does 
not agree that idiomatic constructions such as ‘S knows that p better than 
anyone’ would suffice to serve as proof that knowledge ascriptions are 
genuinely gradable (see Stanley 2005: 40). Rather, he argues that sentences 
like ‘That broccoli is low fat is better known than that broccoli prevents 
cancer’ (ibid: 41) does not genuinely show that ‘knows’ can be conceptually 
related to a qualitative comparative construction, because the use of ‘better 
known’ in this sentence does not imply that the fact that broccoli is known in 
a better way or with better justification, but just that the fact is known by more 
people. This diagnosis can be supported by the oddness of the following 
statement: ‘It is well known that p, and less well known that q, but more 
people know that q than know that p.’ (2005: 42) If it is only the amount of 
‘knowers’ that is put into comparison, then those comparative constructions 
involving ‘knows that’ neither show that knowledge-that is qualitatively 
gradable, nor prove it to be quantitatively gradable.  
 
Julien Dutant 
Another representative argument for absolutism from linguistic evidence is 
given by Julien Dutant, who starts his argument with some objections to 
Stanley. Following Stanley, Dutant (2007) firstly examines the gradability of 
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‘knows’ in terms of the two linguistic criteria for being gradable predicates, 
namely, ‘degree modifiers and comparative constructions’. Stanley concludes 
that ‘knows’ cannot pass the test of degree modifiers, while Dutant objects 
that there are natural statements where ‘knows’ is genuinely modified by 
degree modifiers24. For example: 
 
‘a. Tim knows well that we must have no illusions that 
somehow the danger has passed. (Dick Cheney)  
b. But Chirac knows well that, while times change, an 
unchanging rule of politics is this: you say whatever you 
have to say to get elected. (International Herald 
Tribune)  
c. And he knows very well that it requires work to get 
past old grievances. (GW Bush)’ (2007: 5) 
 
Dutant argues that the uses of ‘well/very well’ in these statements should not 
be understood as pragmatic indicators that confirm that the subject knows. 
Instead, they do imply that the subject’s knowledge enjoys higher quality. In 
response to Stanley’s criticism that those prima facie felicitous modified 
knowledge ascriptions would turn out to be awkward once they are negated, 
Dutant points out that the same alleged problem also applies to paradigmatic 
gradable predicates, such as ‘shows’ and ‘sees’25. For instance: 
 
‘a. You see very well that he is lying. 
b. ?You do not see very well that he is lying.  
a. The results show very well that the company fares 
better. 
                                                          
24 Hetherington (2011 §5.13) provides a different response to Stanley’s objection on the basis of his 
practicalism, i.e., an account of knowledge that knowledge is essentially a kind of ability rather than 
a kind of belief. In response to Stanley’s test of degree modifier, Hetherington concedes that ‘very 
much’ is not a way to modify the knowledge relation, but he insists that modifiers like ‘very well’ can 
understandably and genuinely modify ‘knows’ as long as we understand knowledge as a kind of 
ability. 
25 Hetherington (2011 §5.13) advocates a more steadfast reply regarding this problem of negation. 
He argues that we do understand utterances such as ‘He knows, but not as well as he should, that he 
is now a man.’ That utterance can make sense as it is conceivable that ‘Maybe he has enough 
evidence and an unconfident belief for the knowledge; yet he could easily permit his lack of 
confidence to unseat his belief if even slight counter-evidence appears’ (2011: 210). Even though I 
also appreciate Hetherington’s argument, I think Dutant’s reply might be more undercutting than 
Hetherington’s, as it relies less on the readers’ linguistic intuition. 
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b. ?The results show very well that the company fares 
better.’ (2007: 9-10) 
 
Therefore, the oddness of negations of ‘knows well that’ does not suffice to 
disprove the gradability of ‘knows’. In summary, it is unfair to claim that 
‘knows’ does not allow for degree modifiers because of linguistic data. 
 
As for the test of comparative constructions, Dutant provides, contra Stanley, 
many cases (see Dutant 2007: 7 & 25) where ‘knows-that’ constructions can 
be genuinely and felicitously built with qualitative comparatives. For example: 
 
‘(17) Myers knows better than Mr. Kennedy that our 
military will have ‘the will to win.’ (Letter to the Washington 
Times) 
(18) It works, but Julie knows better than Sarah that she 
cannot let Frank off the hook. (Alan C. Shaw, MIT Prof.) 
(19) Mike Matthews knows even better than Norton that 
durability is the name of the game for the lefty reliever. 
(Cincinnati Post)’ (2007: 7)26 
 
For Dutant, it seems that the two linguistic tests cannot constitute reasons for 
denying the gradability of knows, and thus he carves out a new way of 
defending absolutism. Drawing on Kennedy and McNally (2005), Dutant 
employs the so-called ‘two-scales account’ of quantitative/qualitative 
modifiers to lend support to absolutism. According to the two-scales account, 
the scale over which ‘know well/better’ (qualitative degree modifications of 
‘know’) constructions are evaluated is orthogonal to the scale over which 
‘know much/a lot’ (quantitative degree modifications of ‘know’) constructions 
                                                          
26 Hetherington (2011 §5.13) adopts a similar strategy to address Stanley’s test of comparative 
constructions. That is, Hetherington argues that there are linguistically acceptable utterances 
involving ‘knows better than’ constructions as long as there is evidential room for one to know better 
or worse, for example, ‘John knows better that he is in pain than Mary does’ (2011: 212) and ‘That 
broccoli is a vegetable is better known (by all who do know it) than is its being low in fat (by all who 
know this)’ (2011: 213). Both Hetherington’s reply and Dutant’s reply have their own merits. 
Dutant’s objection is appreciable as it quotes real English expressions from authoritative sources. 
Hetherington’s argument is helpful in the sense that it explains more clearly why some knows-
relevant comparative constructions are linguistically acceptable while some are seemingly less 
felicitous—the difference lies in whether the utterance itself involve sufficient conceivable evidential 
room for one to know the proposition in question better or worse. 
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are evaluated. Although Dutant discovers that ‘knows’ can be modified by 
genuine qualitative degree modifiers like ‘well’, it was argued that qualitative 
modifications of ‘know that’ does not actually denote degrees of knowledge. 
His argument goes as follows: 
 
‘Know well that’ constructions do have degrees, but the problem is whether 
this output of the well-modification, qua a new gradable predicate, operates 
on the same scale as the original unmodified ‘know that’ construction. For 
Dutant, the way in which ‘know’ is modified by ‘well’ is analogous to the way 
in which ‘written’ is modified by ‘well’. Dutant argues that ‘written’ itself is 
associated with the quantitative scale and has denoted a maximal point of 
that scale. The idea is, when one says that ‘the article is written’, one means 
that the article is completely written—if the article is just half-written, it is not 
genuinely written. Because the unmodified ‘written’ itself has already denoted 
the maximal endpoint of the quantitative scale, the ‘well written’ modification 
cannot be understood as denoting a higher degree along the same scale. 
That is to say, the well-modification can only operate on the qualitative scale, 
which is orthogonal to the scale which the unmodified ‘written’ is associated 
with. Call this the two-scales argument. Dutant then applies the same 
argument to ‘know’. Accordingly, it is concluded that the scale over which 
‘know well that’ is evaluated is orthogonal to (and thus different from) the 
scale over which the unmodified ‘know that’ is evaluated. Now that when we 
claim that ‘S knows well that p’, we mean that S’s knowledge is of high 
quality, it seems that the well-modification of ‘know’ is corresponding to the 
qualitative scale. Given the two-scales account, the relevant scale over which 
the unmodified ‘know that’ construction is evaluated must be orthogonal to 
that of its well-modification. Therefore, if ‘know that’ can be graded, then it 
can only be graded along the quantitative scale. However, because ‘know 
that’ cannot felicitously occur with quantitative degree modifications—for 
example, it is awkward to say ‘Bob knows a lot/much that the city is unsafe’ 
(Dutant 2007:12)—‘know that’ cannot be properly evaluated along the 




In summary, according to Dutant, ‘know that’ is not evaluated along the 
qualitative scale, and cannot be felicitously evaluated along the quantitative 
scale, therefore, ‘know that’ cannot be graded along any scale. So, if 
knowledge-that does not admit of degrees, then why are some ‘know well 
that’ modifications felicitous? Dutant’s explanation is, their apparent 
felicitousness comes from the widely-accepted gradability of justification—the 
‘know well that’ modification only denotes degrees of justification rather than 
degrees of knowledge. 
 
3.2: Argument from Object 
 
The second form of argument for absolutism might be motivated by the well-
known T-schema, i.e., ‘(for all p) <p> is true iff p’ (see Båve 2013), that is, a 
proposition p is true if and only if p. Therefore, asserting a proposition p is 
equivalent to asserting that p is true. For example, to say that ‘snow is white’ 
equals to say that “‘snow is white’ is true” (see Ramsey 1927; Ayer 1935; 
Quine 1970; etc.). Trading on this intuitively appealing view, it seems natural 
to accordingly draw a conclusion as follows:  
 
[Equivalence Thesis of Knowledge] 
Because the proposition that p is equivalent to ‘p is 
true’, knowing that p is equivalent to knowing that p is 
true.  
 
The equivalence thesis of knowledge (hereafter, ETK) seems to make prima 
facie sense, if the T-schema is acceptable—the thesis just involves a simple 
substitution given that p and ‘p is true’ are mutual-substitutable. According to 
ETK, to know that snow is white is to know that ‘snow is white’ is true; to 
know that Trump is the president equals to know that ‘Trump is the president’ 
is true. With this equivalence relation in play, it is seemingly smooth to derive 
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that to know a proposition is to know the truth value of that proposition. That 
is to say: 
 
[Object of Knowledge Thesis27] 
The object of a piece of proposition knowledge is the 
truth of that proposition. 
 
Taking one step further, one can argue that to have a better knowledge of a 
proposition is to have better knowledge of the truth value of that proposition 
on the basis of OKT. Absolutists can then argue that, however, the fact that 
one proposition is true is absolute. If a proposition is true, it is completely and 
perfectly true—the cut-off point between a true proposition and a false 
proposition is absolute and clear, no true proposition is ‘truer’ than another 
proposition. Therefore, knowing that Trump is the president requires nothing 
more than to know the truth of the fact that Trump is the president. Once this 
condition (knowing that ‘Trump is the president’ is true) is met, any further 
justification or any more evidence cannot or any more solid belief toward that 
proposition cannot contribute more to the truth of the fact that Trump is the 
president. Even working in the White House cannot improve your knowledge 
that Trump is the president is true, if you have already known that Trump won 
the US selection by reading newspapers before you enter the White House 
and work with President Trump. The truth of ‘Trump is the president’ has 
already be known by you, the threshold has already been crossed. The fact 
that ‘Trump is the president’ is perfect as a fact—if it is true, then it is 
perfectly true. Therefore the knowledge of that fact, once achieved, is perfect 
as a piece of knowledge of that fact—no room for improvement, just absolute 
and perfect knowledge. In light of this, propositional knowledge is absolute. 
 
To clarify the schema of this form of argument for absolutism, the argument 
can be summarised as follows: 
 
                                                          
27 Abbr., OKT. 
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[The Argument from Object] 
(AO1) Asserting a proposition p is equivalent to 
asserting that ‘p is true’, therefore knowing that p is 
equivalent to knowing that p is true. (ETK) 
(AO2) To know a proposition is to know the truth of that 
proposition.  (OKT) 
(AO3) The truth of a proposition is absolute. 
(AOC) Knowledge of a proposition is absolute.    
 
This Argument from Object captures the sense of what Hetherington 
(2005) calls as ‘the strongest form of defence’ for epistemic 
absolutism:  
 
‘To know that p is to know the truth of the proposition p; 
and you cannot alter, even slightly, the object of that 
knowledge without wholly deleting the knowledge that p. 
(Either you lose knowledge altogether, or you replace 
knowledge that p with knowledge that q, where q ≠ p.) 
Knowing that p is an all-or-nothing state of affairs. If any 
different component of the knowledge that p (such as 
the justification) is altered, even by being improved, 
again that particular piece of knowledge that p is no 
more. At best, you gain a new instance of knowledge 
that p28… Contrast knowing that p with knowing a 
person, say. There can be better or worse knowledge of 
a person—because that kind of object of knowledge has 
more or less of itself being known at a given time.’ 
(Hetherington 2005: 148) 
 
                                                          
28 Surely, there is a trivial understanding of Hetherington’s ‘If any different component of the 
knowledge that p (such as the justification) is altered, even by being improved, again that 
particular piece of knowledge that p is no more. At best, you gain a new instance of 
knowledge that p’, which interprets this quotation as saying that once an instance of 
knowledge-that-p is improved, it is no longer the same original instance of knowledge-that-p 
-- simply because it becomes a better instance of knowledge-that-p! This interpretation is too 
trivial to support absolutism, and seems endorse that there can be ‘better knowledge that p’ 
(which is just what gradualism aims to urge), but just argues that it is not the same instance 
of knowledge anymore (certainly, every improved item is not exactly the same item in this 
sense). In addition, this reasoning seems to apply to knowledge of person as well. It makes 
perfect sense to argue that Mary’s improved knowledge of John is not her original knowledge 
of John just because it is improved. If that is the case, this would fail to retain the disanalogy 
between knowledge of proposition and knowledge of person that Hetherington presented in 
that cited paragraph. Therefore, I would not discuss this trivial interpretation here.      
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While conceiving such a defence, Hetherington emphasises that it might be 
argued that the object of knowledge-that-p is the truth of the given 
proposition p. This object cannot be more or less known or known in part, 
which is different from the object of knowledge of a person (i.e., that person 
per se), because a person can be known more or less at a given time. 
Likewise, this object cannot be altered or improved without changing the 
original instance of knowledge-that-p into an instance of knowledge of 
another proposition q, because if more evidence of p is gained, then the 
subject just gains a new piece of knowledge of the new evidence. For 
example, it might be suggested that one’s knowledge that ‘Trump is the 
president’ can be improved by gaining more evidence proving that fact, e.g., 
by seeing Trump giving a presidential speech in the television. However, 
according to the Argument from Object, seeing Trump giving a presidential 
speech in the television does not improve your knowledge of the truth of 
‘Trump is the president’, instead, it at best just provides with a new piece of 
knowledge of a new proposition that ‘Trump is giving a presidential speech in 
the television’. The truth of ‘Trump is the president’ cannot be improved by 
the fact that ‘Trump is giving a presidential speech in the television’. 
 
This form of argument for absolutism can be utilised to defend both 
quantitative epistemic absolutism and qualitative epistemic absolutism. On 
one hand, it can be argued that this argument capture perfectly the sense, as 
what Ryle’s remark conveys, that a subject ‘could not be said to have 
incomplete knowledge of Sussex being an English county. Either he knows 
this fact or he does not know it.’ (Ryle 1949: 59) Because the truth of the fact 
that ‘Sussex is an English county’ cannot be known more or less or in part—if 
it is known, it is known completely and perfectly—then according to the 
argument from truth value, the knowledge of Sussex being an English county 
cannot be quantitatively gradable. On the other hand, it can be interpreted 
that the truth of a proposition is absolute means that a truth cannot be 
qualitatively better than another truth in terms of qualifying as a truth. This 
can explain what Dretske said that ‘factual knowledge is absolute. It is like 
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being pregnant: an all or nothing affair’ (1981: 363). The truth of a proposition 
is an all or nothing affair—the threshold is clear-cut and absolute. Once the 
threshold is crossed, every truth is equal qua a truth. Neither more evidence 
nor better justification can improve the truth and thereby the corresponding 
factual knowledge. In that propositional knowledge is not qualitatively 
gradable.  
 
In addition, it seems that absolutists can trade on this argument to explain the 
linguistic evidence supporting absolutism. It can be argued that when 
asserting that someone knows that p, we are in fact asserting that he or she 
knows that p is true. Accordingly, when evaluating one’s knowledge of a 
certain proposition, we are actually evaluating her knowledge of the object of 
that instance of knowledge-that-p. The oddness of asserting ‘S knows that p 
better than another person’ can be explained by the oddness of asserting ‘the 
truth of p is better than the truth of q’ as the truth of p is the object of 
knowledge-that-p. Those prima facie linguistic cases for epistemic 
gradualism can then be explained as just cases where the object of the 
original instance of knowledge is alerted. For example, ‘Myers knows better 
than Mr. Kennedy that our military will have ‘the will to win’’ can be explained 
as just implies that Myers knows more relevant facts than Mr. Kennedy about 
the fact that the military has the will to win, but these relevant facts just entitle 
Myers of more knowledge of relevant evidence, rather than genuinely make 
Myers’ knowledge of the fact ‘our military will have ‘the will to win’’ a better 
instance of knowledge than Mr. Kennedy’s. The linguistic explanation derived 
from the Argument of Object is different from and even incompatible with 
Dutant’s. Dutant holds that ‘S knows well / better that p if and only if one 
knows that p on the basis of a good number of / more propositions’ (Dutant 
2007: 16), while the Argument from Object will argue that by knowing a good 
number of / more propositions, one just alerts the object her original 
knowledge-that-p, rather than knows better that p. In addition, Dutant wrote 
that ‘Working in the White House does not improve one’s knowledge that 
G.W. Bush is president. By contrast, having been a women basketball coach 
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for twenty years improves one’s knowledge of the fact that women basketball 
has come a long way’ (2007: 8). That is to say, Dutant endorses that 
sometimes a certain instance of knowledge-that-p can be improved by 
gaining more supporting fact.   
 
 
3.3: Argument from Contextualism  
 
The last motivation for accepting epistemic absolutism that I want to 
introduce is more like an impression or an induction rather than a rigid 
argument. This impression arises from the phenomenon that debates around 
epistemic gradualism and absolutism are always relevant to (perhaps 
originate from) the debate around contextualism and anti-contextualism. 
Especially in virtue of the wide influence of Stanley’s discussion about 
gradualism, people may be inclined to combine gradualism with 
contextualism, and believe that by rejecting gradualism, contextualism can 
thereby be undermined. It is thus natural for opponents of contextualism to 
be averse to gradualism. One may worry that if gradualism cannot be 
independent of contextualism, especially if gradualism turns out to be rooted 
in contextualism, then because contextualism is implausible, gradualism 
should thus be rejected. This worry is reasonable, especially when taking the 
(T1) thesis of threshold epistemic gradualism into consideration—denying 
that there is a fixed ungradable standard of knowledge sounds extremely 
alike to a contextualist claim.  
 
The argument can be formulated in a form like this: 
 
[Argument from Contextualism] 
(AC1) Epistemic gradualism is based on epistemic 
contextualism. 
(AC2) Epistemic contextualism is wrong. 




Advocates of contextualism would not trade on this argument to reject 
gradualism, because they would deny (AC2). However, for those people who 
dislikes contextualism and finds that in previous discussion around 
gradualism, ‘knows’ is always taken to be analogous to context-sensitive 
adjectives like ‘talk’, ‘flat’ and ‘large’ (in order to support contextualism), it is 
natural for them to inductively conclude that (AC1), and thus rejects 
gradualism. So gradualists are required either to defend contextualism (to 
disprove (AC2)), or to prove that epistemic gradualism can be motivated and 
developed independently of contextualism (to falsify (AC1)). In this thesis, I 
will take the latter approach, i.e., to reject (AC1), by displaying how 
gradualism can be constructed without thereby being committed to 
contextualism. It will also be argued that the debate about 
gradualism/absolutism should not be a sub-battlefield of the debate around 
contextualism—the debate has its sui generis theoretical value.  
   
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has introduced two conflicting views on the gradability of 
propositional knowledge, viz, epistemic absolutism and epistemic gradualism. 
Different forms of epistemic gradualism have been characterised, and I have 
clarified the form of gradualism that this thesis aims to defend. Three main 
arguments for epistemic absolutism have been introduced. In the next 
chapter, I will argue against all the three forms of argument for epistemic 
absolutism introduced above respectively. It will be concluded in that chapter 
that there is no plausible reason to accept epistemic absolutism. Now that 
absolutism is ill-grounded, it should do no harm to turn to reassess 








































Chapter Two: Why Absolutism is Ill-Grounded 
 
Abstract: This chapter purports to demonstrate that epistemic 
absolutism is not as well supported by arguments as the orthodoxy has 
it. The first section will debunk the linguistic argument for absolutism, 
which appeals to the alleged fact that we usually do not use ‘knows’ as 
a gradable predicate in the ordinary language. Drawing on 
Hetherington’s criticism of absolutism, I will develop a more thorough 
objection to the linguistic argument for absolutism. My objection 
consists of two parts. As Stanley and Dutant, on absolutists’ behalf, 
have put forward two rejoinders to Hetherington’s original objection, 
the first part of my objection will focus on refuting the two rejoinders 
respectively. After that, the second part of my objection will propose 
three general strategies that gradualists can take to reject all forms of 
linguistic argument for absolutism. I will demonstrate that: 1) 
gradualism can also provide counterevidence supporting the 
gradability of knowledge-that in the English language; 2) non-English 
linguistic data can also lend support to gradualism; 3) the linguistic 
argument for absolutism is premised on a linguistic methodology that is 
untenable because of the gap between an epistemic concept’s 
linguistic uses and its conceptual nature. The second section puts 
weight on the argument from object. I will reject one essential premise 
of this argument, to wit, ‘to know that p is to know that p is true’. 
Besides, it will be argued that the absoluteness of knowledge’s object 
cannot entail the absoluteness of knowledge per se. Finally, the third 
section will briefly show how gradualism can be constructed without 
appealing to contextualism. The conclusion of this chapter is: epistemic 
absolutism is ill-grounded. 
 
 
1. Objections to the Argument from Linguistic Evidence 
 




The most influential and straightforward reason to reject gradualism might be 
the linguistic evidence that ‘knows’ seems not to be a gradable verb in 
English. In the first chapter, I have outlined the two most influential and 
systematic linguistic arguments for absolutism. To reject absolutism, 
gradualists have to refute the two arguments put forward by Stanley and 
Dutant. A (somewhat) good news for gradualists is that Dutant has provided 
some cogent criticisms to Stanley which I will adopt at this stage. As we have 
noted in the last chapter, to sum up, Dutant’s objections consist of two parts. 
First, Stanley neglects that there are also cases where ‘know that’ can be 
felicitously modified by degree modifiers and be built with comparative 
constructions. Second, Stanley argues that, unlike paradigmatic gradable 
terms such as ‘regrets’, ‘know well that’ can hardly be infelicitously negated. 
Notwithstanding, he ignores that there are also paradigmatic gradable verbs 
like ‘shows’ and ‘sees’ whose negation or question constructions are 
infelicitous, hence the oddness of negation and question construction of 
‘know well that’ fails to prove its ungradability.  
 
So, now there remains Dutant’s own argument. Dutant’s argument for 
absolutism essentially hinges on a quickly drawn analogy between ‘know 
that’ and ‘written’. It is presupposed that the two-scales account, which is 
alleged to be applicable to ‘written’, also holds for ‘know that’. However, it is 
not explained why ‘know that’ is analogous to ‘written’ rather than some 
gradable verbs such as ‘like’ or ‘enjoy’. This makes Dutant’s argument 
suspicious as it seems that he implicitly presumes, rather than proves, that 
‘knows’ is ungradable. Apart from this, the analogy between ‘know that’ and 
‘written’ is improper as there is a significant asymmetry between the two 
phrases such that the two-scales argument, which is applicable to the latter, 
is inapplicable to the former. Dutant’s two-scales argument, which argues 
that the scales along which ‘well written’ and ‘written’ are measured have to 




(P1) ‘Written’ has denoted the maximal point of the quantitative 
scale.  
(P2) ‘Written’ can be evaluated among the quantitative scale.  
 
Note that, (P1) is premised on (P2)—after all, if a term cannot be evaluated 
along the quantitative scale, how can it denote the maximal point of the 
quantitative scale? ‘Written’ can be evaluated along the quantitative scale 
because it is natural to say ‘Bob has written a lot of papers’ (although for 
every single paper that is written, it is completely written). Therefore, if ‘know 
that’ is sufficiently analogous to ‘written’ such that the same two-scales 
argument also applies to ‘know that’, then ‘know that’ should also meets two 
conditions:  
 
(P1*) ‘Know that’ has denoted the maximal point of the 
quantitative scale.  
(P2*) ‘Know that’ can be evaluated among the quantitative 
scale.  
 
However, this is not true. Just as Dutant admits, ‘know that’ does not admit of 
quantitative degrees, so it is also inconsistent to claim that ‘know that’ 
construction denotes the maximal point of the quantitative scale. Therefore, 
the analogy between ‘know that’ and ‘written’ is improperly asymmetric, and it 
is unclear why the scale along which ‘know well that’ is evaluated has to be 
orthogonal to the scale along which ‘know that’ is evaluated. As a matter of 
fact, Dutant fails to rule out the possibility that ‘know that’, as well as ‘know 
well that’, can be evaluated among the qualitative scale. The dilemma is thus 
disarmed. 
 
So why does Dutant think that the analogy between ‘written’ and ‘know that’ 
holds water? That seems to be because he presumes (without 
demonstration) that the two-scales account put forward by Kennedy and 
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McNally, which focuses on adjectives, also applies to (all) verbs. When 
analysing the two-scales account, Dutant notes that: 
 
‘The account has two crucial features. First, the two 
scales are in principle orthogonal. The scale over which 
one measures how much of the thesis is written is 
orthogonal to the scale over which one measures how 
well the thesis is written. Second, the relevant scale for 
applying the basic predicate is the quantitative scale 
(very / much), not the qualitative one. 
 
The same points seem to hold for verbs. The scale over 
which we measure whether John works a lot is 
orthogonal to the scale over which we measure whether 
he works well. And the relevant scale for saying whether 
he worked or not is the quantitative one.’ (2007: 12) 
 
But this presumption is made too quickly, as the two-scales account does not 
always hold for verbs. Many counterexamples can be found, for instance, 
‘understand that’. The ‘understand well that’ modification is associated with 
the qualitative scale, e.g., ‘Sam understands well that he cannot force others 
to love him’. But this does not imply that the relevant scale for saying whether 
Sam understands that p is the quantitative one. It is even infelicitous to claim 
that one understands a lot that p, in that ‘understands’ is akin to ‘knows’ in 
terms of the lack of quantitative gradability. Nonetheless, ‘understand that’ is 
still a paradigmatic qualitatively gradable term, to which the two-scales 
account fails to apply. Besides, the qualitative ‘design-well’ modification (e.g., 
‘Ludwig designed this building well’) is evaluated among the qualitative scale, 
but it does not mean that the only relevant scale for measure whether Ludwig 
designed this building is the quantitative one. Quite the opposite, it seems to 
be awkward to say something like ‘Ludwig designed this building a lot’.  
 
Now we have seen why both Stanley’s and Dutant’s arguments fail. 
However, it is completely conceivable that absolutists can argue that their 
arguments fail to represent the best shot that absolutism can give. Also, one 
might find the above gradualist objections to absolutism too particular to be of 
broader persuasiveness. In light of this, the remainder of this section will 
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explore three more general strategies that gradualists can take to refute all 
forms of linguistic argument for absolutism. 
 
1.2: Objection from Counterevidence 
 
Arguments for absolutism from linguistic evidence are typically based on 
cases where our gradable uses of the ‘know that’ construction are odd. 
However, competing linguistic evidence supporting epistemic gradualism can 
also be found. As we have noted before, both Hetherington (2001) and 
Dutant (2007) provide relevant counterevidence indicating that ‘know that’ 
can also be felicitously used in a gradable manner. In particular, linguistic 
data listed by Dutant (2007) are expressions with authoritative sources that 
he collected from the Internet. The existence of those competing linguistic 
data does not imply that we have to use ‘know that’ gradably, but it does 
show that we do use it gradably sometimes. 
 
Here, I do not plan to repeat their counterevidence or list more linguistic data 
supporting gradualism. I believe that counterevidences provided by Dutant 
and Hetherington have already been sufficient to reveal an important fact. 
That is, linguistic data can also be found to support epistemic gradualism in 
the English language. This nip-and-tuck state of play is actually in epistemic 
gradualism’s favour, as gradualists do not need to build their view on the 
basis of linguistic evidence, while epistemic absolutism is primarily motivated 
by negative linguistic data for gradualism. Gradualism can profit from the fact 
that absolutists cannot reject gradualism on the mere basis of linguistic 
evidence.  
 
Moreover, another point that is worth noting is that the awkwardness of 
gradable uses of ‘know that’ might not be able to lend as strong support to 
absolutism as it is expected to be. After all, for some paradigmatic gradable 




(1) I very much believe that it will rain tomorrow.  
(2)???I believe very well that it will rain tomorrow. 
(3) I believe that it will rain tomorrow more strongly 
than Tom does. 
(4)???I believe better that it will rain tomorrow than 
Tom does. 
(5) I remember well that it rained last week. 
(6)???I remember very much that it rained last 
week. 
(7) I remember more clearly that it rained last week 
than Tom does. 
(8)???I remember better than Tom that it rained 
last week. 
 
‘Believe’ and ‘remember’ are two typical gradable verbs. Belief and memory 
are also ordinarily granted as gradable in terms of the firmness, clarity, 
credence, etc. Nevertheless, there are still infelicitous gradable utterances 
containing these two verbs, e.g., (2), (4), (6), and (8). The moral is: the 
existence of infelicitous gradable uses of a concept does not suffice to deny 
the gradability of that concept.  
 
Nevertheless, I am far from believing that all linguistic data, no matter 
supporting gradualism or absolutism, are intuitive for all readers. It is 
understandable that linguistic intuition sometimes varies from person to 
person. Moreover, it can also vary from language to language. This leads us 
to the second anti-absolutist strategy. 
 
1.3: Objection from Non-English Language 
 
The extant absolutism/gradualism debate is basically limited to the English 
language. This should be seen as a worrisome problem, given that the 
relevant debate significantly hinges on the linguistic intuition, while people’s 
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linguistic intuition can be influenced by the language that they speak. The 
current English-centred investigation of gradualism overlooks this influence. 
In some other languages, people’s linguistic intuition towards gradable uses 
of ‘know that’ can be different. For example, ‘A knows that p better than B’ 
might be a bad expression in English, but there is nothing odd to say that ‘我
比你更知道……’ in Chinese, which means ‘I know that … better than you do’. 
In addition, there is another synonym of ‘know that’ (知道) in Chinese, 
namely, ‘清楚’, which means ‘know clearly that’, that can be used even more 
naturally as a gradable verb. Hence, differences in linguistic felicitousness 
will emerge when we compare the following utterances: 
 
 (9)???I know better that I suffered a bad toothache last night. 
(10) 我比你更知道我昨晚牙很疼。       
(11)???I know clearly better than you that he is a nice guy. 
(12) 我比你更清楚他是个好人。 
 
Utterances (9) and (10) deliver the same proposition in two different 
languages respectively - (9) is just the Chinese translation of (10). So are 
utterances (11) and (12). Although they share the same semantic meanings, 
the English expressions are infelicitous while the Chinese ones are natural. 
This indicates that a negative datum in one language can be a positive one in 
another language. One might doubt that I just reported the linguistic intuition 
of myself, which might not be representative enough to reflect the linguistic 
intuition held by a broader community of Chinese speakers. To save my 
argument from this suspicion, let me exhibit more linguistic data that are 
collected from authoritative websites or published books in the Chinese 
cyberspace. The original Chinese expressions and their corresponding 





When I went to a good school, I knew better that it is 
deceiving to claim that study is useless. 
(http://www.sohu.com/a/208979258_827871) 
(14) 我想你比我更知道，你就是我的女主角。 








I just saw through myself, knew my thought, my desire, 
my fear, faced up to the dark side of myself, the 
ugliness of myself, came to know better that everyone is 
different, and thus was able to sympathise with others 
more rationally without being affected by my own will. 
(Maiqi, A Undiscovered Noblewoman; see 
https://www.juzimi.com/article/353563) 
            (16) 我知道淚該停，我知道夢該醒，我更知道我還是不
肯相信 （劉志宏 & 劉思銘，《淚該停夢該醒》，歌词） 
            I know that my tears should be stopped, I know that my 
dream should be over, but I know better that I am still 
not willing to believe this. (Zhihong Liu & Siming Liu, 
The Tear Should Be Stopped, the Dream Should Be 
Over, lyrics; see https://mojim.com/twy100441x2x9.htm) 
 
                                                          
29 There is a comma in the original Chinese sentence because in the Chinese language, a 
comma is ordinarily inserted between the predicate and the clause in order to highlight the 
object clause.   
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The existence of these data proves that people do use ‘知道’ (i.e., ‘know 
that’) gradably in the Chinese language. Admittedly, not all gradable 
expressions involving ‘know that’ constructions are felicitous in Chinese. The 
acceptability of each utterance following decreases progressively: 
 
(17) 我比你更知道他是个好人 (I know better than 
you that he is a nice guy) 。 
(18)?我比你更知道雪是白的 (I know better than 
you that snow is white)。 
(19)??我比你更知道卡夫卡生于 1883 年 (I know 
better than you that Kafka was born in 1883)。 
(20)???我比你更知道 1+1=2 (I know better than 
you that 1+1=2)。 
 
It is beyond the purpose of this chapter to provide a full explanation for this 
decline of acceptability. However, I believe that the oddness of a gradable 
use of ‘know that’ or ‘知道’ might be positively correlated with the difficulty in 
conceiving how one can know the given proposition better than another 
person. It is relatively easier to understand how Jim can know that Hugh is a 
nice person better than Tom does—probably Jim is a close friend of Hugh 
while Tom is not. In contrast, it is relatively hard to imagine a relevant context 
in which one can know that 1+1=2 better than another person does. With 
these being said, it should be evident that linguistic data cannot serve as a 
good basis for epistemic absolutism, as the linguistic intuition behind can vary 
from language to language—some negative data for gradualism in English 
are positive in other languages.  
 
1.4: Objection from Methodology  
 
The two objections introduced above both focus on analysing how ‘know that’ 
is used in our ordinary language, while the last strategy that I plan to propose 
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is more undercutting. The two strategies stated before both aim to show that 
the linguistic data do not favour absolutism over gradualism, but they do not 
doubt the role that linguistic evidence can play in a debate around 
knowledge’s conceptual nature. Hence they can be taken to be two internal 
criticisms of the linguistic argument for absolutism. In contrast, the third 
refutative strategy that I am about to introduce can serve as an external 
criticism. It questions the linguistic argument for absolutism by undermining 
its postulated methodology, viz, the methodology that generalises the 
epistemological nature of a concept from its daily uses in the ordinary 
language. This linguistic methodology is widely adopted in contemporary 
epistemology.  Faith in this linguistic methodology also constitutes the 
primary motivation for opponents of gradualism to hold the overall-absolutist 
attitude and the equivocal-absolutist attitude (cf. Chapter One, Section 2).  
 
Recently this methodology was challenged by Hazlett (2010, 2012) who 
argues that non-factive uses of ‘know-that’ can be found in people’s ordinary 
linguistic practice, which contradicts the longstanding ‘consensus’ that 
propositional knowledge has to be factive. In other words, according to 
Hazlett’s discovery, linguistic data can be at odds with the widely-accepted 
thesis of ‘Factivity’: 
 
Factivity  Certain two-place predicates, including ‘knows’30, 
‘learns’, ‘remembers’, and ‘realizes’, which denote relations 
between persons and propositions, are factive in this sense: 
an utterance of ‘S knows p’ is true only if p, an utterance of ‘S 
learned p’ is true only if p, and so on. (Hazlett 2010: 499)  
 
The upshot is that Factivity is falsified by our non-factive uses of ‘knows’. And 
thus, if one chooses to stick to the linguistic methodology, then one has to 
give up the standard truth condition of propositional knowledge. Here are 
some non-factive uses of ‘knows’ that Hazlett provided:  
 
                                                          




‘(1) Everyone knew that stress caused ulcers, before 
two Australian doctors in the early 80s proved that 
ulcers are actually caused by bacterial infection. 
(2) He figures anything big enough to sink the ship 
they’re going to see in time to turn. But the ship’s too 
big, with too small a rudder … it can’t corner worth shit. 
Everything he knows is wrong.  
(3) In school we learned that World War I was a war to 
‘make the world safe for democracy,’ when it was really 
a war to make the world safe for the Western imperial 
powers.  
(4) I had trouble breathing, sharp pains in my side, 
several broken ribs and a partially collapsed lung, and I 
was in the middle of nowhere without any real rescue 
assets—it was then that I realized I was going to die out 
there.’ (Hazlett 2010: 501) 
 
By the linguistic methodology, it should follow from those linguistic data that 
propositional knowledge can be non-factive, to wit, knowledge does not have 
to entail truth. This corollary of the linguistic methodology directly contradict 
the standard understanding of propositional knowledge, that is, truth is 
necessary for knowledge. This traditional view that knowledge has to be 
factive reflects in almost all, past or present, mainstream accounts of 
knowledge (e.g., JTB theory, truth-tracking theory, relevant alternative theory, 
anti-luck epistemology, virtue epistemology). Hence Harrison claims that: 
 
‘The fact that one cannot say such things as ‘I know, but 
I might be mistaken’ shows that when one is claiming to 
know that some proposition is true, one is claiming that 
there is no possibility of one’s being mistaken about its 
truth’ (Harrison 1978: 137) 
 
Therefore, an irreconcilable contradiction between the linguistic methodology 
and the standard truth condition of knowledge will emerge if Hazlett is right in 
that Factivity is falsified by non-factive uses of ‘knows’ that he listed. It is 
noteworthy that, by listing those non-factive examples, Hazlett does not 
purport to discard the standard truth condition of knowledge. Instead, what he 
challenges is just the widely granted linguistic method of analysing 




‘[T]he linguistic method: imaginary situations are 
described, and intuitions (which are presumed correct) 
are elicited concerning whether or not a character in the 
story said something acceptable’ (Hazlett 2010: 497-
98). 
 
Hazlett’s suggestion is not to abandon the standard truth condition of 
knowledge or to deny those non-factive uses of ‘know-that’ constructions, but 
a divorce of the linguistic method and the theoretical nature of 
epistemological concepts: 
 
‘What I’m claiming is that epistemologists have every 
right to insist that knowledge (as they understand it) is 
factive—but the price to pay for this (which many will be 
happy to incur) is to give up the linguistic method 
described above. I’m suggesting, in other words, a 
divorce for the linguistic theory of knowledge attributions 
and traditional epistemology.’ (2010: 500) 
 
Cross-language evidence can also be employed to cast doubts upon the 
linguistic methodology. Bac & Irmak (2011) point out that phrases like ‘knows 
wrongly’ (‘yanlış bilmek’) are commonly used among speakers of the Turkish 
language. The Turkish language accepts statements like ‘He knows that p 
wrongly’ as natural utterances. Nonetheless, this does not mean that Turkish 
epistemologists have to discard the standard factive conception of 
knowledge. The linguistic fact that ‘know that’ is used in a non-factive manner 
does not entail that knowledge-that per se is a non-factive concept. There is 
a gap between an epistemic concept’s linguistic uses and its conceptual 
nature. 
 
Hazlett does not deny that, at least typically, we use ‘knows’ to guarantee the 
truth of some propositions. He argues that this only indicates that ‘S knows 
that p’ typically implies that p is true, rather than entails that p is true—and 
this implication can be accommodated by a Gricean explanation. Drawing on 
Grice (1989), Hazlett argues that knowledge ascriptions such as ‘S knows 
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that p’ typically implies p’s truth because it is generally mutually assumed by 
speakers that they conform to at least three maxims of conversational 
cooperation:  
 
Quality: ‘Do not say anything you believe to be false, or 
which you don’t have reason to believe is true’;  
Quantity: ‘Make your contribution to a conversation as 
informative, and only as informative, as is required’; 
Relation: ‘Make your contribution to a conversation relevant’ 
(see Hazlett 2010: 511-512). 
 
Hazlett argues that the phenomenon that ‘knows’ typically implies truth can 
be explained by the fact that we ordinarily obey these Gricean maxims, and 
thus would only utter something that we believe to be true when making 
knowledge ascriptions. For example, when asked ‘Any information from the 
FBI about how the bomb was constructed?’, if one answers that ‘They know 
the bomb was homemade’, now that we assume the speaker is conforming to 
Quality, the speaker is assumed to be asserting something that she believes 
to be true. Moreover, given Quantity and Relation, the speaker is also 
assumed to wish her interlocutor to believe that it is true that the bomb was 
homemade—otherwise, the speaker should say something like ‘They thought 
they knew that the bomb was homemade, but that was false’. In summary, 
the speaker’s utterance implies that ‘it is true that the bomb was homemade’.  
 
Hazlett’s non-factive theory of ‘knows’ invites many objections. Before 
discussing some most representative objections in more detail, I want to 
emphasise two things. First, almost all critics of Hazlett admit that his 
examples involving non-factive uses of ‘knows’ are authentic rather than 
invented (in fact, they are all quotations from real publications). What they 
question is just how to explain those authentic linguistic data. Hazlett argues 
that there is a simple, effective, and elegant explanation—to wit, ‘knows’ 
does not entail truth. Hazlett’s opponents reject this non-factive account of 
‘knows’ and argue that those Hazlett-friendly data can be explained away 
without sacrificing Factivity. Second, the fact that the linguistic nature of 
‘knows’ is controversial (as the debate around Hazlett’s proposal has shown) 
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is sufficient to undermine the linguistic method that absolutists rely on. It is in 
dispute whether ‘knows’ (linguistically speaking) is factive, however, in 
contrast, it is much less controversial that truth is necessary for constituting 
knowledge (epistemologically speaking). This asymmetry in controversiality 
can already provide us with a ground for doubt about the linguistic method. 
For example, many critics of Hazlett (e.g., Turri 2011a; Tsohatzidis 2012; 
Dahlman 2016; Domaneschi & Di Paola 2019) attempt to account for the 
data that Hazlett’s cites by appealing to a polysemous reading of ‘knows’ to 
the effect that ‘knows’ has two different senses—a factive sense and a non-
factive sense. This polysemous attitude towards the semantics of ‘knows’ is 
common in this debate. However, it would be much more surprising if 
philosophers also concede that the conceptual nature of knowledge comes in 
two distinct senses: for one sense the truth condition obtains, while for 
another sense truth is not necessary for constituting knowledge. Quite the 
contrary, just as Laurence BonJour points out, the truth condition is 
“something almost no philosopher has seriously disputed” (2002: 32). 
Furthermore, almost all opponents of Hazlett endorse a univocal attitude that 
the truth condition of knowledge should be preserved, at least for the concept 
of knowledge that epistemologists are interested in (see Turri 2011a: 143; 
Tsohatzidis 2012: 449; Hannon 2013: 364; Buckwalter 2014: 391; Dahlman 
2016: 150; Domaneschi & Di Paola 2019: 102). This shows that the 
epistemological nature of knowledge is not as faithfully reflected in the 
linguistic traits of knows as the linguistic methodology presumes.  
 
With these being said, now I will briefly discuss standard objections to 
Hazlett’s non-factive theory of ‘knows’. My conclusion is: none of those 
objections can adequately refute Hazlett’s proposed divorce for the linguistic 
method and the epistemological investigation of knowledge. So how do 
opponents of Hazlett account for recalcitrant data for Factivity that Hazlett 
cites? One standard approach is to resort to Richard Holton’s theory of 
protagonist projection (see Tsohatzidis 2012; Hannon 2013; Dahlman 2016; 




‘I suggest that these sentences work by projecting us into the 
point of view of the protagonist; let us call the phenomenon 
protagonist projection. In each case the point of view into 
which we are projected involves a false belief. We describe 
the false belief using words that the protagonists might use 
themselves, words that embody their mistake. So we 
deliberately use words in ways that do not fit the case.’ 
(1997: 626) 
 
In accordance with the protagonist projection theory, when making 
knowledge ascriptions non-factively, we are just projecting us into the points 
of view of the protagonists who thought they knew that p where p is in fact 
false31. A central idea of protagonist projection is that we deliberately use 
‘knows’ falsely without literally meaning that the protagonist really knows a 
false proposition. Accordingly, we can explain away Hazlett’s data without 
sacrificing Factivity or admitting that those knowledge ascriptions involving 
false beliefs are literally true. 
 
Hazlett objects the protagonist projection theory by doubting whether people 
who assert sentences that he cites are 'deliberately' uttering something that 
they know to be false—it is unclear that people 'know' that nothing false can 
be known. Hence it is unclear that speakers who use sentences like 
'everybody knew that stress caused ulcers' believe that this knowledge 
ascription is false. Hannon (2013) casts doubt upon Hazlett’s judgment by 
                                                          
31 The protagonist projection argument is also claimed to receive empirical support according to 
Buckwalter (2014) and Domaneschi & Di Paola (2018). Both works report that more participants find 
the more natural interpretation of utterances involving non-factive uses of 'knows' is not that 'the 
subject really knows that p' when p is untrue. Instead, more participants find it more natural to 
interpret those utterances as 'the subject simply believe that p' (Domaneschi & Di Paola 2018), or 
'the subjects thought they knew' (Buckwalter 2014). The problem of these experiments, as 
Domaneschi and Di Paola admit, is that they fail to show that ‘they simply believe that p’ or ‘they 
thought they knew that p’ entails ‘they do not really know that p’. Thus the two options of their 
surveys are not mutually exclusive. Given Hazlett’s Gricean account, it would also be unsurprising 
that people see ‘simply believe’ or ‘they thought they knew’ as the more accurate expressions. But 
this cannot prove that people deny the literal truth of those knowledge ascriptions involving false 
beliefs. Thus, if those experiments are to provide solid support for Factivity, it must be assumed that 
‘simply believe’ and ‘thought they knew’ are not ‘really know’ -- but this seems to be just presuming 
that Factivity is true. Otherwise, for what reason can one conclude that those protagonists just ‘do 
not really know’ but ‘simply believe’?  
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arguing that it seems to be very natural for speakers to reply negatively when 
asked ‘Did people really know that stress caused ulcers?’ However, this does 
not undermine Hazlett’s claim that it is not obvious that when people use 
‘knows’ non-factively, they are deliberately using ‘knows’ in a way that they 
believe to be false. Here, we can have two readings of ‘deliberately use 
words in ways that do not fit the case’. According to the strong reading, it 
requires the speakers to know that they are using ‘knows’ in a false way (this 
seems to be the reading that Hazlett adopted), to wit, they know that Factivity 
is true. If that is the case, then there is one further defence that Hazlett could 
have made (though it seems that he did not): champions of Factivity would 
be begging the question if they presume that Factivity is known to be true. As 
for the weak reading of the deliberateness, it also requires people to presume 
that Factivity is true, but it is unclear whether this presumption is commonly 
shared by ordinary people.   
 
The second line of objection that Hazlett takes is to appeal to the principle of 
charity. It is argued that if the explanation provided by champions of 
protagonist projection theory is true, then they would impose systematic 
falsehood on our ordinary talks of ‘knows’—every non-factive use of ‘knows’ 
would thus be subject to this falsehood. In contrast, if ‘knows’ is interpreted 
as not requiring factivity, and we also endorse that when asserting ‘S knows 
that p’ we do typically imply that p is true (but this implication does not entail 
Factivity, according to Hazlett’s Gricean explanation), then the systematic 
falsehood will not be found in the non-factive theory of knows. Thus, a non-
factive account of 'knows' enjoys the advantage of charity over the traditional 
factive one32.  
 
Another standard objection to Hazlett appeals to the idea that ‘knows’ is 
polysemous. Hazlett admits that he cannot prove this idea to be false; he just 
                                                          
32 Most opponents of Hazlett do not deny this. Hannon (2013) only remarks that this extra 
systematic falsehood is not acceptable if we have justifiable reasons to impose it. Thus, Hazlett’s 
non-factive theory at least enjoys a ceteris paribus advantage over its opponents on this aspect. 
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insists that a polysemous account of knows is inelegant and cannot make the 
traditional factive definition of knowledge the definition, other than one among 
many. In addition, as we have noted before, the claim that ‘knows’ has two 
distinct senses already suffices to cast doubts upon the linguistic method as 
the epistemologically interesting concept of knowledge is universally 
accepted as univocal: it must entail truth. On this point, Tsohatzidis (2012) 
suggests that factive knowledge is the chosen subject matter of 
epistemology, while the fact that knows has another non-factive sense is 
linguistically irrelevant to this choice. Hazlett (2012) objects that, if that is the 
case, then the fact that knows has a factive sense should also be 
linguistically irrelevant to the traditional epistemologist's choice of subject 
matter. In other words, this simply undermines the linguistic method that the 
linguistic traits of ‘knows’ can give our judgments of knowledge's 
epistemological characteristics a solid ground (see also Hazlett 2010: 519). 
 
Now we have seen how we can divorce the linguistic uses of ‘know that’ from 
the standard epistemological conception (e.g., knowledge has to be factive). 
In a similar vein, this divorce can also be accomplished by considering some 
non-standard epistemological theories. The first example that I want to 
discuss is the non-doxastic account of knowledge. I do not think this case 
study could be as intuitive as the non-factive case discussed above for all my 
readers, as the non-doxastic account of knowledge is somewhat 
counterintuitive (but couldn’t the minority turn out to be correct?). However, I 
believe that it could still help to illustrate how the divorce for linguistic 
methodology and minority epistemology can be realised. The traditional view 
holds that belief is a necessary for propositional knowledge, ‘knowing that p’ 
entails ‘believing that p’. On the contrary, Radford (1966) argues that 
knowledge can be independent of belief by constructing a scenario where an 
unconfident student correctly answers many questions asking her to write 
down the date of a certain historical event (e.g. Queen Elizabeth died in 
1603) in her history exam, though she does not actually believe in her 
answer as she feels like she was just guessing. Radford argues that although 
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the unconfident student lacks relevant belief, it is still acceptable to claim that 
she knows that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603 as her answer is correct and 
epistemically more valuable than a mere guess. Many epistemologists do not 
agree with Radford that the unconfident student does possess knowledge, so 
Myers-Schulz & Schwitzgebel (2013) modifies Radford’s case. In the 
modified unconfident student case, the student is described as a well-
prepared examinee who had a good revision before the exam. While in the 
last minute of the exam, she got nervous and unconfident as she realised 
that the time was running out. Therefore she wrote that ‘Queen Elizabeth 
died in 1603’ in disappointment and self-doubt, which is exactly the correct 
answer. Basing on this modified case, Myers-Schulz & Schwitzgebel 
conducted a survey among undergraduate students asking whether the 
protagonist has belief and knowledge. A divorce for ‘believes’ and ‘knows’ 
can thus be found in terms of people’s epistemological intuition.  
 
Apart from that, Farkas (2015) also argues that belief might not be a 
necessary condition for knowledge by trading on the extended mind thesis. 
Farkas claims that there are some convincing cases where propositional 
knowledge can be extended by lights of the ‘extended knowledge’ proposal, 
e.g., the famous Otto’s case put forward by Clark & Chalmers (1998). In that 
envisaged scenario, Otto can be taken to know that ‘MoMA is on 54th street’ 
(call the proposition ‘M’) in virtue of the information recorded in his coupled 
notebook. Nevertheless, Farkas argues that there are sufficient reasons to 
deny that Otto has the belief that M. For example, one reason that she refers 
to is from Adams & Aizawa (2010)—mental states (such as beliefs) need to 
have non-derived intentionality, which is what Otto’s record of M in his 
notebook lacks. In light of this, Farkas concludes that Otto’s case can be 
recognised as a case of knowing without believing.  
 
If those arguments for non-doxastic epistemology are right, then there would 
be a contradiction between the (belief-unnecessary) nature of knowledge and 
our daily uses of ‘know-that’ in the ordinary language. That is because, no 
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matter the non-doxastic epistemology is granted or not, utterances as follows 
are still intuitively inconsistent: 
 
(17)??? I know that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, 
but I do not believe that she died in 1603. 
(18)??? I know that MoMA is on 54th street, but I 
do not believe that it is on 54th street. 
 
Let me reclaim that I do not aim to defend the non-doxastic epistemology and 
conclude that belief is unnecessary for knowledge. I am just showing how our 
linguistic evidence could contradict the epistemological nature of the concept 
‘knowledge’, if the non-doxastic epistemology is right.  
 
Likewise, drawing on Wittgenstein’s reading of hinge commitments, some 
hinge epistemologists such as Moyal-Sharrock (2004), McGinn (1989) and 
Pritchard (2012b)33 have argued that our hinge commitments to basic 
quotidian propositions (e.g., ‘I have hands’, ‘The Earth has been in existence 
for a long time before I was born’) cannot constitute knowledge-apt beliefs—
we do not virtually hold rational beliefs of those hinge propositions. That is 
because beliefs, qua a type of propositional attitude, are responsive to 
rational considerations, but hinge commitments are visceral and ‘animal’ in 
nature—they are more like ways of acting rather than beliefs. Hence 
Pritchard (2012b) argues that: 
 
‘But that is just to say that it is not the kind of 
commitment that could ever be responsive to 
rational considerations, whether in its favour or 
against it, and it is hard to see how a commitment 
of that sort could be properly characterised as a 
belief. (A belief, after all, is a belief that such-and-
                                                          
33 Pritchard’s non-epistemic reading differs from the non-propositional reading of Moyal-
Sharrock and McGinn in the sense that the non-propositional reading does not endorse that 
hinge commitments are propositional attitudes – while the non-epistemic reading endorses 
so, but just insists that they are not beliefs. Nonetheless, what is common for both the non-
epistemic reading and non-propositional reading is that they refuse to recognise hinge 
commitments as beliefs. 
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such is so, and hence is in its nature in principle 
responsive to rational considerations—i.e., 
considerations which indicate whether something 
is so. That is why wishful thinking, even when in all 
outward respects very alike belief, is not belief)’ 
(2012b: 267-68).   
 
One somewhat surprising upshot of this Wittgensteinian view is that we do 
not indeed know those hinge propositions now that we do not have beliefs 
(but just groundless hinge commitments) of them. Hinge propositions are not 
in the market for knowledge as they cannot be virtually believed (here, unlike 
the non-doxastic epistemology discussed above, the Wittgensteinian view 
still sees belief as a necessary condition for knowledge). Hence, presume 
that this Wittgensteinian view is right, then our linguistic evidence would be 
standing on the opposite side, as it is felicitous and natural regardless to say 
that ‘I know I both hands’ or ‘I know that the Earth has been in existence for a 
long time’ in our ordinary language34. If one sticks to his guns and insists on 
the linguistic method, then the Wittgensteinian view is unacceptable anyhow 
as it predicts something significant incompatible with our linguistic data and 
linguistic intuition.   
 
The linguistic argument for absolutism postulates the linguistic methodology 
that how we use a notion in the ordinary language determines how we should 
understand the notion’s conceptual traits. This methodology appears to be 
intuitively legitimate as we ordinarily talk of ‘gradability’ from a linguistic point 
of view. Notwithstanding, I have explained why we had better discard the 
linguistic methodology in terms of both standard and non-standard 
                                                          
34 A contextualist reading of the Wittegensteinian hinge epistemology grants that there are 
daily contexts where it is natural to assert those claims, and hence those ‘Moorean 
propositions’ might potentially be felicitously claimed to be known. For example, contexts of 
daily communication. But these will not be contexts where those claims functioning as 
‘hinges’. According to contextualism, those claims typically function as hinges in contexts 
where they are called into question by sceptics. In those contexts, these claims cannot be 
known or rationally doubted (see Pritchard 2011). However, this reading does not affect my 
argument. That is because, even in contexts where scepticism is involved, it is still (at least 
linguistically) felicitous to claim that ‘scepticism is wrong, as I know that I have both hands’. 
Wittegensteinian contextualists might find those claims inappropriate as they violate an 
essential conceptual property of hinges (i.e., the unknowability), but this inappropriateness 
(provided that the Wittegensteinian view is correct) is philosophical, rather than linguistic.   
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epistemological understandings of knowledge. It has been revealed that 
there is an explanatory gap between linguistic evidence and the 
epistemological nature of propositional knowledge that absolutists can hardly 
cross. Why does this gap exist? I think there are at least three possible 
explanations. First, as we have seen before, the linguistic methodology turns 
essentially on people’s linguistic intuitions, while intuitions regarding how 
‘knows’ should be properly used might vary from people to people, or from 
case to case. In contrast, it is a natural philosophical aspiration that 
‘knowledge’, qua the central concept of epistemology, ought to be of a more 
stable conceptual essence. Second, it is evident that different languages can 
have fundamentally different ‘conventional usages’ of ‘knows'. However, it 
seems to be much less evident and persuasive that the notion of knowledge 
also differs so fundamentally for speakers of different languages. Insofar as 
we see knowledge as an elemental notion for all human beings, it would be 
also natural to expect that some basic epistemological consensuses (e.g., 
knowledge entails truth) can apply in a cross-language manner rather than 
be exclusive to English-speaking countries35. Last but not least, the 
gradability of knowledge can be evaluated in more dimensions other than the 
mere linguistic one. For example, a more philosophically interesting way of 
discussing knowledge’s gradability should concern whether knowledge can 
be improved and how the quality of knowledge can be evaluated. 
Hetherington (2011) also expresses qualms about epistemologists’ worship 
of the linguistic methodology:  
 
‘Much traditional epistemology is said to involve conceptual 
analysis — uncovering meanings, perhaps ascertaining 
essences, and so deriving some significant truths. Often, the 
methodology that is used apparently relies upon claims about 
how a word such as ‘knowledge’ is generally used. Care is 
needed, of course, because epistemologists, while 
confidently relying on various claims as to how people use a 
given term, might dismiss competing uses of those terms or 
associated ones as being confused, for example. Is there 
                                                          
35 Admittedly, absolutists can be steadfast and assert that speakers of different languages 
have different conceptions of knowledge – but this would also undermine the applicability of 
the absolutist conclusion.   
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ever a danger of epistemologists bolstering their arguments 
by respecting only those linguistic usages that cohere with 
their own ways of speaking? Surely there is.’ (2011: 149) 
 
With these being said, the linguistic methodology should not be adopted so 
unhesitatingly. Instead, discarding the worship of it can lead us to a more 
fruitful discussion regarding the gradability problem of knowledge.   
 
In summary, this section provides three reasons why the argument from 
linguistic evidence (which plays an essential role in people’s accepting 
overall-absolutist attitude or the equivocal-absolutist attitude) cannot justify 
epistemic absolutism: 1) there are competing linguistic data for epistemic 
gradualism in the English language; 2) there are also conflicting linguistic 
intuitions in other languages; 3) even if the linguistic evidence favours 
absolutism over gradualism in general, the linguistic methodology that 
absolutists adopt does not suffice to reflect the conceptual nature of 
knowledge-that. Now let us move on to address another important argument 
for absolutism.   
 
2. Objections to the Argument from Object 
 
Knowledge has its object. The object of an item of knowledge-who is a 
person; the object of an item of knowledge-where is a location. But what is 
the object of propositional knowledge? A straightforward and simple answer 
is: the proposition p is known. According to the well-known T-schema36 (see 
Tarski 1933, 1944, 1983; Dummett 1959), the proposition p is true if and only 
if p. Therefore, to say that ‘snow is white’ is equivalent to say that ‘‘snow is 
white’ is true’. Being based on the T-schema, the standard view holds that 
‘know that p’ is equivalent to ‘know that p is true’, which means that the 
object of knowledge-that-p is the truth of the proposition p. This 
understanding of knowledge might be justifiable if one endorses the T-
schema. There seems to be a natural derivation as follows: 
                                                          




[T-schema] <p> is true iff p.  
 
(Where ‘iff’ expresses the material biconditional, and the angle brackets 
indicate an appropriate name-forming device meaning ‘the proposition that…’ 
For the sake of simplicity, I will omit angle brackets when formulating KT-
schema.) Correspondingly, one might derive: 
 
[KT-schema] S knows that p, iff, S knows that p is true.  
 
Given that ‘p’ is equivalent to ‘p is true’, it would make prima facie perfect 
sense to substitute ‘p is true’ for ‘p’ in the know-that construction, hence KT-
schema is intuitively appealing. Another way to understand why KT-schema 
is intuitive is to resort to the closure principle. The closure principle predicts 
that if S knows that p, and that p entails that q, then S knows that q. A proof 
of KT-schema can thus be constructed: 
 
(i) S knows that p. 
(ii) S knows that ‘p ↔ “p” is true’. 
(iii) The closure principle. 
(iv) S knows that p ↔ S knows that p is true.  
 
Few epistemologists have systematically argued for KT-schema, perhaps 
because this schema is too intuitive. Nonetheless, the traditional 
understanding of propositional knowledge behind KT-schema was reflected 
in epistemologists’ interchangeable uses of ‘know that p’ and ‘know that p is 
true’. For example, Dretske (2014) defines the closure principle as follows: 
 
 ‘Closure is the epistemological principle that if S 
knows that P is true and knows that P implies Q, 
then, evidentially speaking, this is enough for S to 





Then in the next page of the same paper, Dretske formulates the closure 
principle as: 
  
‘S knows P.  
 S knows P implies Q.  
 Therefore, S knows Q [emphasis added].’ 
(Dretske 2014: 28) 
 
Here, ‘knows Q’ and ‘knows that Q is true’ are used interchangeably. Another 
evidence is from Ram Neta: 
 
‘What’s the point of trying to give an account of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a subject S 
to know the truth of some proposition p (what I’ll 
henceforth call an ‘analysis’ of ‘S knows that p’) 
[emphasis added]?’ (Neta 2002: 663) 
 
It is also not hard to see how ‘knows the truth of some proposition p’ and 
‘knows that p’ are deemed as identical here. I cannot exhaust all instances 
here37, but it is noteworthy that this understanding of propositional knowledge 
is also embodied in some influential epistemological theories. Truth-tracking 
theory of knowledge (see Nozick 1981; Dretske 1971; Goldman 1967; etc.) 
claims that to know that p is to track the truth of p. With the KT-schema in 
play, it will be easy to comprehend tracking theorists’ emphasis on the truth, 
as tracking the truth is tracking the object of knowledge.  
 
Hetherington (2005) argues the ‘strongest form of defence’ for epistemic 
absolutism, i.e., the argument from object, is based on the idea that to know 
that p is to know that proposition p is true. If knowing a proposition is knowing 
the truth of that proposition, then propositional knowledge has to be absolute 
in the sense that the truth of a proposition cannot be known more or less—it 
can only be known as an absolute whole. Epistemic absolutism can thus be 
defended by virtue of KT-schema. Hetherington does not elaborate on the 
                                                          
37 For more instances, see Dretske 1971; Moser 1987:91; Moffett 2003:82; Hetherington 
2005:148; Jespersen 2008:125; etc.  
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argument very clearly, however, we can try to formulate the argument as 
follows: 
 
[Argument from Object] 
(AO1) To know that p is to know that p is true. 
(AO2) The truth of a proposition p is absolute as it 
cannot be known more or less. 
(AO3) The truth of a proposition p is absolute as it 
cannot be known better or worse without thereby 
altering the object of the original knowledge that p. 
(AOC) Propositional knowledge is absolute. 
  
Hetherington’s own objection to this argument from the object is rejecting KT-
schema, viz, arguing that ‘knowing that p’ is more than ‘knowing that p is 
true’. However, his objection relies heavily on his controversial radical anti-
intellectualism, which claims that knowledge-that is a kind of how-
knowledge—knowing how it is the case that p. On the basis of his how-
knowledge theory, Hetherington argues that: 
 
‘[K]nowledge that p is almost always knowledge of 
more besides. It generally includes knowledge of 
further aspects of how it is that p—aspects beyond 
p as such, most narrowly construed. On such 
occasions, to know that p is to know more than p, 
to some extent or other. It is to know truths, for 
instance, other than p—even as part of knowing 
that p. For it is to know some more or less 
extensive array of aspects of how it is that p.’ 
(Hetherington 2005: 148-49) 
 
Hetherington’s how-knowledge theory will be introduced in more detail in the 
next section, and it will be revealed that this theory is severely problematic. 
Apart from that, Hetherington’s objection to the argument from the object is 
not satisfactory in the sense that he is simply asserting that knowing that p is 
knowing how it is the case that p rather than knowing that p is true. In other 
words, at most he just proposes an alternative account of the object of 
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propositional knowledge that competes with the traditional account supported 
by KT-schema, rather than shows us why KT-scheme is false. He does not 
virtually disprove KT-schema—no substantial attack on KT-schema has been 
given. Here, I aim to provide such a substantial attack by presenting 
counterexamples to KT-schema in which one knows that a proposition p is 
true, but does not know that p. 
 
2.1: Objection to the KT-Schema38 
 
The objection that I will offer here captures the sense that knowing that p also 
requires understanding the semantic meaning of p (to a certain extent), while 
a subject who is (completely) ignorant of the semantic meaning of a 
proposition p can still know that p is true. In other words, one can know a 
proposition that he completely does not understand to be true, while one 
cannot know a proposition that he completely does not understand. A most 
straightforward example is, one can know a proposition written in a foreign 
language to be true (on the basis of testimonies or logical reasoning, etc.), 
while still fails to know the fact expressed by the proposition. Consider the 
following case: 
 
Math Textbook   Suppose that your math teacher told 
you that ‘Every proposition in your textbook is true’. 
Your teacher is reliable. Your textbook is classic and 
well-proofread. You believe that testimony firmly as 
there is no proper reason to doubt it. Given these, your 
belief constitutes knowledge in that case, viz, you know 
that every proposition in your textbook is true. As a 
result, you also know that the last proposition of your 
textbook is true. However, you have not read the last 
                                                          
38 Elsewhere, I have provided a more detailed objection to the KT-schema which includes a more 
technical dilemma for the KT-schema. See Lai (2019).  
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proposition of the textbook, so what that proposition 
expresses is completely unknown to you.  
 
That is a case where you know the truth of a proposition without knowing that 
content of the proposition. In the math textbook case, one fails to know the 
last proposition of the textbook because the content of the proposition per se 
has not been seen or be accessed in any way by the subject. Apart from 
cases like this, there are also cases where the content of the proposition is 
seen. For example:   
 
Foreign Proposition   There is a true Chinese 
sentence ‘爱丁堡是苏格兰首都’ (which means 
‘Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland’) printed in a pub 
quiz book. A non-Chinese speaker, Jonny, read this 
Chinese sentence, but he did not understand that 
sentence at all. So he asked his Chinese friend Chen, a 
reliable man who lives in Scotland, for help. Chen told 
Jonny that this sentence is true. Jonny believed Chen’s 
answer. The next question of the book is ‘What is the 
capital of Scotland?’ Jonny spoke to Chen: ‘Yeah, I 
know this one. The answer is Glasgow!’  
 
In this case above, I take it to be clear that Jonny can be granted as knowing 
the proposition ‘爱丁堡是苏格兰首都’ is true by virtue of Chen’s testimony. 
This should be a typical case in which one’s true belief justified by 
testimonies constitutes knowledge. However, it is obvious that Jonny does 
not know that Edinburgh, rather than Glasgow, is the capital of Scotland. 
Therefore, it will be highly implausible to admit that he virtually knows that 爱
丁堡是苏格兰首都. KT-schema is thus violated. The example above involves 
hybrid languages expressions, which might look not straightforward enough. 




Foreign Proposition 2   There is a true English 
sentence ‘Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland’ printed in 
a pub quiz book. A non-English speaker, Chen, read 
this English sentence, but he did not understand that 
sentence at all—he does not understand any single 
word of that sentence. So he asked his Scottish friend 
Jonny, a reliable man who can also speak Chinese, for 
help. Jonny told Chen that this sentence is true. Chen 
believed Jonny’s answer, but he still did not understand 
that English sentence. In fact, Chen just does not know 
what the capital of Scotland is—even if the question was 
asked in his mother language. He just does not know 
there is a city in the world named Edinburgh (or ‘爱丁堡’ 
in Chinese). 
 
In this modified case, Chen can also be recognised as knowing that the 
proposition ‘Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland’ is true by virtue of Jonny’s 
testimony. Readers who grant that Jonny knows the proposition at issue to 
be true in our first foreign proposition, should also be able to endorse that 
Chen’s belief can constitute knowledge in the same manner. Whilst knowing 
that the proposition ‘Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland’ is true, Chen does 
not know that Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland. The content of the 
proposition is not transparent to him. He is completely ignorant of the 
relevant fact that the proposition supposes to deliver. It is almost incoherent 
to say ‘I know that Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland, but I do not know 
what the capital of Scotland is’39. Chen does not know what the capital of 
Scotland is. He simply does not know that there is a city named Edinburgh, 
which is the capital city of Scotland—no matter the fact is expressed in 
English or Chinese. KT-schema is thus disproved in that case. 
                                                          
39 In contrast, it is coherent to say that ‘Chen told me that ‘爱丁堡是苏格兰首都’, I know that 
must be a true statement, but I do not understand that sentence, and I am still ignorant of 




In both foreign proposition cases, the proposition in question (‘爱丁堡是苏格
兰首都’ and ‘Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland’) is just like a string of 
mysterious codes for our protagonist. The semantic content of the string of 
codes is not important, because it does not influence the protagonist’s 
judgment of the proposition’s truth value. Our protagonists know those 
propositions to be true, just on the basis of a true reliable testimony, rather 
than the semantic content of those propositions per se. They only have 
knowledge de dicto, rather than knowledge de re.  
  
We have seen that, if the subject does not understand the meaning of words 
constituting the proposition in question, then it is possible that KT-schema will 
be violated. Besides, lacking understanding of the proposition’s logical 
structure might also lead to the failure of KT-schema. Consider another 
example: 
 
Logic Exam   There is a multiple choice question in a 
logic exam asking candidates to choose the only one 
correct answer from three options. A student knew 
clearly that both option A and option B are false, while 
he did not understand what does option C ‘p∧q’ mean. 
That is because the student did not remember whether 
the symbol ‘∧’ represents ‘and’ or ‘or’. Nevertheless, the 
student still decided to choose C confidently, as he 
knew that A and B cannot be the correct answer, and 
thus option C has to be true. In fact, C is the correct 
answer indeed. However, without knowing that ‘∧’ is the 
conjunction sign, when asked ‘whether p or not’ and 
‘whether q or not’ after the exam, the student answered 




In this case, I believe that most of us could admit that the student knows that 
‘p∧q’ is true. The student came to know this by the method of exclusion, i.e., 
he inferred that option C is true from the premises that: (i) neither A nor B is 
true; and (ii) one of the three options has to be true (presume that there is no 
sign indicating that the test question is misprinted or provides three wrong 
options). His reasoning is valid and sound, therefore it should be safe to 
conclude that the student knows that ‘p∧q’ is true.  
 
On the contrary, it will be much more improper to claim that the student 
knows that p∧q. That is because the student does not really understand the 
logical structure of the proposition in question, and thus fails to comprehend 
the semantic meaning of the proposition. Moreover, it is highly likely that the 
student would choose option C regardless, even if the proposition expressed 
by option C were ‘~p∨~q’. The content of option C is not important for the 
student to choose C. For that student, option C is just a ‘place-holder’ rather 
than a virtually meaningful proposition whose semantic meaning would affect 
its truth value. No matter what proposition appears in the place of option C, 
the student would deem it as true anyway. In addition, it will be extremely 
counterintuitive to claim that one can know a conjunctive proposition without 
knowing any single conjunction. It is incoherent to claim that ‘I know that 
James is a boy and Jimmy is a boy, but I do not know that James is a boy’. 
However, in the logic exam case, the student does not know either p or q, 
which means that he does not know any conjunction of the conjunctive 
proposition. In contrast, the following statement is coherent: ‘I know that the 
proposition ‘p∧q’ is true, but I do not understand the meaning of the 
proposition, therefore I do not know whether p is true or not’. The upshot is, 
we can hardly grant that the student knows the conjunctive proposition, even 
though he knows (de dicto) that the proposition is true. Therefore, KT-
schema is violated again in this case. 
 
Let us recap all those counterexamples briefly. The math textbook case 
concerns a situation where the content of the proposition is completely 
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unrevealed to the subject and thus KT-schema is violated. The foreign 
language case involves a scenario where the content of the proposition is 
exposed to the subject, nevertheless its semantic meaning is completely 
mysterious to the subject and hence KT-schema fails again. The logic exam 
case further constructs a scenario where the content of the proposition, 
whose semantic meaning is partially understood, is exposed to the subject. 
However, because of the incomprehension of the key logical structure of the 
proposition, the subject still fails to know the proposition and thereby falsifies 
KT-schema. The extent to which the protagonist of the three types of 
counterexample understands the content of the given proposition seemingly 
increase by degrees. Nevertheless, what those protagonists have in common 
is that their understandings are not enough. Admittedly it will be an 
interesting question to ask how much understanding is enough, but that is not 
the main problem that this chapter aims to answer. The moral that I hope to 
draw from those counterexamples is: (a certain extent of) understanding of 
the content of a proposition p is necessary for knowing that p, while it is not 
necessary for knowing that p is true. With this distinction in play, we can 
better understand why there is a gap between [knowing that p is true] and 
[knowing that p], and why KT-schema fails. So, if knowing the truth of p is 
insufficient for answering the object problem of propositional knowledge, 
what are we claiming to know when we claim to possess an item of 
knowledge-that-p? From what we have discussed, a potential answer might 
be that: ‘to know that p’ seemingly means that ‘to know that p is true + to 
know the content of p’. To be specific, we reject: 
 




[T+C Account] To know that p is to know that p is 
true, plus, to know p’s content, which requires 




There are three points that I wish to clarify regarding this T+C account. First, 
this account purports to answer the object problem rather than the definition 
problem of propositional knowledge. The object problem differs from, albeit 
closely-related to, the definition problem. Theories attempting to answer the 
definition problem include the historical ‘JTB’ template, the relatively recent 
‘JTB + anti-Gettier factors’ template, and the AAA-model of virtue 
epistemology, etc. However, none of them is answering the object problem of 
propositional knowledge. Any attempt to solve the object problem should be 
careful about the subtle distinction between the two problems. Given this 
distinction, one should not worry that our ‘truth and content’ account will invite 
circular definition or infinite regress. That is because, we are not defining 
‘knowing-that’ by ‘knowing the truth and the content of p’. We are just 
analysing the object of ‘knowing-that’ by the ‘truth and content’ account.  
 
Second, the T+C account parallels ‘knowing the truth of p’ with ‘knowing the 
content of p’ as two factors constituting the object of knowledge-that-p. This 
does not mean that these two factors are completely independent of each 
other. They could be interdependent and even overlapped to some extent. 
We have seen how one can know the truth of p without knowing the content 
of p. It is also easy to imagine scenarios where one knows the content of p 
without knowing its truth. For example, one can comprehend a proposition 
without believing that proposition. The union of the two factors can constitute 
a more complete and thus better answer to the object problem, which can at 
least avoid counterexamples that we discussed before. However, is this T+C 
alternative the full answer to the object problem of propositional knowledge? 
Is there any other factor constituting the object of propositional knowledge 
except for ‘truth and content’? Or, it may be questioned that, is ‘the content of 
p’ a necessary component of the object of knowledge-that-p? Furthermore, is 
‘the truth of p’ really necessary as it is orthodoxly taken to be? I will leave 
these questions open to my readers. By this stage, my purpose is only to 
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debunk the T-account and propose a better alternative—it does not need to 
be the best answer, but it can serve as a promising replacement. 
 
Third, according to Hetherington (2001), there is a close connection between 
‘knowing’ and ‘understanding’, which coincides with our conclusion that 
knowing that p requires understanding the content of p. One can understand 
the content of a proposition better than another person does. If 
‘understanding-that’ partially constitutes ‘knowing-that’, then it is reasonable 
to infer that knowing-that can also be gradable as understanding-that. That 
is, it will be defendable to argue that knowledge-that-p can be graded in 
terms of one’s understanding of the semantic meaning of p—the better the 
meaning is understood, the better the proposition is known. Admittedly, one 
cannot derive directly that knowledge-that is gradable from that its necessary 
conditions are gradable. Beliefs and justifications are also ordinarily taken to 
be necessary for knowledge, nevertheless, their gradability does not imply 
the gradability of knowledge-that per se. Thus the discussion regarding the 
gradability of understanding should better be understood as an internal 
criticism of epistemic absolutism, which reveals why absolutism does not 
follow from premises put forward by absolutists. That is, if the ungradability of 
truth (qua the alleged object of knowledge-that) can be employed to defend 
epistemic absolutism, then the gradability of understanding should be able to 
undermine absolutism and support gradualism. That is because, we have 
noted that the semantic content of p, as well as the truth of p, also constitutes 
the object of knowledge-that-p. I take it to be justifiable that there is no 
substantial difference between ‘knowing the semantic content of p’ and 
‘understanding the semantic content of p’. Admittedly, this claim needs to be 
borne out by more intensive analyses. But if this claim turns out to be true, 
and insofar as we grant the premise that the gradability of knowledge is 
influenced by the gradability of knowledge’s object, then given that 
understanding is gradable, it is also reasonable to argue that knowing that p 
can also be deemed gradable. This inference does not resort to the 
gradability of the necessary condition of knowledge, but the gradability of the 
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object of knowledge. Notice that this inference is premised on that we grant 
the underpinning presumption of gradualists’ argument from object, to wit, 
knowledge’s object determines knowledge’s gradability. Section 2.2 will 
provide a different objection that challenges this presumption. 
 
It is hard indeed to determine how much understanding is enough for 
constituting knowledge. Actually, I think it is almost unlikely to locate a non-
arbitrary and clear cut-off point between ‘sufficient’ and ‘insufficient’ 
understanding (for constituting knowledge). It is as hard as to locate a non-
arbitrary and clear cut-off point for ‘enough justification (for constituting 
knowledge)’. Notwithstanding, this sort of ‘boundary problem’ should not 
hinder us from taking gradable terms like ‘understanding’ into consideration 
when answering the object problem. After all, an intrinsic trait of most 
gradable terms is the fuzziness of their boundaries. Belief requires 
confidence, but how confident is confident enough for a belief? Gloom 
requires sadness, but how sad is sad enough for one to be recognised as 
gloomy? Likewise, clear-cut boundaries of many other gradable concepts—
such as ‘enjoy’, ‘hatred’, ‘devoutness’, etc.—can hardly be determined in a 
non-arbitrary way. Hence, if knowledge-that is gradable, then we shall not 
even be perturbed by the boundary problem. 
 
2.2: Objection to Other Premises 
 
The argument from object claims that the object of an item of knowledge-
that-p is the truth of the proposition p. Since knowledge of the truth of p 
cannot be gradable, knowledge-that-p cannot be gradable. Objections to KT-
schema in the previous subsection challenge the premise that the object of 
knowledge-that-p is just the truth of p. Now let me exhibit another approach 
to block absolutists’ argument from object, which can be seen as an external 
criticism of absolutism. The idea is that even if we grant KT-schema and thus 
concede (AO1), it is still unclear how the absoluteness of knowledge’s object 
could entail the absoluteness of knowledge per se. In a more general sense, 
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it is a non sequitur to conclude the absoluteness of an epistemic concept 
from the absoluteness of this concept’s object. Take some paradigmatic 
gradable verbs, such as ‘agree’ and ‘believe’, for examples. It can also be 
claimed that the object of a propositional belief (e.g., belief that Edinburgh is 
the capital of Scotland) is the truth of the proposition that ‘Edinburgh is the 
capital of Scotland’; similarly, the object of one’s agreement of a proposition 
is the truth of the given proposition (e.g., to agree that Edinburgh is the 
capital of Scotland is to agree that Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland is 
true). Nevertheless, believe-that-p and agree-that-p are still gradable, which 
means that merely indicating that the object of ѱ-that-p (where ѱ is a verb) is 
the truth of p cannot entail that ѱ is ungradable.  
 
The real substantial argument might lie in (AO2) and (AO3). Unlike ‘believe’ 
and ‘agree’, one cannot say ‘I completely know that p’ (in contrast, ‘I 
completely agree that p’ is seemingly felicitous) or ‘I half know that p’ (in 
contrast, ‘I half believe that p’ is seemingly felicitous). The truth of a 
proposition can neither be known partially, nor more or less; on the contrary, 
it can only be known completely as a whole. However, as we have noted in 
Chapter One, (AO2) can only at most show that propositional knowledge is 
quantitatively ungradable. The question that we concern in this 
gradualism/absolutism debate is whether propositional knowledge is 
qualitatively gradable. (AO3) involves some insights into this question. 
According to (AO3), the object of a given item of knowledge-that-p will be 
altered once one tries to ‘improve’ one’s knowledge. New justification would 
at best lead to a new item of knowledge-that-q. For instance, a person came 
to know that Jonny is the murderer because she witnessed Jonny committing 
the murder. Gradualists might argue that her knowledge that Jonny is the 
murderer can be improved if she also heard Jonny pleading guilty in court. A 
new justification (Jonny’s pleading guilty) is gained in this case. However, 
proponents of the argument from object would suggest that, rather than 
improved her original knowledge that ‘Jonny is the murderer’, the subject at 
best gained a new piece of knowledge that ‘Jonny admitted his guilt in 
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court’—the object of the original item of knowledge has been altered. The 
fact that Jonny is the murderer has been known as a whole by the subject 
when she witnessed Jonny’s murder. Jonny’s admitting his guilt is just 
another item of fact which becomes the object of another item of 
propositional knowledge. That is different from knowledge of a person: 
knowing more facts of a person would not alter the object of an item of 
knowledge-who—the object is still that person. On the contrary, knowing 
more facts (justifying another fact) means altering the object of an item of 
knowledge-that as you are not knowing the same fact expressed by the 
original proposition.  
 
However, the claim that ‘new justifications would alter the object of the 
original item of knowledge-that-p’ is untenable. Even if we grant that the 
object of an item of knowledge-that-p is the truth of p, it is still unclear why 
one cannot know the truth of p better by virtue of more sufficient justification. 
Absolutism cannot just identify ‘knowing that p’ with ‘knowing that p is true’, 
and then conclude directly that ‘p is true’ cannot be known better or worse. 
That is just begging the question, as ‘p is true’ is also a proposition. It would 
also be untoward to insist that new justification would lead to new 
propositional knowledge. One came to know that Edinburgh is the capital of 
Scotland from her geography textbook. However, it would be odd to claim 
that if Wikipedia also told her that Scotland’s capital is Edinburgh, then this 
justification provided by Wikipedia can only provide her with another item of 
knowledge that ‘Wikipedia says the capital of Scotland is Edinburgh’, rather 
than improve her original knowledge that ‘the capital of Scotland is 
Edinburgh’. The fact delivered by the original proposition is still the object that 
the subject concerns with, and it is still the object that one’s new evidence is 
supposed to justify.    
 
Apart from the fact that absolutists have never provided any independent 
argument elaborating why knowing more p-relevant facts cannot improve 
one’s original knowledge-that-p, another important defect of this explanation 
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of (AO3) is that there is more than one way in which knowledge can be 
improved. The above explanation of (AO3) only deals with the kind of 
epistemic improvement achieved by gaining more evidence. However, 
knowledge can be graded in accordance with other criteria, and epistemic 
improvement can be realised in many other manners. For instance, 
reliabilists can argue that one item of knowledge-that-p can be improved if 
the relevant belief is formed in a more reliable way. In this case, more 
evidence is not necessary, rather, a better way to form the belief is what 
reliabilism concerns. Similarly, virtue epistemologists can also define the 
improvement of knowledge under the AAA-model: one can know that p better 
if one’s relevant epistemic performance is more accurate, more adroit and 
apt—degrees of accuracy, adroitness and aptness does not necessarily 
concern more justification. In summary, (AO2) can only defend the 
quantitative absolutism, which is not what we aim to object to. (AO3) does 
not hold water and seems to be a petitio principii. The argument from object 
cannot defend epistemic absolutism successfully even if KT-schema is 
granted. 
 
3. Objections to the Argument from Contextualism 
 
Responses to this argument for absolutism should not be the focus of this 
chapter, as this argument, by its nature, is a ‘conditional censure’ to 
epistemic gradualism that blames epistemic gradualism be based on 
contextualism. Surely, one can choose to reject this argument by defending 
contextualism directly, but that is beyond the purpose of this thesis. Instead, 
chapter 4 will demonstrate how gradualism can be constructed without 
resorting to contextualism. If the alleged connection between contextualism 
and gradualism is cut off, then absolutists cannot easily discard gradualism 
as an appendage of contextualism. Here I will only provide a rough picture of 
how epistemic gradualism can be developed without being tied up with 
contextualism or even any particular account of knowledge, as many 




For the classic JTB template of knowledge, it can be argued that within this 
account of knowledge, knowledge can be graded in terms of degrees of 
belief, justification and even accuracy of truth. For proponents of virtue 
epistemology, gradualists can propose that propositional knowledge can be 
graded in terms of gradations of epistemic competence and levels to which 
that epistemic competence is manifested. Sosa’s distinction between ‘animal 
knowledge’, ‘reflective knowledge’ and ‘knowledge full well’ can also be 
employed to grade the quality of knowledge. In addition, as we have noted 
before, for externalism such as reliabilism, it can be argued that the quality of 
an item of knowledge-that-p is determined by the reliability of the process of 
forming the true belief that p. While when it comes to knowledge-first 
epistemology, the combination of ‘knowledge’ and ‘evidence’ could be 
explored. It is plausible for knowledge-firsters to argue that the better an 
instance of knowledge-that-p is, the better it can be an evidence for believing 
that p, and vice if the quality of ‘evidence’ is deemed as gradable.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks    
 
This chapter has provided objections to all three mainstream arguments 
supporting epistemic absolutism. Among them, the argument from linguistic 
evidence and the argument from object are the focus of this chapter. Both 
internal and external criticisms have been offered in order to argue against 
the two arguments. With all three main arguments for absolutism being 
debunked, it should be fair to conclude that absolutism is not as tenable as 
the orthodoxy takes it to be. Instead, absolutism is ill-grounded. Therefore, it 
is time for us to give its opposite, i.e., epistemic gradualism, a more serious 
consideration. As we have mentioned before, currently, the most developed 
gradualist account of knowledge is constructed by Stephen Hetherington. 





Chapter Three: Hetherington on Epistemic 
Gradualism 
 
Abstract: In this chapter, I will analyse and criticise Hetherington’s two 
versions of gradualism. The first version is based on his 2001 book Good 
Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology, which can be 
regarded as the most well-known and systematic epistemic gradualist theory 
that can ever be found in the current literature. The second version of his 
gradualist proposal is mainly developed in one of his 2005 papers entitled 
‘Knowing (How It Is) That P: Degrees and Qualities of Knowledge’ and his 
2011 book ‘How to Know’. The first two sections will introduce how 
Hetherington constructed the two versions of gradualism respectively. 
Differences between the two forms of gradualism will be highlighted. Section 3 
and 4 will call into question Hetherington’s two gradualist proposals. 
 
In chapter two, we have seen why arguments underlying epistemic 
absolutism are all untenable. Now we shall move forward to see how 
epistemic gradualism can be justified. On our way towards the revitalisation 
of the long-forgotten debate between gradualism and absolutism, a 
precedent that will inevitably be discussed is Hetherington’s gradualist 
proposal. As the most influential advocate of epistemic gradualism, 
Hetherington ushered many ways to motivate gradualism. Before I proceed 
any further to put forward my own arguments for gradualism, it will be helpful 
to analyse Hetherington’s endeavours critically in this chapter. In a nutshell, 
Hetherington has developed two distinct versions of gradualist theories. Let 
us revisit them one by one. 
 




In his 2001 book, Hetherington starts his defence of gradualism with a few 
linguistic evidence indicating that gradable expressions of ‘know-that’ 
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construction can be felicitous (see Hetherington 2001: 2-3). He argues that, 
although there are other (absolutist) ways to talk about knowledge, there is 
no good reason to deny the felicitousness of those gradable statements that 
he listed. Hetherington’s explanation for why those statements are consistent 
and felicitous is: ‘knowing a fact’ is closely related to ‘understanding a fact’, 
and understanding is something clearly gradable. Hetherington argues that 
knowing a fact is sometimes equivalent to understanding that fact—
understand that the fact obtains, and understand how that fact obtains. 
Hetherington also quotes Edward Craig’s view that knowing-how is 
sometimes indistinguishable from knowing-that. Since knowing-how is 
gradable, so is knowing-that. 
 
In addition, Hetherington also draws an analogy between knowing a fact and 
knowing a person. He argues that both sorts of knowledge can be gradable 
in the same manner: If one could only answer a few basic questions about 
the person (What is his name? What is his gender? How does he look like? 
etc.), one knows that person poorly; if one could answer every possible 
question about that person (What is his religious faith? What is his food 
preference? What is his favourite basketball team? etc.), one knows that 
person perfectly. Similarly, if one could only answer a few basic questions 
about a fact (Is it true? When did it happen? etc.), one knows that fact poorly; 
if one could do answer every possible question that might be raised about 
that fact (How to prove it? How does it obtain? Why does it obtain? etc.), one 
knows that fact perfectly. For Hetherington, knowing a fact and knowing a 
friend is fundamentally homologous, thus he notes that ‘knowing is 
tantamount to becoming friends with a fact’ (Hetherington 2001: 9). 
 
Now we have seen a rough sketch of the first approach that Hetherington 
takes to argue for gradualism. That is, to draw analogies between knowing-
that and relevant gradable concepts like understanding, knowing-how and 
knowing a person. Call it the argument from analogy. Apparently, this is a 
weak form of argument for motivating epistemic gradualism. It can help us to 
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see that the idea of gradualism might be more plausible than it is standardly 
assumed to be, but it can hardly prove that gradualism is correct in a rigorous 
way. I am not saying that this sort of argument from analogy is invalid, rather, 
I am just saying that this argument is weak. After all, talking of anything 
analogous to knowledge-that is not talking of knowledge-that per se. 
Moreover, Hetherington does not articulate how analogous knowledge-that is 
to those gradable epistemic notions. Except for the relation between how-
knowledge and knowledge-that, which I will put weight on later, Hetherington 
does not seem to plan to advocate that knowledge-that is tantamount to 
those analogues. Thus it is also unclear how close the connection between 
the gradability of knowledge-that and that of its analogues is.  
 
The second approach that Hetherington takes to argue for gradualism is to 
show how knowledge can come in different degrees. Call this the argument 
from showing-how. In his 2001 book, Hetherington proposed many 
theoretical frameworks within which knowledge-that can be understood as 
gradable. For example, Hetherington suggests that one’s knowledge of a 
given proposition can be improved by virtue of education. A child’s 
knowledge that ‘there are kangaroos’ can be improved after she became a 
biology PhD investigating kangaroos, because her knowledge of the 
existence of kangaroos has become deeper and more entrenched thanks to 
her prolonged education on this topic. Hetherington notes that it would be 
counterintuitive to insist that years of biological education can merely help 
her to maintain her childhood knowledge that there are kangaroos. If 
advanced education can improve one’s knowledge of a given proposition, 
then one’s knowledge-that-p can be graded along a qualitative scale. 
Hetherington also argues that one’s deeper and more extensive knowledge 
of a topic can improve one’s knowledge of a fact related to that topic. A 
biology PhD student’s knowledge of the topic of kangaroos (kangaroos’ 
habits and habitats, kangaroos’ reproductive forms, etc.) can improve her 
knowledge that ‘there are kangaroos’. ‘Increased holism can improve your 
knowledge, even on a specific and simple fact’ (Hetherington 2001:23). In 
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addition, it is also proposed that one’s knowledge-that-p can be graded in 
terms of its failability (nota bene, not fallibility40). A subject S knows that p 
failably, iff, (1) S knows that p; (2) there are possible worlds where (i) p is 
false; or (ii) S fails to believe that p; (iii) S fails to have good justification for p. 
Failability can be graded in terms of the amount and the distance of those 
‘failure-worlds’ (i.e., worlds characterised in (i), (ii), and (iii)). The more or the 
closer those failure-worlds are, the more one’s knowledge that p is failable. 
Accordingly, the more failable one’s knowledge that p is, the worse one 
knows that p. Given that the strength of justification usually determines 
failability, the corollary is: in general, the weaker one’s justification for p is, 
the worse one’s knowledge that p is.  
 
Hetherington also applies this view to solve the Gettier problems. He names 
those epistemically lucky/risky factors involved in Gettier cases as ‘strange 
occurrence’. Hetherington argues that despite those strange occurrences, 
subjects in Gettier cases still possess knowledge—but just know poorly. 
Hetherington remarks that: 
 
‘One's having a well-justified true belief that p is 
sufficient for one's knowing that p. But if there is a 
Strange Occurrence within one's context, the knowing is 
failable.’ (Hetherington 2001:76)  
 
And furthermore,  
 
‘We need to keep in mind that—other things being 
equal—the more failable a piece of knowing is, the less 
                                                          
40 In brief, for Hetherington, ‘knowing failably’ is a broader concept than ‘knowing fallibly’ – 
the latter means that S knows that p but S’s belief that p could have been false, while the 
former means that S knows that p but S could have failed to do so. Failability is broader than 
fallibility in that the former includes not only possible worlds where S’s belief could be false, 
but also worlds where S fails to believe that p, and worlds where S fails to have good 
justification for p. Hetherington suggests that, compared with fallibility, failability is a 
preferable notion in the sense that it can take better care of knowledge of necessary truths – 
this sort of knowledge can fall short of being certain, while cannot possibly be fallible; in 
contrast, we can describe them as being failable. For a full discussion about the distinction 
between failability and fallibility, see Hetherington (1999). 
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confident we should be that it is knowledge.’ 
(Hetherington 2001:86) 
 
A piece of completely infailable knowledge can be deemed as a piece of 
perfect knowledge. A very failable item of knowledge is a very poor item of 
knowledge. That is how knowledge can be graded in terms of failability. A 
natural question people will ask is: how poor a piece of knowledge can be 
qua knowledge? How failable can a piece of knowledge be to distinguish 
itself from non-knowledge? What can an item of minimal knowledge be like? 
Hetherington’s answer to these questions is, somewhat surprising and 
radical, that mere true belief can be sufficient to constitute the minimal 
knowledge. Justification is unnecessary for (the minimal) knowledge. That 
constitutes his objection to the so-called second ‘dogma’ (along with 
epistemic absolutism) of epistemology in his 2001 book, namely 
justificationism—the standard epistemological view that propositional 
knowledge entails justification. As radical and revolutionary this anti-
justificationist view is, Hetherington (2001) employs a fairly weak argument to 
defend it. His argument for anti-justificationism that I will introduce next, as 
Hetherington admits, is a sort of argument from analogy as well.   
 
Hetherington rejects justificationism by criticising both externalist (e.g., 
reliabilism) account and internalist (e.g., evidentialism) account of 
justification. He accuses them of both implausibly requiring that one has to 
know a topic if one is to know a fact. Hetherington argues that this reverses 
the real conceptual relationship between knowledge of a topic and 
knowledge of a fact—‘Knowledge of a topic is conceptually dependent on 
knowledge of facts—not vice versa’ (Hetherington 2001: 113). To hammer 
home this point, Hetherington invites readers to consider an exam case 
where an examinee Mario is asked to answer 100 multiple-choice questions. 
Hetherington claims that reliabilism requires one’s well-justified true belief to 
be repeatable. The idea is that in the exam case, for Mario’s knowing one 
question’s answer, reliabilism will expect Mario to be able to give many 
correct answers rather than only one correct answer. Alternatively, Mario 
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should be able to repeat the same true answer in similar possible situations. 
Otherwise, Hetherington claims that, reliabilism would not recognise Mario as 
knowing the correct answer. Hetherington thinks this repeatability 
requirement is too harsh. Here, the analogy he draws is that reliabilism sees 
knowing-that as something that is more akin to a good act done by a good 
person, rather than a good act simpliciter. Hetherington holds that the correct 
way to interpret knowing-that is to treat it just as a good act simpliciter. Just 
like a good act per se can be done by a bad person and can be one-off, a 
piece of knowledge-that-p can just be attained by virtue of some unique 
characteristics (some lucky factors involved) of one’s process of attaining that 
piece of knowledge. For Hetherington, we cannot simply rule out the 
possibility that knowledge can also be one-off and thus unrepeatable. That is 
the analogy Hetherington trades on to argue against externalism. When it 
comes to internalism, his analogy becomes one between a supporting essay 
and supportive evidence. Hetherington claims that, for evidentialism, Maria’s 
knowing a particular fact (knowing the answer to one question) depends on 
her having knowledge of the background topic. It is just like treating her 
supportive evidence to her knowledge of a fact as a supporting essay on the 
relevant topic. For Hetherington, evidentialism is ridiculously demanding as 
evidentialism is simply requiring that Maria has to be able to write a 
supporting essay on the relevant topic to show that she knows a particular 
fact within that topic.  
 
One might find Hetherington’s argument from analogy unconvincing. After all, 
it is far from clear how much analogousness there is between 
externalism/internalism and Hetherington’s analogy. Also it is highly 
doubtable whether externalists and internalists would actually impose those 
(allegedly implausible) requirements to knowledge as Hetherington predicts 
they would do. Given the ambiguousness and doubtfulness of those 
analogies, I do not plan to give an intensive criticism to Hetherington’s 
original argument for anti-justificationism here. However, it is noteworthy that, 
apart from his original arguments, Hetherington also refers to Alvin 
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Goldman’s anti-justificationist view. Here is the argument that Hetherington 
quotes from Goldman: 
 
‘In one sense of “X knows that P”, it is synonymous with 
“X is aware that P” (or “X is apprised of P”), a sense that 
ignores justification. Suppose it is given that P is true, 
and we wonder whether Jane is aware of it. The only 
question that needs to be resolved is whether she 
believes P. If she does, she is aware of it; if she doesn't, 
she is unaware of it. The issue of justification or 
evidence is irrelevant. “Know” can be used similarly. If 
we wonder whether Jane knows that p, again given its 
truth, the only issue to be settled is whether she 
believes it. She knows if she does believe it, and is 
ignorant (does not know) if she does not believe it. The 
issue of justification, or its ilk, is again out of the picture. 
Here is another example. The sentence “You don’t want 
to know what happened while you were gone” seems to 
mean: You don't want to have the truth about what 
happened in your belief corpus. It does not seem to 
require the translation: You don't want to have a justified 
belief in the truth of what happened. So I believe there is 
an ordinary sense of “know” in which it means “truly 
believe.”’ (Goldman 1993: 24-25) 
 
Hetherington accepts Goldman’s verdicts that we sometimes use ‘knows’ 
without requiring justification. Nonetheless, it is hard to say that Goldman’s 
argument for anti-justificationism is as convincing as Hetherington takes it to 
be. The quotation above basically consists of two arguments. The first one 
essentially turns on the linguistic resemblance between ‘knows that p’ and 
‘be aware that p’. On the basis of this prima facie resemblance, it is 
concluded that one’s knowing that p is equivalent to one’s being aware that 
p. However, this equivalence will always be dubious before we have a clear 
definition of (epistemic) ‘awareness’ here, not to mention that it is also 
unclear why one’s being aware that p does not include justification. A belief 
that suddenly pops up in one’s mind out of nowhere without any support can 
hardly constitute knowledge, even if the belief is true. To attain knowledge 
that p, it is ordinarily expected that there is a certain sort of connection 
between one’s belief of p and the truth of p. If knowing that p is equivalent to 
102 
 
being aware that p, and being aware that p just requires believing that p (as 
Goldman predicts), then where is that kind of connection between belief and 
truth?  
 
Goldman’s second argument relies on a seeming fact that the linguistic 
interpretation of some sentences involving ‘knows’ does not requires 
justification. However, as we have seen in the last chapter, our linguistic uses 
of ‘knows’ can hardly accurately capture the conceptual nature of knowledge-
that. That is because, we do not always use ‘knows that’ strictly in daily 
linguistic practice. Linguistic interpretations of those ‘loose’ uses of ‘knows 
that’ are inclined to be too flexible to reflect the genuine characteristics of 
knowledge-that. Some counterintuitive conclusions might also be derived by 
conducting linguistic analyses as Goldman does. Suppose that your friend 
Elvin spoke to you that ‘you don’t want to know what happened while you 
were gone’. And then he told you that after you left Maria’s birthday party last 
night, Maria threw the birthday gift you gave her into the bin. Unbeknownst to 
you, Elvin just played a trick on you. Maria did not throw your gift into the bin. 
Elvin lied to you just in order to make you embarrassed. In that case, the 
proper translation of Elvin’s statement ‘you don’t want to know what 
happened while you were gone’ should be: you don’t want to hear what I am 
going to tell you. It does not seem to require the translation: you don’t want to 
have a true belief regarding what happened in your belief corpus. Whether 
the belief is true or not does not really matter, as what is unwelcome for you 
is not the truth about what happened after you left, but rather what Elvin 
made up about what happened after you left. Moreover, maybe Elvin does 
not even expect you to believe what he said—your embarrassed doubtful 
face is enough for Elvin’s purpose. Hence, neither truth nor belief is required 
for interpreting Elvin’s statement linguistically. Given these, it seems that 
Goldman’s linguistically sensitive argument would also imply that knowledge 




However, Hetherington’s second approach to argue for gradualism, namely, 
the argument from showing-how, is still weak. After all, what Hetherington 
does is just constructing a competing theory to the standard absolutist theory. 
Hetherington frequently uses phrases like ‘the standard view is not 
mandatory’, ‘it is not mandatory to think in the standard way’, etc. However, 
what essential for gradualists is to prove the competing theory to be 
preferable, rather than just conceivable. In other words, to prove the standard 
view to be not satisfactory, rather than just not mandatory. Merely showing 
how a theory can be constructed does not suffice to achieve this. After all, an 
extreme case is, you can even attempt to prove that the world is made of 
hamburger by showing how it is possible that this world is made of 
hamburgers if we endorse an alternative definition of ‘hamburger’. But 
arguments like this is far from convincing. Surely, I am not saying 
Hetherington’s argument from showing-how is as ridiculous as 
‘hamburgerism’. In fact, in some sense, the way in which Hetherington 
constructs his gradualism is fairly promising. It is just not a strong argument 
for epistemic gradualism. It is more like a description of what knowledge 
would be like, if epistemic gradualism is true. But the central issue on the 
table is why epistemic gradualism is true.      
 
Before ending this subsection, the last point that I want to emphasise is that 
there is a seemingly close connection between Hetherington’s argument from 
showing-how and his anti-justificationist view. Hetherington takes anti-
justificationism as a benefit that his gradualism can bring about. That is, 
justificationists will be troubled by the so-called ‘boundary problem’ of 
justification. The boundary problem asks: where is the cut-off point among 
the spectrum of justification that distinguishes sufficient justification 
constituting knowledge and insufficient justification that fails to constitute 
knowledge? Hetherington thinks that it is hard to find such a non-arbitrary 
cut-off point, while discarding justificationism can avoid this issue—mere true 
belief can suffice to constitute the minimal knowledge. In light of this, 
Hetherington takes ‘gradualism + anti-justificationism’ to be superior to 
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‘absolutism + justificationism’. Thus, Hetherington might construct a strong 
argument for gradualism if he can successfully prove two points: 1) anti-
justificationism does enjoy overall advantages over justificationism, and 2) 
anti-justificationism is intrinsic to gradualism and justificationism is a 
mandatory choice for absolutism. Notwithstanding, in what follows, I will 
prove that both points are untenable. I do not think epistemic gradualism will 
perforce lead one to embrace anti-justificationism as Hetherington does. This 
will be clearer as my argument unfolds. Also, I do not think anti-
justificationism is preferable to justificationism—I will hammer home this point 
in section 3. 
 
1.2: Discussion  
 
Three salient characteristics of Hetherington’s first version of epistemic 
gradualism can be summarised as follows: 
 
(1) It leads to (if not being based on) anti-
justificationism.  
(2) It is a combination of threshold absolutism and 
beyond-threshold gradualism.  
(3) It implies that there should be an absolute definition 
of the minimal knowledge. 
 
The first characteristic has been introduced above. In endorsing an anti-
justificationist view, Hetherington proposes an account of knowledge as 
follows: 
 
‘For any epistemic subject x, time t, and proposition p: 
(1) At ty x knows that p =df. At t, x has a justified and 
true belief that p; (2) this knowledge that p is better, or it 
is worse, as knowledge that p to the extent 
(respectively) that x's justification for this true belief that 




Justification is not necessary for this account of knowledge. However, 
Hetherington also concedes that justification is required if one wants to know 
better that p, rather than to just attain the minimal knowledge. More 
justification can improve one’s knowledge. Moreover, every single item of 
justification can improve one’s knowledge—as opposed to the beyond-
threshold absolutist view that propositional knowledge cannot be improved by 
more or better justification once the threshold of knowledge is met. This 
brings us to the second trait of Hetherington’s first version of gradualism. 
Hetherington claims that:     
 
‘In denying that knowledge need be absolute (as I will 
be doing in this chapter and beyond), I will not be 
denying that there is a cut-off point—and an absolute 
one at that—between knowing and not knowing. When 
‘Is it really knowledge?’ is used like ‘Is it really a toy?’, it 
does not commit the speaker to there not being better or 
worse knowledge of a particular fact. Maybe she is 
unsure as to whether some specific belief falls into the 
category of being knowledge. But even that uncertainty 
is compatible with her thinking that there can be both 
better and worse cases of knowledge qua knowledge—
more carefully, cases of knowledge that are more, and 
ones that are less, clearly cases of knowledge, more or 
less clearly members of the category of being 
knowledge.’ (Hetherington 2001:6) 
 
That is to say, Hetherington claims that he is committed to a 
combination of views as follows: 
 
‘(i) Knowledge is to be absolutely distinguished from 
whatever is not knowledge (whatever is external to 
knowledge). This is because there is an absolute cut-off 
point between knowing and not knowing, (ii) But within 
the category of knowing, non-absolutism is true. That is 
because it is possible that some cases of knowledge 
that p are better as knowledge that p, or more clearly 





View (i) is called ‘external absolutism’ by Hetherington (and in my 
terminology, ‘threshold absolutism’), and view (ii) is named ‘internal non-
absolutism’ (in my terminology, ‘beyond-threshold gradualism’). I do not 
think Hetherington can successfully develop epistemic gradualism by 
defending this combination of views. That is because, when endorsing the 
external absolutism and pursuing an internal non-absolutism, Hetherington 
confounds the fuzziness of knowledge with the gradability of knowledge. He 
can at most prove that ‘knows’ is fuzzy, rather than gradable. The claim that 
‘X is ungradable’ can be compatible with the claim that ‘there are less or 
more clearly cases of X qua X’. For instance, ‘death’ is not a gradable 
concept, it will be untoward to say ‘A is more dead than B is’. Nevertheless, 
there can also be less clearly cases/manifestations of death (e.g., lying 
motionlessly without breath) and more clearly cases/manifestations of death 
(e.g., brain death indicated by the electroencephalogram). The fuzziness of 
the boundary of a concept X does not suffice to entail the gradability of X. 
After all, it can be argued that every philosophically interesting concept is 
fuzzy in this or that sense.  
 
To be more specific, there can be at least two kinds of fuzziness: first, the 
definitional fuzziness, which means that the boundary of a concept X is fuzzy 
due to the vagueness of the definition of that concept—due to the lack of an 
absolute criterion to determine whether something can be recognised as an 
instance of X or not. For example, the fuzziness of being a toy. It is hard to 
define what a toy is in an absolute and clear manner. Sometimes we adopt 
functional definitions, e.g., ‘a toy is an artefact that can be played with’, but 
there is no absolute criterion to judge whether an object can be played with or 
not. Furthermore, it is even hard to define the behaviour ‘play with’ precisely. 
The second kind of fuzziness, which I shall call the epistemic fuzziness, 
means that a concept X has a clear and absolute definition, but sometimes it 
is not easy to tell its instances in our daily epistemic practice. For example, 
we can have an absolute definition of ‘fake’ (counterfeited; not real), but 
sometimes it is still hard for us to tell whether a given artwork is fake or not. 
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Also, sometimes it is easy to tell that a poorly counterfeited fake is fake. 
Hence, there are still less or more borderline cases of ‘fake’ even though the 
definition of ‘fake’ can be absolute. Notwithstanding this fuzziness, ‘fake’ is 
still an ungradable term. The fuzziness of ‘death’, I think, also falls into the 
category of epistemic fuzziness.  
 
The definitional fuzziness often leads to the epistemic fuzziness, but not vice 
versa. Among the two sorts of fuzziness, the epistemic fuzziness of 
concepts is much more clearly compatible with the ungradability of 
concepts. It seems to be relatively hard to find a predicate that has a vague 
definition but is still ungradable. But it is easy to find predicates that are 
epistemically fuzzy but still ungradable (e.g., ‘fake’, ‘dead’, ‘extinct’, 
‘plagiaristic’). One explanation for this difference might be: almost every 
concept, under certain conditions, can be epistemically fuzzy; while not 
every concept is definitionally fuzzy (admittedly, the concept ‘fuzzy’ itself is 
definitionally fuzzy and gradable, but it does not mean that everything has a 
fuzzy definition). We will revisit the relation between vagueness and 
gradability in the next chapter when we remodel the debate between 
gradualism and absolutism. At this stage, let us move forward to see how 
this relates to Hetherington’s gradualism. 
 
Given that Hetherington endorses that there is an absolute difference 
between knowledge and non-knowledge, it seemingly implies that 
Hetherington agrees that the definition of knowledge is clear and absolute 
so that there can be a cut-off point of knowledge. As a result, it seems that 
for Hetherington, the fuzziness of ‘knows’ is not definitional but only 
epistemic. The reason why there are less or more clearly cases of 
knowledge qua knowledge is not because of the vagueness of the definition 
of knowledge, but because of the practical difficulty of identifying instances 
of knowledge, the practical difficulty of making knowledge ascriptions. 
However, we have noted that epistemic fuzziness is insufficient to entail 
gradability. Therefore the basis of Hetherington’s internal non-absolutism is 
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not solid. In addition, since every concept can be epistemically fuzzy under 
certain conditions, it is hard to see who the opponent of Hetherington’s 
internal non-absolutism will be, if this view is just based on the sense that 
the concept ‘knows’ is of epistemic fuzziness. That is, internal non-
absolutism may not be that controversial as Hetherington presents it to be, 
and on the contrary, internal absolution is not that platitudinous as 
Hetherington takes to be. 
 
Now we have discussed characteristics (1) and (2) of Hetherington’s first 
gradualism. With (1) and (2) in play, a natural corollary that would be 
entailed is (3): that there needs to be an absolute definition of the minimal 
knowledge. That is because, (1) implies that justification is not necessary for 
knowledge, and (2) claims that there is an absolute difference between 
knowledge and non-knowledge. Combining (1) and (2) together, the 
absolute difference between knowledge and non-knowledge just amounts to 
the absolute definition of the minimal knowledge, i.e., true belief. The 
definition of the minimal knowledge has to be absolute (without definitional 
fuzziness) so that the difference between knowledge and non-knowledge 
can be absolute—a straightforward definition fitting the bill is ‘true belief’.  
 
I will reject Hetherington’s first version of gradualism in terms of the three 
characteristics. Precisely put, I do not accept anti-justificationism; I do not 
accept the threshold/external absolutism that Hetherington accepts (I deny 
that there is an absolute difference between knowledge and non-
knowledge); I do not think an absolute definition of the minimal knowledge is 
necessary.  
 
There is more that needs to be said about the relation between 
Hetherington’s minimalism and his gradualist proposal. Strictly speaking, 
Hetherington’s gradualism is not logically based on his minimalism—it is not 
the case that the former entails the latter or the latter entails the former. 
However, the two views are closely connected to each other. As we have 
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noted, Hetherington’s first version of gradualist proposal is a hybrid one 
consisting of internal gradualism and external absolutism—he insists that 
there is a cut-off boundary distinguishing knowledge from not-knowledge. 
Correspondingly, now that knowledge is argued to be gradable and there 
can be good knowledge and bad knowledge, a natural question to be asked 
is how bad an instance of knowledge is allowed to be. In other words, where 
is the boundary of knowledge41? Given his internal gradualist and external 
absolutist stances, minimalism turns out to be a straightforward answer for 
Hetherington. Again, this minimalist answer is not the only logically possible 
option (and might also not the optimal option) for Hetherington, but it does 
constitute an unignorable part of the whole gradualist storytelling as a matter 
of fact. It is motivated by Hetherington’s commitment to external absolutism, 
and can, in turn, answer an important (at least for Hetherington) problem 
invited by this commitment. Therefore, minimalism completes Hetherington’s 
first version of gradualist picture as an important piece of jigsaw. I concede 
that rejecting Hetherington’s minimalism is insufficient for rejecting his 
gradualism. Nevertheless, the defects of his minimalism should also be seen 
as defects of his gradualist account of knowledge. 
 
I have outlined the first version of Hetherington’s gradualist proposal, now let 
us go ahead to see how Hetherington constructs his second version of 
gradualism.   
 




                                                          
41 This seems to be a very important philosophical issue for Hetherington, and he has discusses this 
problem in many places (e.g., 2001. Chap 4; 2006; 2011. Chap 1). Notice that, this is not an exclusive 
problem for gradualism. Hetherington (2006) argues that anyone who endorses fallibilism should pay 
adequate attention to the boundary problem. However, as we will see in Chapter 4, if we reject 
external absolutism, then gradualists do not have to be nagged by the boundary problem too much. 
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Hetherington’s second version of gradualism originates from his 2005 paper 
‘Knowing (How It Is) That P: Degrees and Qualities of Knowledge’, where 
knowing that p is argued to be identical with how-knowledge that p, to wit, 
knowing how it is that p. This idea is inherited and expanded in his 2011 book 
‘How to Know’ (in particular, the fifth chapter).  
 
Before we proceed to introduce the main argument for Hetherington’s second 
version of gradualism (which is based on how knowledge-that p), it is worth 
noticing that Hetherington (2011) also puts forward a closely related but 
subtly distinct approach to argue for gradualism, which is motivated by a 
novel account of knowledge that he calls practicalism. Hetherington’s 
practicalism, as the reverse of the standard intellectualism, argues that 
knowledge-that is a kind of knowledge-how. One core practicalist thesis 
relevant here is the so-called knowledge-as-ability hypothesis, which 
interprets knowledge as an ability to manifest various accurate 
representations of p. This ability can be graded in accordance with how 
detailed one knows how it is that p. The more aspects of how it is that p one 
knows, the better one’s knowledge that p is. Accordingly, knowledge, qua an 
ability, is gradational.  
 
There are three reasons why I do not see Hetherington’s practicalist account 
of gradualism as the core of his second version of gradualism. First, 
Hetherington’s practicalist argument is not as exclusively dedicated to 
gradualism as his argument based on how-knowledge that p that we will 
introduce later. The main target the knowledge-as-ability hypothesis aims to 
argue against is the standard view that knowledge is a kind of belief, rather 
than that knowledge does not admit of degrees. Gradualism only serves as a 
‘side product’ if the knowledge-as-ability hypothesis succeeds42. Second, I 
                                                          
42 I have qualms about the hypothesis itself as well. The hypothesis argues that knowledge 
that p is the ability to register accurately that p. Therefore, knowledge is not the 
manifestation of abilities, but the ability itself. On the contrary, true belief is just a type of 
manifestation of knowledge, while knowledge per se is the ability to register accurately that 
p. ‘Accurately believing that p’ is just a member of what Hetherington calls epistemic 
diaspora, which refers to a group of manifestations of knowledge including believing 
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think the account of gradualism based on how-knowledge that p that 
Hetherington presented in the fifth chapter of the same book is a more robust 
expansion of the practicalist account that he presented in the second 
chapter. Although the two accounts appeal to different conceptual resources 
to construct gradualism, these resources are closely connected to each 
other. For example, both accounts rest on an essential notion ‘how it is that 
p’. The practicalist account of gradualism suggests that knowledge that p, 
qua an ability, can be graded in accordance with how detailed one knows 
how it is that p. How should we understand ‘how detailed one knows how it is 
that p’? I think, the account of gradualism based on how-knowledge that p 
can give us a more explicit answer. That is, ‘how many details of how it is 
that p are known’ can be interpreted in terms of ‘how many parts of a minimal 
truthmaker for p are known’. Finally, even if the knowledge-as-ability 
hypothesis is correct, it is unclear how far this can lead us towards 
gradualism. Take Hetherington’s own ‘home run’ analogy as an example. 
Hetherington (2011) concedes that striking a home run is an ability, however, 
whether a home run is struck or not is an absolute yes-or-no affair. He also 
notes that ‘knowledge—according to knowledge-absolutism—is like that 
(home run)’ (2011: 7)43. If that is how absolutism interprets knowledge (in 
fact, this is a typical external-absolutist interpretation), then it will be 
confusing how knowledge’s being an ability helps to refute absolutism. 
Striking a home run is an ability which can be evaluated and graded by many 
qualitative properties, such as the amount by which the ball clears the 
outfield wall or the speed at which it flies. But whether a home run is struck or 
                                                          
accurately that p, asserting accurately that p, reasoning accurately in p-related ways, acting 
appropriately in p-related ways, etc. However, it is unclear why the existence of the 
epistemic diaspora entails that knowledge is an ability. Why is it not the contrary? Why is it 
not the case that those members of the epistemic diaspora constitute what we call ‘cognitive 
competence/ability’ and knowledge is just the manifestation of this competence/ability rather 
than the competence/ability itself?    
43 This reading of epistemic absolutism is borne out by Fantl & McGrath (2009: 24): ‘Home 
runs depend on, and vary with respect to, factors that come in degrees: how far the ball 
traveled, how hard it was hit, how skillfully, etc. There are, in some sense, better and worse 
home runs—home runs that are more or less majestic, more or less lucky, etc. But whether a 
hit is a home run is a binary matter. There is no reason the fallibilist shouldn't say the same 




not is an absolute binary matter. Similarly, shooting a three-pointer is an 
ability, but ‘shooting a three-pointer’ is not gradable. Thus it seems that ‘φ is 
an ability’ fails to entail that ‘φ is gradable’. At least, this type of ability-based 
gradualism would still allow for the equivocal attitude that I mentioned in 
Chapter 1: knowing that p, qua an ability, can be graded in a peculiar 
sense—but it is ultimately non-gradational in general, just like hitting a home 
run and shooting a three-pointer. 
        
Comparatively, Hetherington’s how-knowledge-that-p-based account of 
gradualism is more fully developed. At the start of his 2005 paper on this 
form of gradualism, Hetherington states in the footnote that:  
 
‘Unlike the knowledge-gradualism in that earlier book, 
this new version will not be framed in terms of whatever 
strength of justification is present within a given piece of 
knowledge.’ (Hetherington 2005: 129-130) 
 
Indeed, in the beyond-threshold gradualism that Hetherington develops 
previously, what determines the degree of a piece of knowledge is the 
strength of its justificatory support. The better justification one has, the better 
her knowledge (beyond the threshold of knowledge) will be. While in his new 
account of gradualism, Hetherington resorts to the idea of how-knowledge 
that p44 to explicate how knowledge-that p can be gradable: 
 
‘That is, in my previous knowledge-gradualism, the 
degree or quality of a piece of knowledge was a function 
of what constituted the knowledge ‘from within’—the 
strength of its justificatory component. In this paper’s 
knowledge-gradualism, the degree or quality of a piece 
of knowledge that p is a function of the extensiveness of 
the ‘wider’ network of knowledge that constitutes the 
degree to which the knowledge that p how-knows that 
p.’ (Hetherington 2005: 138)  
 
                                                          
44 How-knowledge that p, Hetherington emphasises, is distinct from knowledge-how. The 
former refers to knowledge of how it is that p, whereas the latter refers to knowledge of how 
to do something.  
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Hetherington does not provide a very clear definition for how-knowledge. 
Basically, he uses this term to refer to knowledge of how it is that p. And how 
it is that p, according to Hetherington, comes in many aspects. The minimal 
aspect of how it is that p is that p obtains. That is to say, the minimal aspect 
of one’s how-knowledge that p is one’s knowledge that p simpliciter. How-
knowledge that p can be enriched and deepened if more aspects of how it is 
that p (other than that ‘p obtains’ per se) is known.  
 
Hetherington further trades on the truthmaker theory to spell out the notion of 
how-knowledge. Hetherington adopts David Armstrong’s truthmaker 
necessitarianism (see Armstrong 2004) and defines a truthmaker for a 
proposition p as something in the world that necessitates p’s truth being true. 
A minimal truthmaker for a truth that p is characterised as a truthmaker such 
that if some parts of it are subtracted, then it will not suffice to make it true 
that p. For example, a minimal truthmaker for the truth that ‘Kyle is a boy’ can 
be Kyle’s being a boy. Given these, to have a better how-knowledge that p is 
to know more parts of a minimal truth-maker for p. Hetherington thereby 
proposes a thesis ‘HkTm’: 
 
‘HkTm       At time t, a person x’s how-knowledge that p 
is more, or it is less, well developed or extensive, in 
accord with how many parts of a minimal truthmaker for 
p are known by x at t.’ (2005: 137) 
 
So how does Hetherington utilise those concepts to argue for his new 
epistemic gradualism? The schema of his argument can be summarised as 
follows, which I refer to as argument from equivalence: 
 
[Argument from Equivalence] 
(E1) Having knowledge that p entails having how-
knowledge that p, as knowledge that p is the minimal 
aspect of how-knowledge that p. 
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(E2) Having how-knowledge that p entails having 
knowledge that p, as knowledge that p is the minimal 
aspect of how-knowledge that p. 
(E3) From E1 and E2, having knowledge that p is the 
necessary and sufficient condition of having how-
knowledge that p. 
(E4) From E3, having knowledge that p is equivalent to 
having how-knowledge that p.  
(E5) How-knowledge that p is gradable. 
(E6) Knowledge that p is gradable. 
 
Premises E1 and E2 are taken to be true by virtue of Hetherington’s 
characterisations of how-knowledge that p. It is stipulated that the minimal 
requirement of one’s knowing how it that p is knowing that p simpliciter. 
Knowledge that p is deemed to be the threshold of how-knowledge that p. 
Therefore knowing that p entails having how-knowledge that p (to the minimal 
extent), and vice versa. From E1 and E2, it seems that one can derive E3 and 
E4 smoothly. Hetherington presents E3 as a biconditional that he calls ‘H’, 
to wit, knowing that p both entails and is entailed from knowing how it is that 
p. From that, Hetherington infers that ‘knowledge that p is how-knowledge 
that p’ (Hetherington 2011: 177). Premise E5 also seems to be apparently 
true by lights of HkTm—one’s how-knowledge that p can be graded in terms 
of how many aspects of how it is that p is known.  
 
One’s knowing how Kyle is a boy might be minimal if only that fact of Kyle’s 
being a boy is known. It can be improved if one also knows the age of Kyle, 
or knows that Kyle is a student of a boy’s school, etc. If E5 is true, and 
knowledge that p is equivalent to how-knowledge that p, then knowledge that 
p should also be gradable—E6 can thus be inferred. 
 




Before we proceed to see how Hetherington’s argument from equivalence is 
untenable (which will be done in section 4), let me end this chapter by 
summarising some traits of Hetherington’s second version of gradualism. In 
particular, we shall focus on places where it differs from the previous version.  
 
First of all, it is obvious that Hetherington’s second version of gradualism is 
based on the concept of how-knowledge that p and the truthmaker theory, 
which is quite different from his first version of gradualism which is based on 
the analysis of epistemic justification. Consequently, the distinction between 
beyond-threshold gradualism and threshold gradualism becomes marginal in 
his second version gradualism, as this distinction no longer plays as 
important a role as it does for the first version of gradualism.   
 
As a result, Hetherington also characterises his new concept of ‘minimal 
knowledge’ in a different way from his previous version. Various 
interpretations of his new account of ‘minimal knowledge’ were given in his 
2005 paper: 
 
‘When a person x’s how-knowledge that p is restricted 
to knowing a minimal truthmaker for p, x has minimal 




‘[M]inimal knowledge that p is unaccompanied by 
knowledge of any parts of a minimal truthmaker for p—
any parts beyond p itself.’ (Hetherington 2005: 141-142) 
 
Moreover, Hetherington also identifies minimal knowledge with fundamental 
knowledge:  
 
‘A piece of foundational knowledge needs only to be an 
instance of knowledge that p which is not informative 
(and draws upon no information) about anything other 




Here, Hetherington’s definition of the minimal knowledge differs significantly 
from his previous work. Minimal knowledge is not interpreted in terms of 
justification, but rather in terms of minimal truthmaker. An item of minimal 
knowledge, here, is no longer understood as one that supported by no 
justification, but rather one that accompanied by no other aspect of how-it-is-
that-p other than p per se. Just as Hetherington emphasises, his previous 
understanding of minimal knowledge is ‘from within’—focusing on the 
justificatory components within a given piece of knowledge; whereas in his 
new version of gradualism, a holistic understanding of knowledge is 
employed—now he focuses on the holistic connection between a given piece 
of knowledge-that-p and its related supportive how-knowledge-that-p45. 
Hetherington admits this change and claims that: 
 
‘How unimpressive is minimal knowledge? For example, 
is it mere true belief—a true belief bereft of any 
justificatory support? I am not presuming so. Hence, I 
am explicating its minimality or bareness in terms of its 
object (namely, p—and nothing else), rather than in 
terms of an absence of justificatory support for it. I will 
continue leaving open that question of whether cases of 
minimal knowledge enjoy justificatory support.’ 
(Hetherington 2005: 142) 
 
Again, we can spot another important difference between Hetherington’s two 
versions of gradualism: the first version implies that knowledge does not 
entail justification, that is, the first version implies anti-justificationism; while 
the second version weakens its advocative attitude towards anti-
justificationism—Hetherington leaves the question of whether justification is 
necessary for knowledge as open46. Hetherington’s second version of 
gradualism can thus be deemed to be less radical than the previous version. 
Notwithstanding, in what follows, it will be argued that both versions of 
Hetherington’s gradualism are problematic.  
                                                          
45 In fact, this holism concept was already mentioned in his 2001 book, where he contributed 
this idea to W.V.O Quine. However, at that time this holist concept of knowledge did not play 
as essential a role as it does in his second version of gradualism.    




3. Criticism of Hetherington’s First Gradualist Theory 
 
In section 1, we have noted that there are three traits of Hetherington’s first 
version of epistemic gradualism: 
 
(1) It leads to anti-justificationism.  
(2) It is a combination of threshold absolutism and 
beyond-threshold gradualism.  
(3) It implies that there should be an absolute definition 
of the minimal knowledge. 
 
I disagree with Hetherington in terms of the three traits. Trait 2 and trait 3 are 
closely related—that is because Hetherington maintains that there has to be a 
clear cut-off point between the minimal knowledge and non-knowledge. He 
advocates the threshold absolutism and the ‘mere true belief’ account of 
minimal knowledge. That is to say, his minimalism proposal is also rooted in 
his threshold absolutist inclination. In what follows, I will show why the three 
traits turn out to be three defects of Hetherington’s first version of epistemic 
gradualism. Since trait 2 and 3 share the same threshold absolutism ground, 
this section will proceed by criticising Hetherington’s anti-justificationist and 
threshold absolutist inclinations.  
 
3.1: Anti-Justificationism  
 
It is epistemologically orthodox that knowledge requires justification47, 
especially when justification is understood as a sort of generic 
epistemic support (e.g., epistemic warrant, as it is sometimes known). 
However, Hetherington argues against this orthodoxy and urges that 
                                                          
47 For exceptions, see Sartwell (1991, 1992), Skidmore (1993), Goldman (1993), Hawthorne 




knowledge can be attained without justification. His main motivations 
for advocating anti-justificationism are based on two observations:  
 
First, Hetherington finds that both mainstream externalist and internalist 
accounts of justification reverse the proper conceptual-priority-relation 
between ‘knowing a fact’ and ‘knowing a topic’. He holds that knowing a fact 
should be conceptually prior to knowing a topic—that is, to know a fact, one 
does not need to have possessed knowledge of an associated topic already. 
On the contrary, knowing a topic is conceptually dependent on knowing facts, 
as to know a topic is to know many facts about that topic. Hetherington 
argues that both reliabilism (a prominent externalist theory) and evidentialism 
(a representative internalist theory) read the conceptual relationship in the 
wrong order—they take knowing a fact to be conceptually dependent on 
knowing a topic. Take reliabilism for example. Hetherington uses a case of 
exam knowledge to argue that, for a student’s knowing the correct answer of 
a specific question, reliabilists would require the student to be able to give 
many more correct answers in sufficiently similar circumstances. That is, to 
know a fact, Maria is required to have knowledge of an associated topic. 
Hetherington holds that this reliabilist requirement is unacceptable. Instead, 
‘enough further knowledge to amount to her having knowledge of a related 
topic is not conceptually necessary for her knowing a particular fact within 
that topic’ (Hetherington 2001: 113). 
 
Second, Hetherington worries that if we take justification as a necessary 
condition for knowledge, then it will be difficult to solve the so-called boundary 
problem. That is, if justification is necessary for knowledge, then how much 
justification can suffice to yield knowledge? Where is the boundary between 
‘enough justification’ and ‘insufficient justification’?  Hetherington is sceptical 
about whether the cut-off point can be found in a non-arbitrary manner. On 
another hand, Hetherington holds that there has to be a cut-off point between 
knowledge and non-knowledge. Putting all these considerations together, he 
infers that justification should not be seen as necessary, so that the boundary 
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problem can be solved, and the cut-off point between knowledge and non-
knowledge can be maintained. The cut-off point, Hetherington argues, is ‘true 
belief’. Contra most epistemologists, Hetherington argues that mere true 
belief can suffice to constitute the minimal knowledge (call this view 
minimalism). 
 
Both observations cannot reasonably motivate anti-justificationism. In the 
previous chapter, we have seen that Hetherington’s criticism of externalism 
and internalism can hardly lend strong support to anti-justificationism. That 
is because, firstly, there are far more accounts of justification other than 
reliabilism and evidentialism, but Hetherington’s criticism only cast suspicion 
upon the two selected accounts and thus appears to be gerrymandered. 
Secondly, reliabilism and evidentialism can deny that they actually require 
that one has to already know a topic before she could know a fact. For 
example, when it comes to the case of exam knowledge, reliabilists can 
agree with Hetherington’s assertion that: 
 
‘[N]o instance of her having knowledge, within the exam, 
of an individual fact depends conceptually on its being 
justified in a way that amounts to her having knowledge 
of an associated topic.’ (Hetherington 2001: 113) 
 
That is because reliabilists can explicate that they do not expect Maria’s 
knowledge of a fact to be justified in a way that amounts to her having 
knowledge of an associated topic. Rather, they just require Maria’s 
knowledge to be justified in a way that amounts to her being able to have 
knowledge of an associated topic. The reliabilist requirement can just be 
dispositional. Consequently, this can avoid Hetherington’s criticism that one’s 
knowledge of a fact has to depend conceptually on her knowledge of an 
associated topic. Dependency implies a certain sort of priority (temporal, 
causal or constituent; etc.). That is, ‘A depends on B’ implies that B enjoys a 
certain kind of priority over A. Certainly, reliabilism does not require that one 
must have already possessed knowledge of an associated topic (temporally) 
before one knowing a fact. Also, reliabilism could deny that one’s knowing a 
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topic is causally prior to one’s knowing a fact. It is not the case that one 
knows a fact by virtue of her knowledge of the relevant topic. Rather, 
reliabilists can argue that one’s true belief is well justified by virtue of the 
reliable belief-forming method, which does not guarantee that one has 
already possessed knowledge of the relevant topic, but just that one would be 
in a very good position to know relevant topic if the method were taken. 
Furthermore, it is also not the case that one’s knowing a topic should be seen 
as a more basic concept than one’s knowing a fact—reliabilism does not 
claim that one’s knowledge of a topic constitutes one’s knowledge of a fact. 
Hence, the reliabilist account of justification does not necessarily imply that 
knowing a topic enjoy any sort of priority over knowing a fact. Therefore, 
Hetherington’s censure that ‘reliabilism renders knowing a fact conceptually 
dependent on knowing a topic’ seems to be unfairly arbitrary.  
 
Now let us move forward to the boundary problem. In that respect, 
Hetherington worries that it is difficult (almost amount to impossible) to find 
out the cut-off point between sufficient justification (for constituting 
knowledge) and insufficient knowledge. As a matter of fact, this worry does 
not suffice to entail that we should abandon justification as a necessary 
constituent of knowledge. On the contrary, insofar as we see propositional 
knowledge as a gradable concept, then the boundary problem should not 
discourage us, as most gradable concepts have difficulties in nominating the 
cut-off point. Belief is gradable, belief needs credence. It is difficult to tell how 
much credence is sufficient for constituting a belief. However, this does not 
mean that credence is unnecessary for belief. Humour is gradable, humour 
requires ‘being funny’. It is difficult to tell how funny is funny enough for being 
humorous, but this does not imply that humour does not need being funny. 
The difficulty in finding the cut-off point is not a problem, but a mark of a 
gradable concept. This also applies to propositional knowledge.     
 
We have seen that Hetherington’s motivations for rejecting justificationism are 
ill-grounded. So, why cannot his anti-justificationism be accepted? What is 
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the problem of endorsing mere true belief as the minimal knowledge? A 
straightforward answer is that it violates the widely-shared intuition that 
knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck, at least, intervening luck48; 
and the intuition that knowledge should be a kind of cognitive achievement 
(see Pritchard 2007, 2012a; Sosa 2007; Greco 2003; Carter & Pritchard 
2013). One can luckily form a true belief via mere guessing or wishful 
thinking. But a true belief formed in these ways can hardly be admitted as 
knowledge as it is true by virtue of mere epistemic luck. Intuitively, if one’s 
true belief B is to be counted as an item of knowledge, then there should be 
some sort of non-lucky relation between the formation of B and B’s being 
true. For example, one forms the belief B and B would not have been easily 
false (cf. the ‘safety’ condition of knowledge, a la Pritchard). Or, one’s belief B 
is true because it manifests one’s relevant cognitive competence (cf. the idea 
of ‘aptness’, a la Sosa). An instance of unjustified true belief lacks this sort of 
non-lucky relation, and thus fails to constitute knowledge. Numerous relevant 
discussions have been undertaken in this fashion49, so I do not plan to 
expand it too much here. Apart from this, I would like to discuss another 
                                                          
48 Dialectically speaking, it is noteworthy that Hetherington (2013) has explicitly argued 
against the anti-luck intuition. His objection to the anti-luck condition of knowledge is based 
on his objection to the safety theory of knowledge. Roughly speaking, Hetherington argues 
that the safety theory succumbs to a modal fallacy. He asserts that advocates of the safety 
theory cannot show a true belief B falls short of knowledge due to its unsafety. That is 
because, to show a true belief B to be unsafe, one has to re-identify B in a close possible 
world W where B (formed via the same method) is false, however, one can only identify a 
false belief B with the same contend in W, rather than the same piece of true belief B. Thus 
one cannot show a true belief to be unsafe. This criticism of the anti-luck intuition strikes me 
as a very unconvincing one. Firstly, it only focuses on the modal reading of the safety-
account of epistemic luck, but as we will see in Chapter Five, there are other (perhaps more 
plausible) ways to account for epistemic luck (e.g., Goldberg’s epistemic entitlement account 
of luck). Secondly, Hetherington seems to distort the anti-luck intuition and the safety 
condition of knowledge. It is unfair to accuse the safety theory of conducting a modal fallacy 
because it has to appeal to a false (and thus different) piece of belief across worlds. That is 
because, safety, by its nature, is a subjunctive/counterfactual concept – a piece of true belief 
is unsafe if in sufficiently similar possible worlds its counterparts (with the same contend and 
is formed via the same method by the same subject) would be false. Consider a similar 
modal concept ‘unnecessary’. A true belief is unnecessarily true iff in some possible worlds 
its counterparts are false. It is unreasonable to reject the idea of ‘unnecessary’ by 
complaining that to identify a true belief to be unnecessarily true, one can only re-identify a 
false belief, rather than the same true belief, in a possible world. It is also untenable to 
conclude that therefore we cannot show a true belief to be unnecessarily true.  




drawback to Hetherington’s minimalism. That involves the value problem of 
knowledge. 
 
It is ordinarily granted by epistemologists that knowledge is more valuable 
than mere true belief50. This tradition can be traced back to Plato’s Meno, 
where Socrates raises the so-called ‘primary value problem’, i.e., why 
knowledge is more valuable than true belief. Accordingly, there is also a 
secondary value problem, which concerns the issue of why knowledge is 
more valuable than any proper subset of its parts. These questions invite 
heated discussions in the literature of epistemology (see Jones 1997; 
Kvanvig 2003, 2005; Pritchard 2007; Goldman and Olsson 2009; etc.), and 
the mainstream view holds that the value problem of knowledge is a genuine 
problem51 in the sense that knowledge is preferable to mere true belief 
indeed—there is discrepancy in value to explain.  
 
Hetherington’s minimalism might also grant that the value problem is a 
genuine problem worthy of considerations. Even if true belief is the minimal 
knowledge, there can still be differences in value between mere true belief 
and more robust knowledge—however, this discrepancy is just a matter of 
degree. Hetherington often describes mere true belief as to the ‘worst 
possible knowledge’—the least valuable knowledge. Hence, in response to 
the value problem of knowledge, Hetherington’s minimalism might argue that 
the difference in value between mere true belief and knowledge lies in the 
justificatory strength. A better-justified item of knowledge is a more valuable 
item of knowledge. While a mere true belief lacks justification, and thus will be 
the least valuable instance of knowledge:    
 
‘Thus, if you have justification for a true belief that p, this 
improves something about your having that true belief; and 
if we let the true belief be knowledge already …, then we 
                                                          
50 As an exception, Kvanvig (2003) famously argues that knowledge is not distinctively more 
valuable than mere true belief. For responses to Kvanvig’s challenge, see Greco (2009, 
2010), DePaul (2009), Ryan (2017), etc. 
51 For some exceptions, see Sartwell (1991, 1992); Goldman (1993). 
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may interpret the justification as making the knowledge 
better knowledge—yet without the justification's having been 
necessary to the knowledge's very existence.’ (Hetherington 
2001: 132)  
 
Therefore, in accordance with Hetherington’s minimalism, anti-justificationism 
can be compatible with the primary and secondary value problem of 
knowledge. Knowledge does often (but not always, given that for 
Hetherington sometimes knowledge is just mere true belief) enjoy more 
value, but this advantage is just a matter of degree—in terms of how well-
justified an item of knowledge is (e.g., how fallible the justification is).  
 
Nevertheless, Hetherington’s minimalism will be in trouble when it comes to 
the tertiary value problem, which holds that ‘the difference in value between 
knowledge and that which falls short of knowledge must be one of kind and 
not merely degree’ (Pritchard 2007:104) and then asks what kind of 
distinctive value knowledge has. This tertiary value problem is taken to be 
significant, as it captures the sense that we usually see knowledge as 
distinctively valuable. If the difference in value between knowledge and mere 
true belief is just a matter of degree, then it would be unclear why it is 
knowledge that is of distinctive epistemic value for us. How can knowledge 
be seen as the central kind of concept in epistemological research that is of 
unique interest to us? The tertiary value problem requires us to find the 
difference in kind such that we can explain why an excellent item of mere 
true belief cannot be seen as epistemologically valuable and desirable as 
knowledge, at least, a poor instance of knowledge. On the contrary, 
Hetherington’s anti-justificationism (and thus his minimalism) asserts that the 
former is sometimes as valuable as the latter indeed. If anti-justificationism is 
right, then knowledge only has a greater degree rather than a different kind of 
value than mere true belief, since mere true belief is counted as a kind of 
knowledge. After all, the worst possible knowledge is still a kind of knowledge 
rather than anything that falls short of knowledge. That is to say, the 
difference in how well-justified a true belief is cannot yield a difference in 
kind, but just one in degrees. Hetherington’s minimalism thus denies the 
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significance of the tertiary value problem52. That is a fairly unpalatable upshot 
for Hetherington’s gradualism, as it will impose a heavy burden of proof upon 
gradualists to prove why, contra the majority of epistemologists, knowledge 
does not possess any distinctive epistemic value compared with mere true 
belief.  
 
One might argue that gradualists should not take the tertiary value problem 
seriously, as it seems to rest on theoretical assumptions that they deny. That 
is, absolutism assumes that the conceptual difference between knowledge 
and true beliefs is one of kind rather than one of degree. Gradualism, at least 
Hetherington’s first version of gradualism, denies this. Knowledge’s being 
gradational implies that we can put knowledge on a kind of continuum 
connecting to lesser epistemic standings that fall short of knowledge. 
Correspondingly, we can also put knowledge on a continuum of value with 
true beliefs that fall short of knowledge. The difference between knowledge’s 
value and that of true beliefs is just a matter of degree. If that is the case, 
then this can get Hetherington off the hook. 
 
I do not think Hetherington’s minimalism can be defended by this response. 
First, this response does not counterbalance the burden of proof that 
Hetherington’s gradualism has to shoulder for rejecting justificationism (and, 
in this case, for rejecting the appropriateness of the tertiary value problem of 
knowledge). Hetherington still has to demonstrate why the conceptual (and 
thus axiological) difference between knowledge and lesser epistemic 
standings is just one of degree rather than one of kind. As aforementioned, it 
                                                          
52 For literature acknowledging the appropriateness of the tertiary value problem of 
knowledge, see Greco (2009, 2010); Pritchard, Alan, & Adrian (2010); Ryan (2017); etc. For 
a challenge, see Simion & Kelp (2016). Simion and Kelp call into question a strong claim that 
knowledge is distinctively more valuable than mere true belief in the way that Pritchard puts. 
However, they endorse a weaker claim that knowledge enjoys a weak superiority over true 
belief. That is, some amount of knowledge enjoys more value of a certain kind than any 
amount of true belief. Notice that, it is also not obvious whether Hetherington’s minimalism 
meets this weaker claim. Within his minimalist picture, it is unclear what kind of distinctive 
value ‘good knowledge’ (well-justified ones) enjoys over ‘minimal knowledge’ (mere true 
beliefs). Instead, it seems that Hetherington was ‘putting knowledge on a kind of continuum 
of value’, which is exactly what Simion and Kelp argue against. 
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is unwise for gradualists to develop gradualism with this kind of unnecessary 
extra burden (we will see why it is unnecessary soon).  
 
Second, more fundamentally, it is unclear why gradualism has to deny that 
the conceptual difference between knowledge and lesser epistemic standings 
is one of kind. Knowledge’s being gradational does not entail that it is not a 
distinct kind of epistemic standing in contrast with true beliefs. ‘Green’ is a 
gradational concept; it can be put on a continuum of spectrum connecting 
with other colours such as blue and yellow. But this does not affect the fact 
that green is a distinct kind of colour. The conceptual difference between 
green and yellow is more like a matter of kind rather than merely one of 
degree. It will be clearer as my own gradualist proposal unfolds (see Chapter 
4) that gradualism just needs to deny that there is a clear cut-off point 
distinguishing knowledge from lesser epistemic standings—but it does not 
follow that knowledge is thus the same kind of epistemic standing with true 
beliefs. Concept A’s being a distinct kind of concept from concept B does not 
rely on the existence of a clear cut-off point between A and B. There is no 
clear cut-off point between ‘jumping’ and ‘flying’ (how far/high should one 
jump so that one can be counted as flying?), and both jumping and flying can 
be understood as gradable. Nevertheless, flying is a distinct kind of action in 
contrast with jumping (we do not see a plane as something that can jump 
very high and far). Moreover, flying enjoys its distinctive value that jumping 
does not have. Therefore, it is not the case that if a concept A is gradable, 
and A is evaluated along the same continuum of value with concept B, then A 
and B do not have distinct conceptual differences and their differences in 
value cannot be one of kind.          
 
So why can a gradualist proposal differing from Hetherington’s avoid being 
plagued by the tertiary value problem? As we have noted at the end of 
section 1.2, gradualism does not have to be based on minimalism. It is just 
Hetherington’s specific commitment to external absolutism that leads him to 
choose to combine his gradualism with minimalism. However, if we discard 
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external absolutism by rejecting the idea that there is a threshold for 
knowledge, then this will not only lead us to a more thorough version of 
gradualism, but also enable us to preserve justificationalism and the 
appropriateness of the tertiary value problem. The idea is, there is no cut-off 
point distinguishing knowledge from lesser epistemic standings, nevertheless, 
as shown before, this does not entail that knowledge cannot be distinctively 
more valuable than true beliefs. 
 
In summary, Hetherington’s anti-justificationism fails to offer a solid ground for 
epistemic gradualism. At least, a version of epistemic gradualism combined 
with anti-justificationism would give rise to resistance from the mainstream of 
epistemologists who take justification as a necessary condition for 
knowledge. Moreover, it would encounter difficulties in explaining the 
distinctive epistemic value that knowledge enjoys over mere true belief. This 
is a significant defect of Hetherington’s gradualist theory, since just as 
BonJour points out, any acceptable epistemological theory must make sense 
of the important value of knowledge (see BonJour 2010). 
 
3.2: Threshold Absolutism 
 
Hetherington insists that there has to be an absolute cut-off point between 
knowing and not knowing. That leads him to adopt a form of threshold 
absolutism (in Hetherington’s own terminology, ‘external absolutism’), which 
maintains that the threshold between knowledge and anything that falls short 
of knowledge is absolute. This absolutist view can be further divided into two 
sub-stances that Hetherington is committed to: 
 
[Trans-Threshold Absolutism] 
There is one and has to be one correct sufficient and 





There is a clear and absolute cut-off point between 
satisfying and failing to satisfy the sufficient and necessary 
condition for constituting knowledge. 
 
Hetherington endorses trans-threshold absolutism in the sense that he 
defines ‘true belief’ as the sufficient and necessary condition for knowledge—
on one hand, to be qualified as knowledge, an instance of belief has to be 
true; on the other hand, once an instance of belief turns out to be true, then it 
suffices to be counted as (at least the minimal) knowledge. He also accepts 
the intra-threshold absolutism, in that the cut-off point between a belief’s 
being true and being false is ordinarily taken to be clear and absolute. It is not 
hard to see that Hetherington’s threshold absolutist inclination is based on his 
commitment to his minimalist account of knowledge. However, as we have 
noted in the last section, it is untenable to define mere true belief as the 
minimal knowledge. As a result, both Hetherington’s trans-threshold and 
intra-threshold absolutisms would fail: Firstly, given that mere true belief is not 
a plausible sufficient and necessary condition for knowledge, it is unclear 
whether there is an absolute sufficient and necessary condition that can 
distinguish knowledge from non-knowledge in a trans-threshold manner. 
Secondly, given that justification should also be taken into considerations 
when judging whether a true belief suffice to constitute knowledge or not, and 
that Hetherington admits that it is almost impossible to locate a cut-off point 
between ‘sufficient justification’ and ‘insufficient justification’, knowledge will 
not be able to be absolute in the intra-threshold sense as well.     
 
But is there any other possible approach to defend the two kinds of threshold 
absolutism that are not based on Hetherington’s minimalism? In particular, 
can the two kinds of threshold absolutism be independent of each other, 
rather than being as closely related as Hetherington presents them to be? 
Can they both, independently, indicate that the threshold of propositional 




When claiming a notion to be absolute, one usually means that the notion is 
absolute in both trans-threshold and intra-threshold sense. Nevertheless, 
there are exceptions. For instance, ‘bilingual’ is ordinarily taken to be an 
ungradable term, a person can either be bilingual or not. That is because, the 
sufficient and necessary condition for being bilingual is clear—being able to 
speak two languages. Thus, the threshold between being bilingual and not 
being bilingual is absolute in a trans-threshold sense. However, the sufficient 
and necessary condition per se, viz, ‘being able to speak two languages’, is 
gradational. There is no such a clear and absolute cut-off point that can 
distinguish ‘being able to speak two languages’ and ‘being unable to speak 
two languages’. How fluently should one speak that language? Is there a 
minimal requirement for the size of one’s vocabulary? How many grammatical 
mistakes are tolerable? Answers to these questions are far from clear. 
Therefore, ‘being bilingual’ cannot be seen as an intra-threshold absolute 
term.  
 
The moral that we can draw from the above analysis is that a complete 
objection to threshold absolutism ought to reject both trans-threshold and 
intra-threshold absolutism. So apart from that fact that Hetherington’s 
threshold absolutism is based on his problematic minimalist account of 
knowledge, is there any other reason suggesting that we shall reject 
threshold absolutism? 
 
Here are some reasons that I take to be important. Firstly, by endorsing the 
threshold absolutism while only arguing for the beyond-threshold absolutism, 
Hetherington misjudges the central dispute in the absolutism/gradualism 
debate. According to Hetherington, what we ought to strive for is just the 
beyond-threshold gradualism. If this is an anti-orthodoxy attempt of 
epistemological interest as Hetherington alleges, then it implies that most 





[Beyond-Threshold Epistemic Absolutism] 
Propositional knowledge is absolute, in the sense that even 
beyond the threshold between knowledge and not-
knowledge, knowledge cannot be better or worse. 
 
However, that is not true. Whereas we have noted in the first chapter that 
most epistemologists would be happy to endorse that one’s knowledge can 
be improved in the sense that the epistemic support for this instance of 
knowledge can be strengthened, Hetherington’s beyond-threshold gradualist 
proposal appears to be attacking a straw man. He claims that there is a 
dilemma for epistemic absolutists as follows:   
 
‘1. Knowledge is absolute, non-gradational. That is, 
knowledge that p cannot be better or worse as knowledge 
that p. 
2. Each part of one’s justification for a belief which is 
knowledge is contributing somehow to the belief’s being 
knowledge, to how it is the knowledge it is.’ (Hetherington 
2001: 21) 
 
Hetherington alleges that 1 is incompatible with 2, and thus in order to 
maintain 1, absolutists have to deny 2, which is an unpalatable result for 
absolutism as the justification can certainly be better or worse:  
 
‘That is, in my previous knowledge-gradualism, the 
degree or quality of a piece of knowledge was a function 
of what constituted the knowledge ‘from within’—the 
strength of its justificatory component.’ (Hetherington 
2005:138)  
 
However, according to our analyses in the first chapter, absolutists can grant 
2 and argue that 1 is consistent with 2. The central dispute on the table is not 
whether one should accept 2 or not, but whether 1 is compatible with 2. By 
maintaining that 1 and 2 are consistent, absolutists can adopt the equivocal 
stance. They grant that knowledge can be improved in terms of the quality of 
justification, but they do not take this kind of improvement to be of 
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epistemological interest. The fact that knowledge can be ‘improved’ in this 
sense does not suffice to indicate that knowledge is gradable. Take the 
famous analogy of ‘pregnant’ for instance, Dretske asserts that knowing a fact 
is like being pregnant. It is not completely unreasonable to argue that one’s 
pregnancy can be seen as improved, in a certain sense, if she has healthily 
and safely come to the late trimester of her pregnancy. However, the length 
for which one has been pregnant does not affect whether one is pregnant or 
not. ‘Being pregnant’ is still a yes-or-no affair. Likewise, it is undeniable that 
for a student who gets his bachelor degree with a 2:2 and gets his master 
degree with a distinction, his second graduation, in a certain sense, is a better 
graduation. It can even be claimed that the student graduates in a better way 
from his master programme. Nevertheless, ‘graduates’ is still an ungradable 
term, an absolute yes-or-no affair in the sense that one can either graduate or 
fail to graduate. Epistemic absolutists can argue that any concept, including 
‘knows’ for sure, can be improved or be better in a certain sense, but that 
sense might just be an insignificant one, which is not of enough 
epistemological interest to make the concept a gradable one. Hetherington 
neglects the possibility of this equivocal stance, and thus leads his 
gradualism to a wrong direction. Focusing merely on the beyond-threshold 
gradualism also mistakenly diagnoses the reason why the orthodoxy of 
epistemology does not accept gradualism. The key is not to show that 
propositional knowledge can be improved in a certain sense, but to show that 
sense to be more epistemologically significant. In other words, the key is to 
reject the equivocal stance. 
 
To be more specific, advocates of the equivocal stance might argue that 
most ungradable terms can be evaluated among at least two orthogonal 
scales—one is essential (intrinsic, genuine, central, authentic), and another is 
extra (incident, additional, peripheral, accessory). For example, ‘defeats’ is 
an ungradable term. ‘Whether a team’s final score is higher than that of its 
opponent’ can be the essential scale for a team’s ‘defeating’ its opponent, 
while ‘by how many scores the team wins’ can be the extra scale. Compared 
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with a team that wins by 7 scores, another team that wins by 17 scores can 
be seen as having a ‘bigger victory’. However, this cannot affect the fact that 
both teams defeat their opponents, and that ‘defeats’ is an absolute yes-or-
no affair (especially in competitions like basketball games or football games). 
Analogously, the quality of knowledge can also be evaluated among two 
orthogonal scales—stronger epistemic support can improve a piece of 
knowledge in the extra sense, but not the essential sense. The strength of 
the epistemic support, once reaches the threshold, would fall into the extra 
scale and has nothing to do with knowledge’s gradability. Just like a larger 
advantage in scores can make a victory a bigger (and thus ‘better’) victory, 
but cannot make the concept ‘defeats’ per se come in degrees. One’s 
epistemic state of knowing-that-p can be evaluated as ‘becoming better’, but 
only among an extra scale, a scale that does not need to be taken into 
consideration when answering the ‘whether-or-not’ question (e.g., ‘whether 
she knows that p or not’). Hence, the connection between the absoluteness 
of knowledge’s threshold and the absoluteness of the concept of knowledge 
is not as close as Hetherington takes it to be. 
 
The second reason why gradualists had better not endorse threshold 
absolutism is fairly straightforward—that is the threshold absolutist proposal 
can hardly succeed. Trans-threshold absolutism aims to figure out an 
absolute sufficient and necessary condition for knowledge, viz, a correct 
analysis of knowledge. However, the post-Gettier epistemology has 
encountered continuous frustration in pursuing this goal. Various new 
analyses of knowledge have been given in response to Gettier’s 
counterexamples (see Gettier 1963) to the classic JTB analysis. At the same 
time, various new counterexamples continue to emerge in response to those 
putative correct analyses (see Shope 1983 for a detailed survey). Zagzebski 
(1994) and Craig (1999) even suggest that the post-Gettier project is 
hopeless at providing a correct analysis of knowledge. Timothy Williamson’s 
influential book Knowledge and Its Limits (2000) and numerous sequent 
knowledge-first studies further argue that the analysis project should be 
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replaced by a new proposal ‘putting knowledge first’—instead of a notion to 
be analysed, ‘knowledge’ should be taken to be the most basic concept prior 
to any other epistemic concepts. I am sympathetic to these anti-analysis 
fashion in contemporary epistemology, and I do not think that a necessary 
and sufficient condition is necessary for the epistemic gradualist proposal. 
Even if it is possible to reasonably defend a putative analysis of knowledge in 
a non-circular and non-arbitrary way, basing gradualism on such an analysis 
is not an ideal strategy, given that there appears to be little consensus on the 
proper analysis of knowledge by now. A gradualist theory based on a specific 
putative analysis of knowledge will inevitably encounter resistance from 
people who disagree with the analysis. Endorsing trans-threshold absolutism 
will invite unnecessary difficulties for gradualism.  
 
As for intra-threshold absolutism, it is also unclear how to locate an absolute 
cut-off point between satisfying the sufficient and necessary condition or not. 
It is unclear whether there is such a condition; even if there was, it is also 
unclear whether there is such a cut-off point. Absolutists might argue that the 
cut-off point locates at the boundary between true and untrue, as whatsoever, 
truth has to be a necessary condition for knowledge given that ‘knows’ is a 
factive term. No matter what other factors constituting the sufficient and 
necessary condition are, we can draw the boundary between knowledge and 
non-knowledge among the clear and absolute boundary between true and 
untrue. Therefore, due to the factivity of ‘knows’, the cut-off point 
distinguishing knowing from not knowing just locates at the boundary 
between truth and falsity. However, a factive term does not necessarily have 
an absolute boundary, and thus can also be gradable. For example, 
‘understands’, at least in the sense that most epistemologists are interested 
in, is also a factive term. If one understands that p, then p must be true. It is 
inconsistent to say something like ‘I understand that you want to save her life, 
but in fact, you do not want to save her life’. Notwithstanding, ‘understanding’ 
is ordinarily taken to be a gradable concept. Understanding is not merely a 
yes-or-not affair, rather, it appears to be a matter of degree. One’s 
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understanding can be improved (in an essential sense), and one can also be 
claimed to understand a fact better than another person does. Factivity thus 
fails to lend strong support to nominate the cut-off point for the threshold of 
knowledge. Neither trans-threshold nor intra-threshold absolutism is 
beneficial to gradualism. 
 
4. Criticism of Hetherington’s Second Gradualist Theory 
 
Hetherington’s second design for gradualism turns essentially on the 
following argument: 
 
[Argument from Equivalence] 
(E1) Having knowledge that p entails having how-
knowledge that p, as knowledge that p is the minimal 
aspect of how-knowledge that p. 
(E2) Having how-knowledge that p entails having 
knowledge that p, as knowledge that p is the minimal 
aspect of how-knowledge that p. 
(E3) From E1 and E2, having knowledge that p is the 
necessary and sufficient condition of having how-
knowledge that p. 
(E4) From E3, having knowledge that p is equivalent to 
having how-knowledge that p.  
(E5) How-knowledge that p is gradable. 
(E6) Therefore, knowledge that p is gradable. 
 
This argument is untenable, because: first, its first two premises are based 
on a mistaken epistemological dogma; second, the schema of this argument 





The first objection focuses on E1 and E2. When proving E1 and E2, 
Hetherington argues that: 
 
‘Manifestly, that p obtains is one of those aspects of 
how it is that p: it is a minimal aspect’ (Hetherington 
2005:131) 
 
That is to say, in Hetherington’s understanding, knowing that p obtains (i.e., 
that p is true) is equivalent to knowing that p, so that knowing that p can 
constitute the minimal aspect of knowing how that p. E1 and E2 cannot be 
smoothly entailed if there is a conceptual lacuna between ‘knowing that p’ 
and ‘knowing that p obtains’. Therefore, both E1 and E2 imply that one’s 
‘knowing that p is true’ suffices to guarantee one’s ‘knowing that p’. 
 
Remember that in Chapter Two, we have discussed the so-called KT-
schema, which maintains that ‘knowing that p’ is equivalent to ‘knowing that p 
is true’. We have also seen that KT-schema can be disproved by 
counterexamples where the subject knows p to be true, but still fails to know 
that p due to the lack of understanding regarding the content of p. Therefore, 
the failure of KT-schema suggests that ‘knowing that p is true’ does not 
suffice to guarantee one’s ‘knowing that p’. Rather, ‘knowing the content of p’ 
seems to be another complementary factor that should be taken into 
consideration. That is to say, from what we have discussed, ‘to know that p’ 
seemingly means that ‘to know that p is true + to know the content of p’. To 
be specific, I advocate a competing account of the object of propositional 
knowledge: 
 
[T+C Account] To know that p is to know that p is 
true, plus, to know p’s content, which requires 
understanding the meaning of p’s content. 
 
The difference between my T+C account and Hetherington’s second 
gradualism lies in whether ‘understanding the content of p’ is necessary for 
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‘knowing that p’. E1 and E2 are premised on the KT-schema which maintains 
that merely ‘knowing that p obtains’ is enough for constituting the minimal 
‘knowing-that-p’. Accordingly, ‘understanding the content of p’ is 
unnecessary. As an opposite, my T+C account argues that one’s 
‘understanding the content of p’ is necessary for her ‘knowing that p’. Hence 
if T+C account turns out to be a more complete answer to the object problem 
of propositional knowledge, then E1 and E2 should be denied as they are 
based on the untenable KT-schema. Correspondingly, Hetherington’s 
argument from equivalence will be blocked as its essential premises are 
falsified. 
 
Even if one insists that KT-schema is true, there is still another way to refute 
the argument from equivalence. The second objection comes in the form of a 
reductio to Hetherington’s argument. The argument from equivalence trades 
on an underpinning sub-argument as follows:  
 
(1) A minimal aspect of φ entails that φ, and vice versa;  
(2) Hence a minimal aspect of φ is equivalent to φ;  
(3) Therefore a minimal aspect of φ should have the same 
property P that φ has.   
 
In Hetherington’s original argument, φ refers to how-knowledge that p, of 
which the minimal aspect is knowledge that p. Given that how-knowledge that 
p has the property of ‘being gradable’, as its minimal aspect, knowledge that 
p should also be gradable. However, if the schema stated before is valid, 
then we can prove many unreasonable conclusions. For example: 
 
(E1*) ‘Being dual-purpose’ entails ‘being versatile,’ as 




(E2*) ‘Being versatile’ entails ‘being dual-purpose’, as 
being dual-purpose is the minimal aspect of being 
versatile. 
(E3*) From E1* and E2*, being dual-purpose is the 
necessary and sufficient condition of being versatile. 
(E4*) From E3*, being dual-purpose is equivalent to 
being versatile. (E5*) ‘Versatile’ is a gradable concept. 
(E6*) Therefore, ‘dual-purpose’ is a gradable concept. 
 
Being versatile means being able to be used for many purposes. Being able 
to be used for two different purposes, i.e., being dual-purpose is the minimal 
aspect of it. Versatile is a comparable and gradable concept, it can be 
felicitously said that ‘this product is more versatile than another’, which 
means ‘this product can be used for more purposes than another’. However, 
dual-purpose is an absolute concept, and it does not make sense to say that 
‘this product is more dual-purpose than another’. Similarly, ‘multicultural’, 
‘multiracial’ and ‘multilingual’ are all gradable, nevertheless, their minimal 
aspects ‘bicultural’, ‘biracial’ and ‘bilingual’ are ungradable. ‘Having two 
colours’ can be the minimal aspect of being colourful, however, colourful is a 
gradable notion while ‘having two colours’ is not. ‘Can cause one’s death’ is 
the minimal aspect of being fatal (at least, a sufficient and necessary 
condition for being fatal), nevertheless, fatal is gradable (‘this is the most fatal 
disease in the world’; ‘this snake is more fatal than that one’) but ‘can cause 
one’s death’ is not. There are many other counterexamples that I cannot 
exhaust here.   
 
Given these reductios and counterexamples, it should be clear that the 
schema of argument utilised by Hetherington fails to obtain. The argument 
from equivalence is not a valid argument that can properly derive the 





5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter critically analysed the most robust and influential epistemic 
gradualist proposals in the literature, to wit, Hetherington’s two versions of 
gradualism. It has been proved that both the two proposals fail to provide us 
with a satisfactory account of gradualism. In particular, it seems that by 
advocating a mixture consisting of threshold absolutism and beyond-
threshold gradualism, Hetherington falsely diagnoses the central divergence 
between gradualism and absolutism. By advocating anti-justificationism, 
Hetherington imposes an unnecessarily heavy burden of proof on gradualism. 
These are not only defects of Hetherington’s gradualist theories—they also 
became defects adopted by the current model of the absolutism/gradualism 
debate. Regrettably, the debate initiated by Hetherington did not attract 
sufficient attention from the epistemologists. A significant reason for the 
debate’s being underappreciated, I believe, is that the current framework of 
debate is not constructed properly. In the next chapter, I will remodel the 
debate between gradualism and absolutism. It will be demonstrated that the 
reconstructed debate should be focused on the question of whether 














































Chapter Four: Remodel the Debate, Threshold and 
Spectrum 
 
Abstract   This chapter aims to overthrow the equivocal 
attitude toward the gradualism/absolutism debate and try to 
prove that gradualism is preferable to absolutism. To achieve 
this goal, I will take two steps. First, I will revisit and remodel 
the gradualism/absolutism debate so that the real divergence 
between the two positions can be clarified. It will be argued 
that the current debate initiated primarily by Stephen 
Hetherington fails to capture the essential divergence 
between gradualism and absolutism, and thus is apt to 
render the debate trivial and equivocal. By introducing the 
distinction between a threshold concept and a spectrum 
concept, it will be suggested that the new 
gradualism/absolutism debate should focus on the question 
whether knowledge should be understood as a threshold 
concept or a spectrum concept. Absolutism sees knowledge 
as a threshold concept, while gradualism should argue that 
knowledge is a spectrum concept. The theoretical merits of 
this new model of the debate will be shown. Second, I will 
illustrate the theoretical advantages that gradualism enjoys 
over absolutism. I will start by showing that gradualism can 
provide us with a unified account of different types of 
knowledge, which can solve the so-called asymmetry 
problem of knowledge. 
 
1.  The Current Model of the debate 
 
In the first two chapters, we have seen that there is no tenable reason 
supporting the absolutist dogma—in particular, the mainstay linguistic reason 
cannot lend sufficient support to absolutism. Nevertheless, the debate around 
gradualism and absolutism is not so easily finished. There still remains an 
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impression that we do not need to revise our epistemological orthodoxy that 
knowledge-that is ungradable. The transformation from the absolutist tradition 
to the gradualist stance lacks enough motivation. The first chapter 
summarises this lingering impression as the equivocal attitude: an equivocal 
hybrid stance that accepts both the absolutist orthodoxy and the minimal 
sense of gradualism (that one’s epistemic support is gradable). People 
holding this attitude are absolutists—in most cases; but they are gradualists 
too—just in the minimal sense. To reject this attitude, gradualism needs to 
complete two tasks: first, to undermine the motivation for holding the 
absolutist orthodoxy, which we have done in previous chapters; second, to 
strengthen the motivation for embracing the gradualist view, which is what I 
aim to accomplish by the remaining parts of this thesis. 
 
So why do current epistemological discussions lack motivations for 
abandoning the equivocal attitude? One important reason, I think, is that the 
current model of gradualism/absolutism debate initiated by Hetherington fails 
to capture the real divergence between the two positions. As we have seen in 
Chapter 3, a significant trait of Hetherington’s non-absolutist theory is that he 
only rejects the idea that knowledge-that is absolute in the sense that 
propositional knowledge cannot be better or worse despite being better or 
worse justified. However, he is committed to the idea that there is an 
absolute threshold (i.e., ‘cut-off point’, in his own terminology) for knowledge, 
which is mere true belief. In summary, Hetherington admits that he is 
committed to a local gradualism that consists of two views: 
 
‘(i) Knowledge is to be absolutely distinguished from 
whatever is not knowledge (whatever is external to 
knowledge). This is because there is an absolute cut-off 
point between knowing and not knowing, 
(ii) But within the category of knowing, non-absolutism is 
true. That is because it is possible that some cases of 
knowledge that p are better as knowledge that p, or 
more clearly knowledge that p, than other cases of 




View (i) is called ‘external absolutism’ by Hetherington, and view (ii) is named 
‘internal non-absolutism’. Given Hetherington’s anti-justificationist position, it 
is not hard to understand why he endorses external absolutism. For 
Hetherington, the central divergence between gradualism and absolutism is 
not whether there is an absolute threshold for knowledge, but whether 
knowledge can be improved beyond the threshold. Correspondingly, 
Hetherington concludes that the answer is certainly ‘yes’—knowledge can be 
better or worse in terms of the strength of the epistemic support (e.g., the 
quality of the justification).  
 
Notice that Hetherington’s commitment to external absolutism is reflected in 
not only his first but also his second version of gradualism. Hetherington 
(2011) advocates the so-called knowledge-as-ability hypothesis arguing that 
knowledge is an ability to manifest various accurate representations of p. An 
ability can be applied better or worse, notwithstanding, Hetherington still 
emphasises that his gradualism is compatible with there being a threshold for 
having the ability: 
 
‘In general, abilities are gradational …… This is 
consistent with there being an absolute cut-off point, 
either precise or not, between having the ability and not 
having it. (So that is not the sense of knowledge-
absolutism I am denying.)’ (Hetherington 2011: 49) 
 
So, in what sense does Hetherington’s second version of gradualism deny 
absolutism? Hetherington (2011) defines absolutism as follows:  
 
‘Knowledge-absolutism thus implies that there cannot 
be two instances of knowledge that p, one of which is 
somehow a better or higher grade of knowledge that p 
than is the other. So, in particular, no instance of 
knowledge that p is ever improvable purely as 
knowledge that p.’ (ibid: 6) 
 
Therefore, here, Hetherington still discusses absolutism in the ‘internal’ 
sense, not only because he argues that his gradualism is compatible with 
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there being a threshold for knowledge (as we have noted), but also because 
he maintains that absolutism is a view that the quality of an instance of 
knowledge that p (qua knowledge that p) cannot be improved by stronger 
epistemic support (as stated in the quoted passage above), which coincides 
with his definition of ‘internal absolutism’ in his early works.    
 
So far, we have seen a brief sketch of Hetherington’s epistemic gradualism 
that has two significant features: 1) being based on anti-justificationism; 2) 
being committed to external absolutism. Although the gradability problem of 
knowledge-that is theoretically interesting and significant, Hetherington’s 
gradualism did not receive sufficient echoes as one might expect it did. This 
is, I think, largely due to its aforesaid two features, as the two features render 
Hetherington’s gradualism both too controversial and too uncontroversial: 
 
On the one hand, the anti-justificationist basis for Hetherington’s gradualism 
severely undermines its appeal, given that the majority of epistemologists still 
see justification as necessary for knowledge. It is not hard to conceive how 
Hetherington’s courageous defence for anti-justificationism would invite 
heavy criticism. For example, the true belief account of knowledge is accused 
of violating the widely-shared intuition that knowledge is incompatible with 
mere epistemic luck (see Pritchard 2007; Sosa 2007; Greco 2003). The idea 
that propositional knowledge is gradable is already novel, so when this idea 
is based on an even more novel and controversial ground, it is 
understandable that people are not willing to pay serious attention to the talk 
of gradualism.  
 
On the other hand, as we have noted in the first chapter, many 
commentators also notice that Hetherington’s commitment to external 
absolutism seems to obscure the distinction between gradualism and 
absolutism. Contra what Hetherington alleges, many epistemologists (e.g., 
Feldman 2002; Brower 2004; Jaster 2013; Leite 2006; as introduced in 
Chapter 1) should already be glad to consent that, at least in a loose sense, 
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there can be better knowledge in terms of better justification—hence 
Hetherington’s local gradualism is not as unorthodox as he presents it to be.  
 
Moreover, some even hold that the gradability of justificatory 
strength/probability/fallibility of knowledge is irrelevant to whether knowledge 
per se is gradable. For example: 
 
‘There is no reason, given fallibilism at least, to deny that 
you can know with more or less probability, but this doesn't 
imply that knowledge is gradable in anything like the way 
that, say, height is or affection is.’ (Fantl & McGrath 2009: 
23-24) 
 
Therefore, it seems that most of the absolutists grant that the quality of one’s 
knowledge can be improved by virtue of better justification—nonetheless, this 
does not imply that the concept of knowledge is gradable. Hetherington 
seems to misdiagnose the central divergence of the debate between 
gradualism and absolutism, and thus faces the danger of trivialising the 
debate. A direct upshot of Hetherington’s local gradualism is an equivocal 
attitude towards the gradualism/absolutism debate. The idea is, knowledge is 
gradable in one sense (viz, internal gradualism), while ungradable in another 
sense (viz, external absolutism). Thus, it is unclear whether, overall, 
knowledge is gradable or not given these two distinct senses. Call this the 
two-sense problem. Hetherington’s model of the debate is silent on which 
sense is more essential for our understanding of the concept of knowledge. 
Just like ‘jump’—it is ungradable in the sense that there is an absolute 
threshold for judging whether one jumps or not (e.g., both feet being off the 
ground); however, ‘jump’ seems to be gradable in the sense that one can 
jump higher or further than another person does. So is ‘jump’ gradable? The 
answer might be equivocal. Hetherington reads knowledge-that in a very 
similar way: on the one hand, knowledge-that is ungradable in the sense that 
there is an absolute threshold (i.e., true belief) distinguishing knowledge from 
ignorance; on the other hand, knowledge-that is gradable in the sense that, 
beyond the threshold, one can have better knowledge if one has better 
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justification. The two-sense problem thus is apt to result in equivocalism 
regarding the gradualism/absolutism debate—propositional knowledge is 
simultaneously gradable and ungradable in two different senses respectively. 
Wherever equivocalism is adopted, there is no genuine debate, as nothing is 
actually irreconcilable in the putative ‘debate’. 
 
Nevertheless, the gradualism/absolutism debate initiated by Hetherington is 
still worth revisiting. After all, Hetherington’s investigation is successful in 
revealing that:  
 
Point 1: The absolutist orthodoxy seems to be ill-
grounded. Thus, its opposite, namely gradualism, is worthy 
of more careful considerations. 
Point 2: There are notable resemblances between 
knowledge-that and other epistemological notions that are 
paradigmatically gradable, e.g., understanding and 
knowledge-how. This seems to indicate that knowledge-
that might be homologous with those gradable notions.  
Point 3: For epistemic absolutists (in particular, fallibilist 
external absolutists) who insist that knowledge has a 
threshold, the boundary problem of knowledge is a 
troublesome issue. 
 
All the three points provide us with reasonable motivations to reconsider the 
debate between absolutism and gradualism. The first two points indicate that 
gradualism might not be such a crazy view as it appears to be. Absolutism 
primarily gains support from linguistic evidence, but we have noted in 
Chapter Two that there are also linguistic data supporting 
gradable/comparable uses of ‘knows-that’ construction. Apart from 
counterevidence provided by Hetherington (2001) and Dutant (2007) based 
on the English language, we can find more linguistic support for gradualism 
from other languages. For example, in Chinese, it is felicitous to say 
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something like ‘我父亲比我更知道生活不易’53, where ‘知道’ (the direct 
translation of ‘knows that’ in Chinese) is used as a gradable term. In addition, 
it is questionable whether a concept’s linguistic uses can reveal the 
conceptual nature of an epistemological concept. For example, Hazlett 
(2010) argues that linguistic evidence suggests that knowledge should be 
seen as non-factive, given the notable amount of non-factive uses of ‘knows-
that’ in the English language54. Nevertheless, it is almost an epistemological 
consensus that knowledge implies truth, and hence knowledge, by its nature, 
is factive. Hazlett thus concludes that there is a gap between an 
epistemological notion’s linguistic uses and its conceptual nature. In 
summary, the linguistic motivation for absolutism is untenable. In contrast, 
given point 2, it is intriguing for us to give gradualism a more serious 
consideration. Perhaps embracing gradualism can provide us with a unified 
account of knowledge that eliminates the somewhat odd asymmetry between 
different types of knowledge—why is propositional knowledge is ungradable 
while knowledge-how and knowledge-wh are widely accepted to be 
gradable? This asymmetry is especially knotty for epistemologists (e.g., 
intellectualists) who believe that different types of knowledge can be reduced 
to one single type of knowledge. Gradualism might give this issue a 
straightforward resolution: the asymmetry just does not exist, because 
knowledge-that is gradable as well. 
 
Point 3 offers a ground for doubt on the very existence of knowledge’s 
threshold. The idea is, if neither infallibilism nor Hetherington’s anti-
justificationism is an appropriate solution to the boundary problem, why do 
not consider the possibility that knowledge-that does not have a threshold?  
 
                                                          
53 It means ‘my father knows better that life is hard than I do’. 
54 Bac & Irmak (2011) also illustrates a similar point on the basis of the Turkish language. 
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Hetherington, as well as many other epistemologists55, seems to accept the 
existence of knowledge’s threshold as an undeniable fact—the problem is not 
whether this threshold exists, but how we can (even if only approximately) 
locate that threshold. There seems to be a close connection between the 
idea that knowledge has a threshold and that knowledge is fallible:  
  
‘[K]nowledge’s having a justificatory boundary is a vital part 
of all traditional fallibilist conceptions of what knowledge 
is.’ (Hetherington 2006: 47) 
 
Hetherington argues that fallibilism naturally invites the question: how fallible 
is a piece of knowledge allowed to be? Fallibilism thus perforce gives rise to 
the boundary problem. Hetherington also realises that it is extremely difficult 
for fallibilists to locate a precise threshold of knowledge. He also admits that 
our ignorance of the location of knowledge’s threshold can significantly 
undermine our knowledge that knowledge has a threshold. Nevertheless, he 
still insists that this does not affect the fact that the threshold exists56. At 
least, there is one achievable way of solving the boundary problem that 
fallibilists can take, that is, to ‘narrow the area or span’ within which the 
threshold lies. This attitude is also shared by Michael Hannon: 
 
‘While an adequate answer to the threshold problem 
shouldn’t demand more precision than is achievable (or 
necessary), fallibilists must provide a reasonable degree of 
approximation. They have not met this challenge, and so I 
take the threshold problem seriously.’ (2017: 608) 
 
Therefore, Hetherington’s local gradualism is thus expected to find an 
approximation of where knowledge’s threshold is. It never questions the very 
existence of such a threshold. However, as we have seen before, this would 
invite the two-sense problem and trivialise the debate between gradualism 
and absolutism. It seems that external gradualism, rather than internal 
                                                          
55 For example, BonJour (2003, 2010), Fantl & McGrath (2009), Bovell (2012), Hannon 
(2017). Rothschild & Spectre (2018) also defend this threshold view of knowledge on the 
basis of a sorites objection. 
56 Similar ideas are echoed by Hannon (2017) and Bovell (2012). 
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gradualism, is what genuinely controversial. So, can we remodel the 
gradualism/absolutism debate by appealing to a global gradualism instead, 
which focuses on not whether knowledge can be improved beyond the 
threshold, but whether knowledge has a threshold? In what follows, I will 
develop such a new version of gradualism which interprets knowledge as a 
spectrum concept instead of a threshold concept. By doing so, we can usher 
a more promising way toward remodelling the absolutism/gradualism debate.  
 
2.  Threshold vs. Spectrum 
 
2.1: Threshold Concepts 
 
What does it mean by saying that a concept has a threshold? Ordinarily, 
‘threshold’ is understood as a point on a scale at which something starts to 
happen or change. If something is taken to be of a threshold, then usually 
this concept can be evaluated or measured along a scale in a certain sense. 
For example, when we say that someone has a high threshold for pain, what 
is evaluated is the strength of pain that one can endure—when the strength 
reaches the threshold, one would be unable to endure the pain. When we 
say that 60% of the vote is the threshold for approval of a proposal, what is 
measured is the percentage of the vote that a proposal can gain—when the 
percentage reaches the threshold, the proposal can be approved. Thus a 
concept that has a threshold ought to be evaluable along a certain scale, 
where its threshold is a point where anything starts counting as an instance 
of that concept. Accordingly, let us define: 
 
[Threshold Concept]    
A concept C is a threshold concept, iff, at the relevant 
scale S on which C is evaluated, there is a cut-off point T 
that distinguishes instances of C from everything that falls 




A threshold concept might be evaluated on multiple scales. For example, if 
knowledge is taken to be a threshold concept, then relevant scales can 
include the scale of belief, the scale of justification, and so on. I am also glad 
to admit that the trade-offs between these different scales can settle an 
overall threshold, and this overall threshold typically comes in the form of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. For the sake of simplicity, the definition of 
threshold concept above only employs a single scale S—however, the scale 
S here can also be understood in the form of a conjunction that combines 
multiple scales together. External absolutists read knowledge as a threshold 
concept. In contrast, I will argue that gradualism should reject this reading. 
Before we move forward to applying the notion of ‘threshold concept’ to 
knowledge, some caveats about this notion are in order:  
 
First, albeit evaluable/measurable on a certain scale, a threshold concept is 
not thus perforce gradable. Quite the opposite, numerous threshold concepts 
are taken to be ungradable, e.g., ‘empty’, ‘extinct’, ‘completed’, and ‘sold out’. 
For these concepts, the threshold is located at the endpoint of the scale and 
thereby renders these concepts absolute—either reaches the threshold or not 
(for example, either empty or not empty), it is a yes-or-no affair. That is also 
why the threshold reading of knowledge matches external absolutism rather 
than gradualism. 
 
Second, a term can be ungradable without thus being a threshold concept, if 
there is no un-farfetched corresponding scale along which the term can be 
evaluated. For example, ‘wooden’, ‘foreign’, and ‘the third’.  
 
Third, when saying that there is a ‘cut-off point’, I do not deny the fact that a 
threshold concept can still have its borderline cases. In other words, 
‘threshold’ is compatible with ‘vagueness’, given that a vague concept is 
ordinarily understood as a concept that has borderline cases. There are at 
least three ways to understand how a threshold concept can be vague. The 
first way appeals to the practical difficulty in telling whether the cut-off point is 
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reached. Whether a cut-off point exists is one thing, while how to judge 
whether the cut-off point is reached is another thing. A threshold concept C’s 
threshold provides a criterion for us to determine (in principle) what is C and 
what is not. Nevertheless, there can be some sub-criteria for determining (in 
practice) whether the threshold is met, and those sub-criteria can be much 
vaguer. By way of illustration, in the UK, a student’s essay ‘fails’ iff its mark is 
below 40. In that case, ‘fails’ is a threshold concept of which the cut-off point 
falls at score 40. However, whether an essay should be given a score below 
40 could be a headache for teachers. When it comes to the evaluation of an 
essay’s quality, the rubric can be highly vague.  
 
The second way is to appeal to the cognitive difficulty in detecting the 
threshold by adopting epistemicism (see Williamson 1994, 2007; Sorensen 
1988; Horwich 2000; Hu 2015; etc.). Epistemicism of vagueness argues that 
there is a sharp boundary between the extension and the anti-extension of a 
vague predicate. For example, there is a cut-off point from which a person 
can be recognised as ‘bald’. It is just because of our cognitive inability that it 
is impossible for us to know where the threshold is—nevertheless, this does 
not affect the fact that the threshold exists. Accordingly, threshold is 
compatible with vagueness, where vagueness is interpreted as ignorance of 
the location of the cut-off point. Hetherington’s attitude towards the boundary 
problem of knowledge is very akin to an epistemicist reading: there is a sharp 
boundary for knowledge, and our ignorance of where the boundary is located 
just undermines our knowledge that there is a threshold, but it does not 
undermine the fact that there is a threshold (see Hetherington 2006).      
 
The third way is to appeal to fuzzy logic that admits degrees of truth. One can 
endorse a form of infinite-valued logic in which the truth value of a proposition 
Fφ (φ stands for any potential instance of F) varies from 0 (definite falsehood) 
to 1 (definite truth) inclusive. The predicate F is vague, as any Fφ whose truth 
value is a real number n (0<n<1) that is very close to 1 can be seen as a 
borderline case of F (see Smith 2008; Hyde 2010; Shapiro 2006; etc.). 
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Correspondingly, F’s threshold can be interpreted as the point where Fφ starts 
being designated to the truth value of 1, viz, the right endpoint of the closed 
interval [0, 1]57.  
 
Finally, a threshold concept can be context-sensitive in the sense that its 
threshold might vary from context to context. A male athlete’s being 
‘heavyweight’ is a threshold notion. However, the threshold varies in different 
sports—say, for boxing, the minimum is 200 pounds, while for wrestling, it 
can be 184 pounds. So when a ring announcer describes an athlete as 
‘heavyweight’, the threshold depends on the context where the statement is 
asserted.  
 
I hope that I have given a clear enough sketch of the idea of ‘threshold 
concepts’. So what does it mean to see knowledge as a threshold concept? 
Remember that a threshold concept should be able to be evaluated on a 
corresponding scale. When it comes to the threshold for belief, the scale can 
be the degree of credence. But when it comes to the threshold for 
knowledge, what is/are the scale(s) that we should take into consideration? 
There can be plural answers to this question. For example, there can be 
multiple scales in terms of knowledge’s various necessary conditions. Most 
current discussions around the threshold problem of knowledge focus on the 
scale of justificatory strength, in particular, the degrees of fallibility. Besides, 
insofar as we take belief to be necessary for knowledge, the scale of 
credence for belief can show us another aspect of the threshold problem of 
knowledge. In this aspect, there are disputes about where the threshold for 
sufficient credence for yielding knowledge-apt beliefs is. The credence-one 
view argues that beliefs require the maximal confidence or credence 1 (see 
Clarke 2013, Greco 2015, etc.), while the threshold view holds the beliefs 
                                                          
57 Naturally, one might ask whether there is a sharp boundary for a borderline case’s being 
borderline. That is to ask, are there borderline cases of borderline cases of a vague 
predicate F? This query relates to the issue that whether higher-order vagueness exists. An 
absolutist can accept the idea of higher-order vagueness. Alternatively, she can also argue 
that higher-order vagueness is just an illusion (see Wright 2010). Interesting as it is, this 
issue is beyond this chapter’s purpose.  
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only require credence above a threshold that is below degree 1 (see Kaplan 
1996, Foley 2009, etc.). It is noteworthy that although the credence-one view 
is seen as an opposite to the threshold view, it does not deny the existence 
of belief’s threshold (in terms of the degrees of credence). The disagreement 
between the two competing views lies in where the threshold is—degree 1 or 
a certain number that is below 1? Apart from these, various other 
interpretations of knowledge’s threshold can be provided in accordance with 
different accounts of knowledge. For instance, anti-luck virtue epistemology 
advocates an analysis of knowledge as follows: ‘S knows that p if and only if 
S’s safe true belief that p is the product of her relevant cognitive abilities 
(such that her safe cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to 
her cognitive agency)’ (Pritchard 2012a: 20; emphasis mine). Accordingly, 
the threshold for knowledge can be understood as a cut-off point indicating 
how creditable is creditable enough for yielding knowledge. This chapter will 
discuss knowledge’s threshold in a general sense, that is, without being 
limited to any specific account of knowledge58.   
 
With these being said, taking knowledge to be a threshold concept means 
being committed to this thesis: 
 
[K-THRESHOLD] 
Knowledge is a threshold concept in the sense that there is 
a threshold Tk, which distinguishes knowledge from 
everything that falls short of knowledge. 
  
As we have noted before, many epistemologists who endorse K-
THRESHOLD also admit that it is very hard (if not impossible) for us to know 
where Tk is (e.g., see BonJour 2003; Hetherington 2006; Bovell 2012; 
Hannon 2017; Foley 2009). Call this attitude moderate K-THRESHOLD, 
which might be a position that most epistemic absolutists adopt. In contrast, 
                                                          
58 However, for the sake of convenience, if helpful, readers are welcomed to primarily 
interpret the threshold mentioned in this chapter in terms of justificatory strength as the 
majority of current literature does. 
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there are also voices claiming that we can know exactly where the threshold 
is (e.g., see Hetherington 2001; Goldman 1993; Clarke 2013; Greco 2015). 
Call this attitude radical K-THRESHOLD. In addition, we have noted that a 
threshold concept can also be context-sensitive, a third attitude defending K-
THRESHOLD argues that knowledge has its threshold, while Tk can vary 
from context to context in accordance with practical factors, such as stakes 
(e.g., see Fantl & McGrath 2009; Hannon 2017; Hawthorne 2003; Stanley 
2005) 59. Call this attitude contextualist K-THRESHOLD. Note that the three 
attitudes above are not mutually exclusive. Rather, both moderate and 
radical K-THRESHOLD can overlap with contextualist K-THRESHOLD. 
Endorsing any version of K-THRESHOLD means being committed to 
external absolutism. 
 
In the previous chapter, we made a distinction between trans-threshold 
absolutism and intra-threshold absolutism. K-THRESHOLD reflect the gist of 
the both types of absolutism. That is, Tk typically comes in the form of an 
absolute necessary and sufficient condition of knowledge (trans-threshold), 
and there is a cut-off point for this threshold’s being reached (intra-threshold). 
K-THRESHOLD is a prima facie plausible thesis that is deeply entrenched in 
standard epistemological thinking. K-THRESHOLD’s apparent plausibility 
comes from at least three aspects: first, linguistic data suggest that it is often 
infelicitous to use ‘knows-that’ as a comparable construction (see Stanley 
2005; Dutant 2007; etc.), in the sense that ‘knows’ is merely a ‘yes or no’ 
affair, where the distinction (threshold) between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ ought to be 
clear. Second, most epistemologists are fallibilists who hold that knowledge 
is allowed to be fallible to a certain degree. While if there is no such a 
threshold for knowledge, that means we cannot find the certain degree to 
which knowledge is allowed to be fallible, which might significantly undermine 
the persuasive force of fallibilism (see Hetherington 2006; Hannon 2017). 
Third, we find knowledge distinctively more valuable and desirable than every 
                                                          
59 They advocate a solution to the boundary problem of knowledge called impurism – the 
threshold for sufficient justificatory strength is not only determined by truth-conducive factors, 
but also partly by one’s practical reasoning situation. 
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epistemic standing falling short of knowledge such as true belief (see 
Pritchard, 2009a; BonJour 2010; etc.). Correspondingly, it seems to be 
natural for us to infer that there is a cut-off threshold for knowledge so that 
knowledge can enjoy its distinctive epistemic value. 
 
Now we have outlined the absolutist side of the remodelled debate by 
employing K-THRESHOLD. So what about the gradualist side? How can we 
conceive of a concept of knowledge with no threshold? I suggest that 
gradualists can resort to the idea that knowledge is a spectrum concept. 
 
2.2: Spectrum Concepts 
 
What is the threshold for a colour’s counting as red? Where is the boundary 
distinguishing ‘red’ from ‘yellow’, ‘blue’ or any other colour? It is not only 
practically difficult to draw this boundary, but also seemingly impossible in 
principle to locate such a threshold. That is because, ‘red’, as well as other 
colours, refers to a range of colour across a spectrum, of which the 
‘boundary’ is too gradient to be regarded as a threshold. Admittedly, if one is 
taken through colour samples that start with blue and become gradually more 
reddish, there would be some point at which one starts describing them as 
red. Nevertheless, this only proves that we are able to tell a spectrum 
concept A from another spectrum concept B, but not that there is a threshold 
distinguishing A from B. Consider eye tests. In an eye test, as the doctor 
adjusts the phoropter, the patient who stares at a picture through the lens will 
be constantly asked whether the vision is clear now, until the patient replies 
‘yes’. However, this does not imply that there is an absolute threshold for a 
picture’s being ‘clear’ or ‘vague’. When asking for a threshold for ‘clear’ or 
‘red’, one is committing a category mistake fallacy. A concept’s threshold is 
ordinarily used to identify whether a given instance is a member of that 
concept. However, we do not identify a colour as red by resorting to the so-
called ‘red’s threshold’. Instead, we usually determine whether a colour is an 
instance of red by (roughly) comparing it with paradigmatic cases of red. The 
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more that colour resembles those paradigmatic cases of ‘red’, the more likely 
the colour will be recognised as red. Also, there is no clear threshold for a 
case’s being paradigmatic. Identification of a concept like ‘red’ is not a matter 
of ‘yes’ or ‘no’, but more like one of degrees.  
 
So is ‘cold’/‘hot’. A cup of water’s being ‘ice-cold’, ‘cold’, ‘warm’, or ‘hot’ is not 
a matter that can be determined by a given threshold. These grades of 
‘warmness’ refer to different ranges of temperature on a spectrum of which 
there are no cut-off beginning points or endpoints. The spectrum of 
temperature is continuous, gradient, and intrinsically gradable. This spectral 
nature also applies to many other perceptual concepts, such as ‘spicy’, 
‘bright’, and ‘fragrant’.   
 
Now we have roughly classified a cluster of concepts such as ‘red’, ‘cold’, 
and ‘clear’, which should be better understood as a matter of spectrum rather 
than something with a threshold. They should be categorised as a type of 
concepts that are opposite to a threshold concept. Accordingly, let us define: 
 
[Spectrum Concepts]  
A concept C is a spectrum concept, iff, at the relevant 
scale S on which C is evaluated, instances of C fall into a 
range of more paradigmatic or more borderline cases that 
come in different degrees, while there are no cut-off points 
distinguishing instances of C from anything that falls short 
of C. 
 
Again, some caveats would be helpful. First, the relationship between 
spectrum concepts and ‘vague concepts’. It is an attractive view for a lot of 
philosophers that every philosophically interesting concept is somewhat 
vague in this or that sense. So, is every ‘vague’ concept a spectrum concept? 
No. Being a spectrum concept is just one way for a concept to be ‘vague’, but 
there are still other senses in which a concept could be seen as vague. As we 
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have noted before, there are some vague threshold concepts. Besides, some 
concepts that are neither threshold nor spectrum concepts can also be 
inclined to be vague if they are defined in a functional way. For example, 
‘pen’, ‘desk’, and ‘fork’. Where is the boundary between a tree twig and a pen 
or a fork? Can a large flat rock be counted as a desk? The boundaries are 
fuzzy. However, they will not be spectrum concepts if there are no relevant 
scales on which those concepts can be evaluated and graded. A spectrum 
concept requires a gradable scale intrinsic to the concept’s nature. It does not 
make sense to say something like ‘this desk is more desk than that one’, 
because no relevant gradable scale entrenched in the concept of ‘desk’ could 
be found—even though the boundaries of desk’s definition are fuzzy60.   
 
Second, are all context-sensitive concepts spectral? No. As aforesaid, there 
are context-sensitive threshold concepts that are not spectrum concepts. 
Also, some indexical terms such as ‘I’ and ‘this’ are context-sensitive, but 
they are neither threshold nor spectrum concepts due to the lack of relevant 
scales. 
 
Third, is every gradable concept spectral? Given that a spectrum concept 
has to be gradable, the two categories (i.e., gradable concepts and spectrum 
concepts) overlap with each other to a very large extent. However, there 
could be exceptions. That is, a concept might be graded not on a continuous 
scale but only in a discrete sense. In other words, the concept’s different 
grades do not constitute a spectrum, but a ‘staircase function’61. For 
example, academic degrees. One might see ‘academic degree’ as a 
gradable notion in that it comes in different levels, e.g., bachelor, master, and 
PhD. However, for each particular level, there is a threshold for being 
                                                          
60 One might also find my definition of ‘spectrum concepts’ somewhat vague. However, this 
does not means that the concept ‘spectrum concepts’ is a spectrum concept – because of 
the lack of relevant gradable scale. 
61 Sosa (2001, 2015) interprets knowledge in a highly similar way. He holds that knowledge 
can be graded into three levels: animal knowledge, reflective knowledge and knowledge full 
well. However, one might also argue that, within each level, there is a corresponding 
threshold for that level of knowledge.  
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awarded such a degree to the effect that anything in between does not count 
as a higher degree (e.g., PhD candidate is not a degree but just a status). 
 
So what does it mean by regarding knowledge as a spectrum concept? 
Contrary to K-THRESHOLD, the spectrum reading of knowledge holds that in 
a given relevant scale, there is no such thing serving as the threshold for 
knowledge. On the contrary, there are better or worse (and of course, more 
or less paradigmatic) cases of knowledge that come in different degrees 
which constitute a spectrum. Again, there are various relevant scales that 
could be taken into consideration when evaluating the quality of a piece of 
knowledge, e.g., justificatory strength, credence, reliability, the creditability (of 
one’s cognitive success to her cognitive agency)62. To put it more clearly, as 
opposite to K-THRESHOLD, which reflects epistemic absolutism’s core 
thesis, epistemic gradualism should strive to defend the following thesis:  
 
[K-SPECTRUM] 
Knowledge is a spectrum concept in the sense that there is 
not a threshold Tk distinguishing knowledge from 
everything that falls short of knowledge, but only better or 
worse instances of knowledge that can be graded into 
different degrees on the relevant scale S. 
 
We have seen that there are three attitudes supporting K-THRESHOLD. 
Since K-SPECTRUM denies the existence of Tk, it is compatible with neither 
moderate nor radical K-THRESHOLD. As for the impurism, K-SPECTRUM 
does not need to deny that knowledge can be context-sensitive, nevertheless, 
it denies that there are thresholds for knowledge which vary from context to 
context, as gradualism insists that in no context there exists such thing as Tk. 
Hence, K-SPECTRUM is opposed to all three versions of K-THRESHOLD. 
 
                                                          
62 Also, for the AAA-model of virtue epistemology, the scales can be about accuracy, 
aptness, and adroitness. 
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So how can we distinguish knowledge from what falls short of knowledge if no 
threshold is available for us to refer to? By endorsing K-SPECTRUM, 
gradualism can reply that: it is just like how we tell whether an object is red or 
not. Admittedly, there can be no easy and precise criteria when making 
judgments like these. In our real-life epistemic practice, judgments about 
‘whether one knows’ are not always easy and precise. Instead, when 
encountering some borderline cases, our judgments are inclined to be full of 
uncertainty and hesitation—just like when we see a half-ripe apple. The 
spectrum view of knowledge can mirror and explain away this hesitation. 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that we all have various types of paradigmatic 
instances63 of knowledge in mind, e.g., logical knowledge and mathematical 
knowledge of analytic truths (such as ‘1+1=2’, ‘P→P’), perceptual knowledge 
(‘I see that I have hands’, ‘I feel a headache now’), and the like. These cases 
constitute some typical indicators of paradigmatic instances of knowledge. 
Also, there are some typical indicators of not-knowledge, such as falsity, 
disbelief, or mere epistemic luck. It is noteworthy that this also indicates that 
K-SPECTRUM does not imply that knowledge has no necessary conditions. 
The spectrum reading of knowledge is compatible with the existence of 
necessary conditions for knowledge especially when they serve as indicators 
of paradigmatic not-knowledge. With these indicators of paradigmatic cases 
of knowledge and not-knowledge in play, we can construct the frame of 
reference for making knowledge ascriptions. The more fine-grained and 
elaborative the frame of reference is, the better we can accordingly 
distinguish knowledge from not-knowledge—although the distinction can 
never be clear-cut or easy given that there are no absolute thresholds.  
 
                                                          
63 Analogously, consider the ‘doneness’ of steaks. There are no thresholds for a steak’s 
being ‘rare’, ‘medium rare’, ‘medium’, or ‘well done’ – one can only (roughly) judge the 
doneness by how ‘pinky’ or tender the meat is. Restaurants or recipe books might provide 
you with illustrative pictures showing what steaks with different degrees of doneness would 
typically look like, which could help you to judge whether my steak is medium rare or 
medium. Nevertheless, these illustrative pictures are not ‘thresholds’ for doneness, but just 
paradigmatic cases for you to refer to.  
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So is there a threshold for a case of knowledge’s being paradigmatic? I think, 
a consistent gradualist should say ‘no’. That is to say, a thorough spectrum 
account of knowledge ought to endorse higher-order spectrum-ness. 
Otherwise, K-SPECTRUM is just delaying the inevitable—it just transfers the 
problem from finding a threshold for knowledge to finding a threshold for 
‘paradigmatic cases of knowledge’. This does not solve the problem, but just 
postpones it. One may worry that: does this mean that you are committed to 
paradigmatic cases of paradigmatic cases of knowledge? And therewith, 
paradigmatic cases of paradigmatic cases of paradigmatic cases of 
knowledge, and so forth? Does this invite infinite regress? My reply is: there 
is nothing wrong with this infinite iteration of higher-order spectrum-ness. A 
spectrum, by its nature, is the result of an infinite series of gradual changes 
and the infinite iteration of threshold-less-ness. There is no threshold for red, 
just like there are no thresholds for crimson, scarlet, laky or claret. One 
should not worry that a spectrum concept has no higher-order threshold, just 
like one should not worry that a circle has no straight sides. One should not 
try to analyse a curve line into straight lines, likewise, one should not expect 
to analyse a spectrum concept into threshold concepts. 
 
Qua a core thesis that epistemic gradualism should defend, K-SPECTRUM 
perfectly captures motivations for embracing the gradualist reading of 
knowledge. As introduced before, gradualism can be motivated by the 
following discoveries: first, the absolutist orthodoxy is ill-grounded; second, 
there are significant resemblances between knowledge-that and other 
paradigmatic gradable epistemic notions. Furthermore, the intractability of the 
boundary problem of knowledge also renders epistemic gradualism an 
apparently more intriguing solution. These motivations for epistemic 
gradualism all lend support to K-SPECTRUM. If knowledge is a spectrum 
concept, then it is no wonder that there are linguistic data using ‘knows-that’ 
as a gradable phrase. Likewise, it can also explain why knowledge-that 
notably resembles paradigmatic gradable epistemic notions such as 
knowledge-how and understanding—they are homologous in the sense that 
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they are all spectrum concepts. Finally, insofar as K-THRESHOLD is 
accepted, the boundary problem ought to be thereby resolved because it 
makes no sense to search for a spectrum concept’s threshold—spectrum 
concepts are anti-threshold by their nature.   
 
With K-THRESHOLD and K-SPECTRUM in play, we can now reconstruct the 
debate between epistemic absolutism and epistemic gradualism by basing it 
on these two contradictory theses. That means, the central disagreement 
between absolutism and gradualism should be understood as the dispute the 
threshold reading of knowledge and the spectrum reading of knowledge. How 
does the gradualism/absolutism debate benefit from this reconstructed 
model? 
 
3.  Remodelling the Debate 
 
The extant model of the debate between gradualism and absolutism rests 
essentially on the distinction between external gradualism/absolutism and 
internal gradualism/absolutism (a la Hetherington). Hetherington argues that 
external absolutism is unquestionable, and thus we should focus on the 
comparison between internal gradualism and internal absolutism. We have 
noted that this model of the debate has two defects. First, the internal sense 
of gradualism is not as controversial as Hetherington presents it to be—
instead, most absolutists would be glad to admit that knowledge can be seen 
as gradable in terms of its justificatory strength. Nevertheless, they would still 
insist that they are epistemic absolutists rather than gradualists, because 
knowledge is ungradable in another more important sense—it has an 
absolute threshold. This leads to the second defect of the extant model of the 
debate between gradualism and absolutism—it gives rise to the two-sense 
problem. Second, within Hetherington’s framework, both internal absolutism 
and (his) internal gradualism are unappealing. Few epistemologists would 
actually insist that one’s knowledge cannot be improved despite better 
justification—there is apparently no reason for one to defend this 
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unreasonable stand. However, the internal gradualist reading of knowledge, 
which is supposed to be relatively more plausible, is based on a fairly 
unpopular anti-justificationist ground by Hetherington. Consequently, 
although external absolutism is more widely accepted and relatively more 
debatable such that it is more suitable for constituting one side of the 
absolutism/gradualism debate, it is hard to find its opposite within 
Hetherington’s framework. That is because, Hetherington did not spell out 
what an attractive external gradualist reading of knowledge is like, because 
he grants external absolutism; but on the other hand, his internal gradualism 
is too weak to constitute a balanced debate. 
 
By reconstructing the debate on the basis of two irreconcilable theses, to wit, 
K-THRESHOLD and K-SPECTRUM, the new model of the debate enjoys 
advantages over the current one in at least three aspects: 
 
(1) The divergence between gradualism and absolutism is 
characterised more explicitly. The central disagreement between 
K-THRESHOLD and K-SPECTRUM is whether there is a 
threshold for knowledge. Absolutism claims ‘yes’, gradualism 
argues ‘no’—the divergence is clear and certain. There is no 
space for equivocalism, as a concept cannot be both threshold-
ed and spectral. Hence it avoids the two-sense problem of the 
extant debate, and can thus prevent the equivocal attitude. 
 
(2) The divergence between gradualism and absolutism is captured 
more accurately. Drawing on Hetherington’s own definition of 
‘external absolutism’, this new model bases absolutism on its 
commitment to the existence of a threshold for knowledge. 
Moreover, for different scales to evaluate knowledge, there is a 
notable amount of philosophers who advocate the existence of 
Tk on relevant scales, which prevents gradualists from tilting at 
windmills. By way of illustration, for the scale of belief, we have 
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philosophers who endorse credence-one or threshold-view of 
belief. For the scale of truth, we have numerous bivalentists and 
epistemicists. For the scale of justification, we have infallibilists 
(see Williamson 2000; Dutant 2016; Dodd 2011; Littlejohn 2008; 
Davies 2018; etc.), anti-justificationists (e.g., Hetherington and 
Goldman) and a large number of aforementioned proponents of 
moderate K-THRESHOLD who might be seen as epistemicists 
on the boundary problem of knowledge. 64 Compared with 
Hetherington’s model of the debate, of which the ‘internal 
absolutism’ side has no genuine proponents, the remodelled 
absolutism can avoid becoming a straw man. 
 
(3) The remodelled debate is more balanced as both sides of the 
debate become more attractive. On the one hand, the 
remodelled gradualism has more appeal as it does not need to 
be based on the counterintuitive anti-justificationist position. 
Rather, it can be applied to different accounts of knowledge. On 
the other hand, this new model of the debate is not unfairly 
unfavourable for absolutism. Instead, it also boosts motivations 
for advocating absolutism by shifting the focus of the debate from 
internal absolutism to external absolutism. Precisely put, firstly, 
this remodelled debate preserves all motivations for being an 
absolutist that one can hold in the original model of the debate 
(e.g., linguistic evidence). Besides, it further absorbs some 
motivations for absolutism that are compatible with internal 
gradualism, such as epistemicism, moderate K-THRESHOLD, 
and the credence-one/threshold view of belief. Since 
Hetherington presents the gradualism/absolutism debate as one 
between internal gradualism and internal absolutism, these 
                                                          
64 In addition, Jaster (2013) explicitly claims that knowledge is a pure threshold predicate. For a pure 
threshold predicate, in each context ‘the obtaining standard fixes the conditions that have to be 
satisfied for a subject to exceed the threshold. Once the threshold is exceeded, the predicate 
applies.’ (Jaster 2013: 321) 
162 
 
motivations are not only unavailable but also inconsistent with 
the absolutist side within the current model. 
 
The last point that I shall mention without expanding is: this new model can 
also yield a more fruitful debate that can shed light on many contemporary 
epistemological issues. For example, the threshold view and the spectrum 
view of knowledge could lead us to two distinct directions of epistemological 
investigation. By endorsing K-THRESHOLD, epistemology should strive for 
locating the threshold for knowledge, or at least, narrowing down the span 
within which Tk is located. Call this paradigm of epistemological investigation 
the threshold paradigm. In contrast, if K-SPECTRUM is accepted, then we 
should not even attempt to narrow down the span, as there is no threshold 
for knowledge at all. Rather, it is more meaningful to figure out indicators of 
paradigmatic cases of knowledge and not-knowledge so that we can depict 
the spectrum of knowledge in a more fine-grained manner. Call this paradigm 
of epistemological investigation the spectrum paradigm. Under the threshold 
paradigm, many advocates65 of K-THRESHOLD see it as a primary task for 
epistemology to give a reductive analysis of knowledge, or, necessary and 
sufficient conditions for knowledge. That is because a threshold for 
knowledge will usually serve as an analysis of knowledge, or indicate the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for an epistemic standing’s being 
qualified as knowledge. On the contrary, under the spectrum paradigm, the 
anti-reductive-analysis line (see, for example, Zagzebski, 1994; Williamson, 
2000) is what we should take. It is in principle impossible to define a 
spectrum concept ‘red’ in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions 
whereby we can distinguish red from any other colour. What is important for 
comprehending a spectrum concept is not analysis, but characterisation—
characterising what a typical instance of that concept is like and what a less 
typical instance would be like, and so forth. It is not totally crazy to grasp a 
                                                          
65 Admittedly, one can deny that knowledge is reductively analysable but still endorse K-
THRESHOLD. The point here is just that a typical characteristic of the threshold paradigm is 
the pursuit of reductive analysis of knowledge. At lease, the threshold paradigm has more 
motivations to pursue such an analysis compared with the spectrum paradigm. For the 
spectrum paradigm, a reductive analysis of knowledge should not have been expected at all. 
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concept without resorting to its analysis or necessary and sufficient 
conditions. Consider family resemblance concepts—by definition, they have 
no commonly shared core/essence encompassing their definitions in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. There can be no reductive analysis for a 
family resemblance concept, such as ‘games’. Moreover, it is impossible to 
draw a sharp boundary dividing all members of ‘games’ from all members of 
‘not-games’. Admittedly, it is worthy of debate whether knowledge is a family 
resemblance concept66—what I try to illustrate here is just that a spectrum 
paradigm of conceptual investigation is not only conceivable but maybe also 
more promising than it appears to be. With these being said, it should be 
evident that, being based on K-THRESHOLD and K-SPECTRUM, the debate 
between absolutism and gradualism is not merely a debate around a property 
(i.e., gradability) of knowledge. More importantly, it also presents us with a 
competition between two modes of epistemological investigations which 
could influence the direction that relevant researches should head to. 
 
The fruitfulness of the remodelled debate also embodies in how gradualism 
and absolutism can be respectively applied to solve epistemological issues. 
The better one side of the debate can help to solve contemporary 
epistemological puzzles, the more likely that it would be seen as a better 
reading of knowledge and thus wins over more support. For example, which 
view can better answer the value problems of knowledge? Can the Gettier 
problem gain better resolutions within a gradualist framework? How should 
we rethink the relation between knowing and understanding?  
 
Important and interesting as they are, this chapter is unable to address these 
problems due to the limited length. Nevertheless, at this stage, I hope that I 
have accomplished the primary goal of this chapter—to reconstruct a better 
framework for the gradualism/absolutism debate. In the remainder of this 
thesis, I will manage to exhibit the theoretical advantages that gradualism 
                                                          
66 Kusch (2011) and Kusch & McKenna (2018) argue that knowledge is a family 
resemblance concept.  
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enjoys over absolutism. The last section of this chapter will take the first 
step—it will be proved that gradualism can offer us a unified account of 
different types of knowledge, which can explain away the putative asymmetry 
between knowledge-that and other types of knowledge in terms of the 
gradability. 
 
4. Towards A Unified Account of Knowledge 
 
The gradualism/absolutism debate is an epistemologically valuable issue that 
is worthy of further discussions. However, the extant model of the debate 
interprets the core divergence of gradualism and absolutism in a problematic 
way, and thus succumbs to the two-sense problem. I suggest that we should 
remodel the debate by focusing on the competition between the threshold 
reading and the spectrum reading of knowledge, given that it can help us to 
construct a more philosophically meaningful and fruitful debate. I am far from 
believing that the considerations developed in this chapter make a conclusive 
case for the debate between gradualism and absolutism. Instead, I hope that 
this chapter could be seen as a restart rather than a conclusion of the 
relevant debate. 
 
There are many types of knowledge in terms of the object to be known. The 
focus of this thesis is knowledge of a proposition, i.e., knowledge-that. 
Besides, knowledge-who, knowledge-where, knowledge-why and the like 
constitute knowledge-wh. Knowledge of how to do something is called 
knowledge-how67. Similar taxonomy also comes in the form of propositional 
knowledge, objectual knowledge, practical knowledge, and so on. 
Reductionism argues that different types of knowledge can be reduced to 
one single basic type of knowledge. For instance, intellectualism holds that 
knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that, while the radical anti-
intellectualism argues that knowledge-that is a species of knowledge-how. 
                                                          
67 Similarly, Hetherington invented a jargon ‘how-knowledge’ which captures not only the 
intension of knowledge-how, but also a broader (while somehow vaguer) sense of ‘how it is 
that p’.   
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However, among those varieties of knowledge, knowledge-wh and 
knowledge-how are ordinarily taken to be gradable concepts (as we have 
discussed in the first chapter). In contrast, the traditional absolutist view 
claims that proposition knowledge is significantly heterogeneous—it is non-
gradable. This becomes an apparent challenge to reductionism. However, 
the absoluteness of knowledge-that suggests that there is something 
fundamentally different between ungradable knowledge-that and gradable 
knowledge-how, which makes the reductionism dubitable. This also 
constitutes a classic anti-intellectualism approach in the literature (see Ryle, 
1949; Sgaravatti and Zardini, 2008; Michaelis, 2011; Bengson and Moffett, 
2011; Wiggins, 2012; etc.). Radical-intellectualism also faces the same 
difficulty. Hetherington (2005) evades this difficulty by combining his radical-
intellectualism with epistemic gradualism, to the effect that both knowledge-
that and how-knowledge are gradable68.  
 
Let me clarify the dialectical state of play now. Although I do not think 
gradualism has to imply reductionism, it is still necessary for anyone who 
advocates reductionism to face up to the gradualism/absolutism debate. That 
is because if knowledge-that, as opposed to other varieties of knowledge, is 
not gradable, then this asymmetry becomes an important explanandum that 
reductionism has to explain properly. Note that this challenge is not only for 
reductionism. For those who endorse both absolutism and anti-reductionism, 
it still remains the problem that what makes knowledge-that so different. How 
should we explain the asymmetry between knowledge-that and other types of 
knowledge in terms of their gradability? Call this problem the asymmetry 
problem. This problem can be further divided into more sub-problems, for 
example: What is the heterogeneous trait that propositional knowledge has, 
while other types of knowledge do not? When taking the genealogy of 
knowledge into consideration, what is the essential difference between the 
function of knowledge-that and that of other types of knowledge? Does this 
                                                          
68 However, as we have seen in the previous chapters, his attempt at basing gradualism on 
how-knowledge is not successful. In particular, the reductionist assumption should not be 
seen as necessary for defending gradualism. 
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difference really exist? Is there another distinct genealogy storyline about the 
formation of our concept of know-how/know-wh, compared with that of know-
that? To answer these questions, absolutists are prone to complicate their 
explications so that the alleged asymmetry can be plausibly addressed. For 
example, they need to distinguish the nature of knowledge-that from that of 
knowledge-how/knowledge-wh, and provide extra explanations about how 
this difference came into being. Even if these tasks can be accomplished, 
this will perforce sacrifice the simplicity of explication. Therefore, an 
absolutist presupposition would encumber both reductionists and non-
reductionists (especially reductionists).  
 
The simplest while plausible solution to this problem is to abandon the 
absolutist position—not only the beyond-threshold absolutism, but also the 
threshold absolutism (Hetherington’s solution failed partially because he just 
abandoned the former). By embracing the gradualist account of knowledge, 
we find the alleged asymmetry disappears as different varieties of knowledge 
are all gradable. There is no more ‘heterogeneous trait’ that needs to be 
explained. This leads us to a unified theory of knowledge where the 
gradability of various types of knowledge are homogeneous and symmetrical. 
In contrast with absolutism that brings on heterogeneity and asymmetry, a 
gradualist account of knowledge is more concise, coherent and simple.   
 
One may question whether a unified account of knowledge is worthy of 
pursuing. Maybe this pursuit is mistaken from the outset, if knowledge is a 
family resemblance concept as Kusch (2011) and Kusch & McKenna (2018) 
suggest. If that is the case, perhaps we shall stop craving for generality or a 
commonly shared essence for different members of the knowledge family. 
My response is that, gradualism-based unified account of knowledge is 
compatible with the idea that knowledge is a family resemblance concept. 
That is because, the family resemblance view only rejects the existence of a 
single core/essence commonly shared by each type of knowledge. It does 
not imply that members of knowledge family cannot have anything in 
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common. For example, for the family of numbers, all types of number have at 
least one thing in common: they are all numbers. Family resemblance does 
not refuse commonly shared characteristic, but just commonly shared 
core/essence that can encompass the definition of knowledge in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions.  
 
In his Blue Book, speaking of family resemblance and philosophers’ 
inclination of ‘carving for generality’, Wittgenstein writes:  
 
‘We are inclined to think that there must be something in 
common to all games, say, and that this common property is 
the justification for applying the term “game” to the various 
games’ (Wittgenstein, Blue Book, 1958: 17; emphasis mine) 
 
It is important that we do not dismiss the latter half of the sentence after ‘and 
that’. For a general term that counts for a family resemblance concept, what 
Wittgenstein denies is not that there is a common property simpliciter shared 
by all instances, but that there is a common property that justifies why these 
instances are all instances of the very general term69. If the thesis of family 
resemblance just indiscriminately denies any common property, then the 
thesis is clearly false. Obviously, there are some traits (albeit trivial) common 
to all types of games, say, they are all human activities, they are all ‘playable’ 
for their game-players, etc. A sympathetic reading of the thesis of family 
resemblance should better consider what question this thesis aims to answer. 
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein starts the talking of family 
resemblance by responding to an imagined critique:  
 
‘You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of 
language games, but have nowhere said what the essence of 
a language-game, and hence of language, is: what is 
common to all these activities, and what makes them into 
language or parts of language.’ (PI, § 65; emphasis mine) 
 
                                                          




It should be evident that the issue that Wittgenstein intends to address is: 
what makes us identify something as belonging to a kind or a general term. 
What makes us call all instances of language as ‘language’? Thereupon, his 
answer is: there is no such a common essence that can make us apply the 
same term to all its instances: 
 
‘Instead of producing something common to all that we call 
language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one 
thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, 
— but that they are related to one another in many different 
ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these 
relationships, that we call them all “language”.’  (PI, § 65; 
emphasis mine) 
 
Taking the context of PI into consideration, we have no reason to dismiss 
Wittgenstein’s restriction on the non-existent common property—it should be 
a property that serves as an essence, to wit, a sufficient and necessary 
condition for membership in the extensions of a general term.   
 
With these being said, it is not hard to see why the commonly shared 
gradability among different members of ‘knowledge’ does not contradict the 
idea of family resemblance. Gradability does not serve as an essence for 
knowledge that can sufficiently and necessarily determine extensions of 
knowledge. It is just a commonly shared characteristic of different varieties of 
knowledge. On the contrary, the existence of such a common property can 
help us better understand why knowledge-that, knowledge-how and 
knowledge-wh belong to the same family.  
 
So now we have seen that epistemic gradualism can provide us with a simple 
unified theory of knowledge in terms of the gradability. Is there any 
competing proposal that argues the opposite? Recently, Carlotta Pavese 
(2017) has proposed a competing account arguing that knowledge-how is 
also ungradable in its nature, despite our ordinary talk about gradable know-
how. According to Pavese, her project aims ‘to argue for the compatibility of 
the phenomenon of gradability with the absoluteness of the state ascribed by 
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know-how ascriptions’ (2017: 350). Pavese suggests that linguistic 
phenomena of ordinary epistemological talks are insufficient to reveal the 
conceptual nature of an epistemic state. I agree with Pavese on this point 
(see Chapter Two). In my case, knowledge-that is gradable, despite ordinary 
talks about ungradable know-that; in Pavese’s case, knowledge-how is 
ungradable, despite ordinary talks about gradable know-how. Secondly, 
Pavese and I both strive for a unified account of knowledge that can 
uniformly explain knowledge-how and knowledge-that. The motivation of 
Pavese’s project is to defend the intellectualism of knowledge-how, a view 
that knowledge-how is reducible to knowledge-that, from the apparent 
asymmetry of their (knowledge-how and knowledge-that) gradability. If 
Pavese’s project succeeds, it would also bring us to a unified solution to the 
asymmetry problem—both knowledge-how and knowledge-that are 
ungradable.  
 
Whereas, I do not think Pavese’s competing project can prevail over mine. 
First, her ungradable reading of knowledge-how is based on the 
intellectualism of knowledge-how. Pavese advocates that one’s knowledge of 
how to φ can be understood as one’s knowledge of a practical answer to the 
question ‘how to φ’—and the practical answer can be propositional. Hence 
one’s knowledge-how is equivalent to one’s propositional knowledge of a 
(bunch of) proposition(s) expressing the practical answer to the question 
‘how to φ’. Given that, Pavese proposes analyses as follows: Quantitative 
talk of gradable know-how expresses just a matter of knowing different 
extents of the practical answer. Qualitative talk of gradable know-how such 
as ‘A knows how to φ better than B does’ just means that A’s practical 
answer to ‘how to φ’ is better than B’s (see Pavese, 2017). All in all, what is 
gradable is just the practical answer, rather than one’s (propositional) 
knowing that answer. One’s propositional knowledge of the answer, and thus 
one’s knowledge-how, is still an absolute matter. Clearly, Pavese’s analyses 
are premised on the intellectualism, which has invited a historic debate where 
numerous philosophers have developed various forms of anti-intellectualism 
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(see Ryle 1949; Roland 1958; Carr 1981; Noë 2005; Hetherington 2006, 
2011; Cath 2011; etc). I do not plan to expand the debate here, but just mean 
to call for readers’ notice that it seems that in regard to whether know-how is 
exhaustively reducible to know-that, the foundation of Pavese’s project is 
dubitable. For example, Carter & Pritchard (2015) argue that knowledge-how 
is not a kind of knowledge-that because the former does not share an 
important epistemic property with the latter. The idea here is that knowledge-
how is compatible with a variety of Gettier-style epistemic luck (in particular, 
environmental luck), while knowledge-that is not. Furthermore, this verdict is 
supported by a recent experimental study conducted by Carter et al. (2019), 
which reports that people are even more inclined to attribute knowledge-how 
in cases where epistemic luck is present; in contrast, knowledge-that 
attributions are not sensitive to epistemic luck. 
 
Moreover, even following the intellectualist line, Pavese’s conclusion is still 
drawn too quickly. That is because Pavese’s analyses can at most shown 
that there is a way to explain linguistic evidence of gradable know-how talk 
without imperilling the propositional essence of knowledge-how. That is, we 
talk of know-how as if it is gradable, but in its nature, know-how is still a 
species of know-that. However, Pavese takes it for granted that knowledge-
that is ungradable. She provides no argument defending her absolutist 
account of propositional knowledge, which is exactly what my proposal urges 
to reject. In other words, ‘whether know-that (rather than know-how) is 
gradable’ is the central dispute, where Pavese talked less. In addition, it is 
unclear why the quality (or say, the gradability) of one’s practical answer 
cannot reflect the quality (gradability) of one’s knowledge-how. It seems to be 
self-evident for Pavese that the quality of one’s practical answer is 
fundamentally distinct from the quality of one’s corresponding knowledge. But 
this might not be that self-evident. Why cannot gradualist of knowledge-how 
argue that one’s knowledge-how-to-φ is gradable just in terms of the quality 
of one’s practical answer to ‘how to φ’? Especially, drawing on the end of 
inquiry account, the primary function of knowledge-how is just to signal that 
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our cognitive inquiry towards ‘how to do something’ can be ended as a good-
enough answer is acquired. Hence it makes good (if not perfect) sense that 
the quality of one’s knowledge-how is subject to the quality of the answer 
acquired. This can better explain why we need knowledge-how and when the 
inquiry can end—for absolutists, there is an absolute cut-off point where the 
inquiry could and should end70; while for gradualists, the end-point can be 
relative to different situations. I find the latter narrative seems to match our 
daily epistemic practice better71.    
 
Now we have discussed the competing unified theory and noticed that it 
lacks competitiveness. Endorsing the gradualist account of knowledge 
remains to be the most promising unified theory that is of the merit of 
simplicity and efficiency.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In Chapter Three, we analysed the defects of Hetherington’s two versions of 
gradualism. While in this chapter, we further discussed the defects of the 
current model of the debate between gradualism and absolutism that is 
based on Hetherington’s problematic gradualist proposals. In order to avoid 
those defects, this chapter has explored a new way to reconstruct the model 
of the debate by proposing the distinction between K-THRESHOLD and K-
SPECTRUM. With a better model of the debate in play, we can now further 
build up motivations for embracing gradualism. My strategy is: if gradualism 
can help to address significant epistemological issues that can hardly be 
                                                          
70 What is worse, Pavese’s absolutist intellectualism of knowledge-how does not seem to 
provide an explanation about when the inquiry can come to an end. That is because her 
account of know-how only emphasises on one’s (propositionally) knowing a practical answer, 
but says nothing on how the quality of that answer influences the truth value of the 
corresponding knowledge ascription. After all, this influence is what Pavese intends to cut off 
from the nature of know-how, so that the quality of the answer does not affect the quality of 
the knowledge.   
71 Consider it: is there actually a cut-off point where one can be recognised as knowing how 
to play the piano? 
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solved within an absolutist picture, then gradualism should be taken to be 
preferable to absolutism. 
 
I have to admit that Hetherington also took a similar strategy to advocate 
gradualism: he also claimed to show gradualism’s theoretical mertis in terms 
of its applications in scepticism, the Gettier problem, a unified account of 
knowledge, and even the McKinsey paradox (see Hetherington 2001; 2011, 
ch. 5). So it seems that Hetherington has already shown gradualism’s 
advantage in the same manner that I am about to do. Why is my attempt still 
needed? The answer is straightforward: the success of Hetherington’s 
comparison between gradualism and absolutism is based on a premise that 
his gradualist proposals hold water. However, as we have seen in Chapter 3, 
both versions of his gradualist proposals have significant defects, and 
therefore we need a new account of gradualism. Defects of Hetherington’s 
gradualist accounts of knowledge will also affect his arguments showing 
gradualism’s theoretical advantages. In Chapter 3, it has been shown that his 
application of gradualism in the Gettier problem is unpersuasive, and how 
problems of his how-knowledge-based account of gradualism regrettably 
hinder his reductionist unified account of knowledge. In Chapter 6, we will 
further see why his gradualist anti-sceptical proposals are also unsuccessful.  
 
We have seen that the first valuable application of gradualism is that it can 
offer us a unified account of knowledge that enjoys the merits of simplicity 
and efficiency. The next chapter will illustrate several more possible 








Chapter Five: Gradualism and Explanatory Power 
 
 
Abstract:  This chapter purports to show gradualism’s 
theoretical merits by exploring its applications in solving two 
important epistemological issues. The first section focuses on 
epistemic luck. It is controversial whether a specific type of 
epistemic luck, namely, environmental luck, is incompatible 
with knowledge. Goldberg (2015) proposes a new account of 
epistemic luck that is based on the notions of epistemic 
entitlement and adequate explanation (in contrast to 
Pritchard’s safety-based account), and is alleged to be able 
to account for the two conflicting intuitions regarding 
environmental luck’s compatibility with knowledge. I will 
argue that Goldberg’s account of epistemic luck suffers from 
two defects: 1) it will end up denying the notion of 
environmental luck; 2) it cannot accommodate the intuition 
that environmental luck is compatible with knowledge. 
Instead, gradualism can reconcile the debate regarding 
environmental luck in a more satisfactory manner. The 
second section will explore gradualism’s application in 
accounting for faultless disagreements. 
Faultless disagreements on knowledge ascriptions have two 
seemingly incompatible conditions: 1) two (or more) 
competent epistemic peers are genuinely disagreeing with 
each other on the truth value of a knowledge ascription 
proposition (call it DISAGREEMENT), and 2) none of them is 
genuinely making a mistake (call it FAULTLESSNESS). How 
shall we reconcile the two conditions? Call this the puzzle 
of faultless disagreement. Three mainstream solutions to the 
puzzle (namely, indexical contextualism, non-indexical 
contextualism, and non-indexical relativism) will be 
examined. The three extant proposals all succumb to a 
dilemma: they would either sacrifice FAULTLESSNESS 
or DISAGREEMENT. In contrast, gradualism can better 
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accommodate both conditions by interpreting knowledge as a 
spectrum concept analogous to ‘red’, ‘warm’, or ‘bright’.  
 
The previous chapter has introduced a new model of the debate for 
gradualism and absolutism. We have seen that a gradualist theory of 
knowledge based on K-SPECTRUM could lead this debate, as well as 
gradualism itself, to a more fruitful prospect. Gradualism’s advantages over 
absolutism can be reflected by its theoretical fruits. K-SPECTRUM’s 
application in resolving the putative asymmetry problem is an instance. This 
chapter will further explore gradualism’s implications in contemporary 
epistemology. It will be argued that gradualism enjoys higher explanatory 
power than absolutism in solving two knotty issues in the contemporary 
epistemological debates that involve epistemic luck and faultless 
disagreements.  
 
1. Gradualism and Epistemic Luck 
 
1.1: Two intuitions 
 
Gettier-style counterexamples famously challenged the JTB account of 
knowledge. Any post-Gettier analysis of knowledge is expected to be able to 
avoid the Gettier-style challenge and explain away Gettier-style cases. The 
influential anti-luck epistemology attributes protagonists’ lack of knowledge in 
Gettier-style counterexamples to knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. It is 
argued that knowledge cannot be the result of mere epistemic luck, while in 
Gettier-style cases, the protagonists’ beliefs are just luckily true.  
 
Pritchard (2009a, 2009b, 2012a) distinguishes two different types of 
epistemic luck. The first type is intervening luck. A knowledge-apt belief of a 
fact is expected to be true because it captures the target fact. While in cases 
such as Gettier’s original coins-in-pocket case and Ford-or-Barcelona case 
(see Gettier 1963), and Chisholm’s sheep-in-the-field case (see Chisholm 
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1966), there is a kind of intervening luck that intervenes between the 
subject’s belief and the target fact. In those cases, the protagonists’ beliefs 
turn out to be true not in virtue of their capturing the target fact by manifesting 
their cognitive abilities, but merely in virtue of the intervening luck. 
 
In contrast, environmental luck refers to the type of luck that is involved in 
fake-barn-county style Gettier cases (see Goldman 1976) where there is 
nothing intervening between the belief and the target fact. For example, in 
the fake barn case, the protagonist (name her ‘Barney’) does see a real barn 
and her belief that ‘there is a barn in front of me’ does capture the fact that 
she sees a real barn. However, her belief is still luckily true as she is in a bad 
epistemic environment where she could have easily formed a false belief by 
mistakenly taking a barn façade for a real barn. A similar case of 
environmental luck is Pritchard’s fire-officer case (see Pritchard 2010), where 
the protagonist occasionally encounters a real fire officer among a group of 
cleverly disguised fake fire officers. The protagonist forms a true belief 
regarding the cause of a fire emergency by virtue of the real fire officer’s 
testimony. However, this belief is just luckily true because our protagonist 
could have easily talked with a fake fire officer who would only lie. The 
absence of knowledge in those cases is not due to the absence of cognitive 
achievement, but due to the inhospitable epistemic environment72.  
 
The safety-based account of epistemic luck accounts for these two alleged 
knowledge-undermining veritic epistemic luck in terms of the notion of safety. 
That is, a true belief is safe iff it could not have easily been formed on the 
same basis and yet been false (see, for example, Sosa 1999; Williamson 
2000; Pritchard 2007). True beliefs in Gettier cases fail to constitute 
knowledge because they all could have easily been false, no matter the 
unsafety is caused by intervening factors or environmental factors.  
                                                          
72 Interestingly, Gendler and Hawthorne (2005) report that many people find there is a 
tendency to ascribe knowledge in a highly similar case that they dub WATCH OUT: a subject 
forms a true belief regarding what time it is by asking a reliable truth-teller who happens to 




It is widely accepted that knowledge cannot be the result of mere epistemic 
luck. Also, it is relatively uncontroversial that classic Gettier-style luck is 
knowledge-undermining. In contrast, there has been a debate on whether 
environmental luck is incompatible with knowledge as Pritchard claims. 
Many, albeit not mainstream, epistemologists share the intuition that 
environmental luck is compatible with knowledge, thus Barney does know 
that there is a real barn in front of her. Prominent advocates of this intuition 
include Hetherington (1999, 2001), Gendler and Hawthorne (2005), Lycan 
(2006), Sosa (2007, 2009), Turri (2011b), and Colao, Buckwalter & Stich 
(2012).  
 
By way of illustration, Hetherington (2001) argues that in the fake barn case, 
Barney (poorly) knows that there is a barn in a very bad way, however, her 
true belief still counts as knowledge, given that mere true belief is sufficient 
for constituting the minimal knowledge. Sosa (2007) holds that Barney’s 
belief in the fake barn case is apt, to wit, her belief is true because of her 
reliable cognitive competence (e.g., perceptual competence). Thus, her apt 
belief suffices to count as a piece of animal knowledge despite the luckiness. 
We find the quality of Barney’s knowledge not very satisfactory because it 
falls short of reflective knowledge, which is a higher-level of knowledge that 
‘requires also an apt apprehension that the object-level perceptual belief is 
apt’ (Sosa, 2007: 108). Drawing on Sosa’s AAA-model (accurate, adroit, apt) 
of knowledge, Turri (2011b) adds one more condition for knowledge—to 
constitute knowledge, a belief should not only be apt (true because of 
competence), but also adept (a true belief that manifests competence)73. In 
accordance with this analysis of knowledge, Barney’s true belief does 
manifest her relevant cognitive competence, and thus should be recognised 
as knowledge. As for the prevailing intuition that knowledge is absent in the 
fake barn case, Turri directly denies that he shares this intuition. To persuade 
the readers, Turri invites us to consider a modified case: Bad Henry 
                                                          
73 For a detailed discussion of the aptness/adeptness distinction, see Turri (2011b). 
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maliciously destroys a barn (that he firmly believes to be a barn) by a 
bazooka, without being aware that he is in a fake barn county where the only 
real barn that he destroyed is surrounded by indistinguishable barn façades. 
Turri holds that it should be more intuitive that Bad Henry did know that he 
was destroying a real barn as he pulled the trigger. However, just like Turri 
lacks the intuition that Barney lacks knowledge, advocates of environmental 
luck’s incompatibility of knowledge might also lack Turri’s intuition that Bad 
Henry possesses knowledge. Incompatibilists can simply insist, without being 
stubbornly steadfast, that Bad Henry’s belief is just luckily and unsafely true 
and hence falls short of knowledge. It is irrelevant whether he destroyed the 
barn or just saw the barn.  
 
In summary, we seem to reach an impasse in the debate. What worsens this 
impasse is, from an experimental-philosophy perspective, Colao, Buckwalter 
& Stich (2012) discover that the Turri-style intuition is held by the majority of 
respondents. So, when the two uncompromising conflicting intuitions pose an 
apparent impasse, is there any possibility of putting forward a reconcilement 
that breaks the deadlock? Moreover, how shall we account for the existing 
divergence? That is, each side of the dispute seems to hold a reasonable 
intuition—notwithstanding, the two reasonable intuitions turn out to constitute 
a contradiction. Is there any plausible explanation for this paradoxical 
phenomenon? 
 
1.2: Goldberg’s Reconcilement  
 
We have seen that there seems to be a stalemate in the debate about the 
compatibility between environmental luck and knowledge. The two sides of 
the debate hold two conflicting intuitions and neither side can convince the 
other to abandon their intuition. A reconcilement would be valuable if it can 
break the current deadlock of dialogues and account for the seemingly 
paradoxical phenomenon that two reasonable intuitions reach two conflicting 
conclusions regarding Barney’s epistemic status. Few researches in the 
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literature attempted to reconcile these two apparently irreconcilable intuitions. 
An exception is Goldberg (2015).  
 
Goldberg argues that Pritchard’s safety-based account of epistemic luck 
cannot fully capture the sense that knowledge cannot be lucky, since there 
can be lucky true beliefs that are safe. He cites some influential 
counterexamples to the safety account of epistemic luck, for instance, 
Lackey’s SOUTHERNMOST BARN case: 
 
‘SOUTHERNMOST BARN [W]hile entering a 
Midwestern farming community on her cross country 
drive, Janice looked at the first barn that she saw, which 
was on the southernmost end of the field, and formed 
the corresponding belief ‘There is a barn’. As it 
happens, the barn she saw is the only real one, 
surrounded by barn facades that members of this 
community have placed in the field in order to make 
their town appear prosperous. However, as a matter of 
strict and unwavering policy, the members of this 
community always place their only real barn on the 
southernmost end of their land, since this is where traffic 
first enters their town. Moreover, thirty years earlier, 
Janice had lived in a house on the southernmost end of 
this field in the precise location of the one real barn. 
Because of her deep interest in her childhood roots 
combined with the brief period during which she can 
safely take her eyes off of her driving, she would 
invariably have looked at only the particular place in the 
field where the real barn exists.’ (Lackey 2006: 288) 
 
Goldberg argues that, in this modified fake-barn-county case, Janice’s belief 
should be seen as safe if we adopt Pritchard’s modal account of safety. 
Pritchard defines safety as follows: 
 
‘S’s belief is safe iff in most nearby possible worlds in 
which S continues to form her belief about the target 
proposition in the same way as in the actual world the 




For the safety-based account of epistemic luck, a true belief is lucky iff it is 
not safe. However, in the SOUTHERNMOST BARN case, in most nearby 
possible worlds Janice would always invariably have looked at the 
southernmost end of the field where the real barn stands, thus her belief that 
‘there is a barn’ would continue to be true in those worlds. According to the 
modal account of safety, her belief is safe. Nevertheless, Lackey, as well as 
Goldberg, argues that Janice’s true belief still suffers from epistemic luck. 
After all, it is purely a matter of luck that, first, residents there decided to put 
the only barn in the precise location where used to be the very house that 
Janice once lived in; second, Janice was so interested in her childhood roots 
that she would invariably look at the real barn rather than those barn façades 
aside. So there is a specific kind of epistemic luck, which is not associated 
with the unsafety of Janice’s belief, but is rooted in the lack of explanatory 
connection between her belief’s being safe and her epistemic agency. That is, 
the safety of Janice’s true belief has nothing (or at least little) to do with the 
manifestation of her relevant cognitive competence. 
 
Given these safe-but-lucky counterexamples74, Goldberg proposes a new 
account of epistemic luck that is based on the notion of epistemic entitlement. 
Goldberg defines epistemic entitlement in this way: 
 
‘[A] subject S is epistemically entitled to the proposition 
that p just in case it would not be epistemically improper 
for S to presuppose that p in the course of belief-formation 
or deliberation.’ (Goldberg 2015: 281)  
 
According to Goldberg, here are two varieties of epistemic entitlement: 
earned and unearned. One’s entitlement to a proposition p is earned just in 
                                                          
74 Goldberg’s motivation for rejecting the safety-based account of epistemic luck is more 
sufficient than solely a SOUTHERNMOST BARN case. SOUTHERNMOST BARN is just a 
counterpart of Goldman’s fake-barn-county style luck. In fact, he argues that there are also 
counterexamples mirroring Gettier’s original Ford-or-Barcelona style luck and Chisholm’s 
sheep-in-the-field style luck (for the former, see Hiller & Neta 2007: 308; for the latter, see 
Goldberg 2015: 277-278). The reason why I only select to present SOUTHERNMOST BARN 




case p is either doxastically or propositionally justified for him/her. There are 
also some unearned entitlements relevant to one’s proper reliance on routes 
to knowledge, i.e., methods (such as perception, memory, and testimony) 
that when employed under normal conditions and working properly, often 
yield knowledge. Roughly speaking, a route to knowledge is required to be a 
reliable belief-forming method that often results in the acquisition of 
knowledge. Goldberg claims that when one properly relies on an epistemic 
method that qualifies as a route to knowledge, one is presumptively (though 
defeasibly) entitled ‘to presuppose such things as that the method is reliable 
when functioning properly under normal conditions’ (Goldberg 2015: 281; 
emphasis mine).  
 
After introducing these central terminologies, Goldberg formulates his 
account of epistemic luck as follows: 
 
‘EL   S’s true belief that p (acquired through method M 
in circumstances C) suffers from knowledge-
undermining epistemic luck iff there is no available 
explanation for the fact in question—how it came to 
pass that S’s employment of M in C resulted in a belief 
that is true—in terms of those propositions to which S 
has an earned entitlement, together with those (KR-) 
propositions to which S is presumptively epistemically 





‘ELBrief   S’s true belief that p suffers from epistemic luck 
when the veritic explanandum is not adequately 
explained in terms of S’s corresponding entitlement 
propositions.’ (Goldberg 2015: 285) 
 
Two more notions to unpack. First, ‘entitlement propositions’ refer to 
propositions that one is entitled. These include those unearned entitlements 
to propositions such as ‘the environmental conditions are normal’—Goldberg 
calls this the normal condition proposition; and ‘my cognitive faculties are 
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functioning properly’—Goldberg calls this the proper cognitive functioning 
proposition; and ‘my perceptual faculties are reliable when functioning 
properly in normal conditions’—Goldberg calls this the reliability proposition. 
Those propositions are entitled when one is properly relying on a route to 
knowledge. They are altogether named KR-propositions by Goldberg. 
Second, as for what counts as an adequate explanation, Goldberg admits 
that he does not have a clear criterion to offer—whether an explanation 
adequately explains its explanandum tends to be a matter of intuitive 
verdicts.   
 
So how can this new account of luck be applied to solve the Gettier problem? 
By way of illustration, in the Ford-or-Barcelona case, the protagonist Smith 
forms a true belief that ‘Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona’. He 
believes in the first disjunct of this proposition because he overhears a 
conversation discussing Jones’ Ford car. By the rule of disjunction 
introduction, he concludes that the whole disjunction must be true, although 
he does not have any information about Brown’s location. Unbeknownst to 
Smith, the first disjunct of the proposition turns out to be false, while the 
second disjunct is surprisingly true. Hence, Smith’s true belief is a result of 
epistemic luck. Goldberg can account for this luck by diagnosing that, the 
veritic explanandum of this case, viz, how it came pass to that Smith’s 
overhearing and inferring resulted in his belief’s being true, cannot be 
adequately explained by propositions that he was entitled to. After all, the 
actual reason why Smith’s belief turned out to be true was that he 
constructed a disjunction by randomly introducing an accidentally true 
disjunct. But Smith was not entitled to presume that his randomly introducing 
a disjunct could yield knowledge—it is not a reliable route to knowledge. He 
was at most entitled to presume that if the interlocutors in a conversation that 
he overheard were reliable, then he could take their testimonies at face 
value—but this obviously does not suffice to explain how it came pass to that 
his belief was true. As a result, according to the entitlement-based account of 




It seems that Goldberg’s account works smoothly when accommodating 
intervening luck that occurs in cases like Ford-or-Barcelona. But what about 
environmental luck? Goldberg alleges that one virtue of his account is that it 
can address both intuitions regarding whether Barney knows in the fake barn 
county. For the knowledge-absence intuition adjudicating that Barney lacks 
knowledge, Goldberg’ entitlement-based account of luck can explain that, this 
is because Barney’s epistemic success is due to the fact that she looks at the 
only real barn rather than barn façades around by coincidence. Her 
entitlement propositions cannot explain why she happens to glimpse at the 
only real barn. Hence Barney’s true belief is lucky and thus falls short of 
knowledge. 
 
As for the knowledge-presence intuition adjudicating that Barney does know 
that there is a barn, Goldberg’s explanation is that it can be interpreted that 
Barney’s epistemic success can be fully explained in terms of her manifesting 
her perceptual competence, which is a reliable route to knowledge. Barney is 
entitled to presume that her perceptual faculty is functioning well (which is 
true), and that her properly functioning perceptual faculty is reliable (which is 
true as well). In addition, her belief that ‘there is a barn’ is actually justified by 
her seeing that barn, thus she also enjoys the relevant earned entitlement. 
Putting these all together, her true belief can be adequately explained. 
Goldberg admits that there is something abnormal regarding Barney’s 
epistemic environment—her environmental conditions are abnormally 
inhospitable. However, he suggests that advocates of the knowledge-
presence intuition can argue that ‘this abnormality is irrelevant to how it came 
to pass that Barbara’s reliance on perception in this circumstance resulted in 
a belief that is true’ (Goldberg 2015: 289). After all, Barney is not looking at a 
fake barn, and what explains her epistemic success is but her seeing and 
recognising the real barn, together with her corresponding unearned 
entitlements in that circumstance. The reason why she happens to see the 
sole real barn rather than other fake barns is irrelevant to the explanation of 
183 
 
her epistemic success. We can better comprehend this irrelevance by 
considering a detective who knows a key clue by accidentally glimpsing at a 
corner of the room where the murder was conducted. Drawing on this key 
clue, the detective thereby reasons out the identity of the murderer. The 
detective knows the clue, and he knows who the murderer is. According to 
Goldberg’s suggested diagnosis, for people who attributes knowledge to the 
detective, the explanation of the detective’s epistemic success is irrelevant to 
why he happens to cast his eyes at that very corner rather than other corners 
or any place else. His epistemic success can be adequately explained by his 
perceptual contact with the clue and the consequent recognizing-inferencing 
process. Similarly, in the fake-barn-county case, we do not need to explain 
why Barney happens to see the real barn in order to adequately explain her 
epistemic success. The upshot is, by taking this line of explanation, Barney 
has a true belief that is not luckily true, and thus one can reasonably attribute 
knowledge to her. In other words, in the fake barn case, there is no epistemic 
luck, and hence there is knowledge.  
 
I doubt whether Goldberg’s account of epistemic luck can properly explain 
away the knowledge-presence intuition. As we have seen, he accommodates 
this intuition by arguing that Barney’s true belief, contra what Pritchard and 
most anti-luck epistemologists would predict, does not suffer from epistemic 
luck. However, this explanation faces the risk of eliminating the concept of 
environmental luck thoroughly. That is not only because the fake-barn-county 
style cases are seen as paradigmatic instantiations of environmental luck in 
the present literature, but also because that the notion environmental luck is 
exactly used to refer to epistemic luckiness caused by abnormal 
environmental factors. If Goldberg’s explanation for the knowledge-presence 
intuition holds water, then one could easily exclude all abnormal 
environmental factors from the full explanation of one’s epistemic success—
and hence the judgment of whether epistemic luck involves. Abnormal 
environmental factors are irrelevant to the identification of epistemic luck. The 
corollary is that, even in cases where the environmental conditions are 
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abnormal (such as Barney’s case), there is no such thing as environmental 
luck. As a result, there would be no cases for environmental luck—it is an 
empty and inconceivable concept. 
 
Furthermore, even if we endorse Goldberg’s account of epistemic luck and 
bite the bullet that there is no such thing as environmental luck75, the difficulty 
still remains. That is because, if we examine the entitlement-based account 
of luck strictly, it would be found that this account is just incompatible with the 
knowledge-presence intuition. It would fail to explain why Barney has 
knowledge in the fake barn county, as Barney’s relevant entitlement 
propositions cannot explain why her belief is true. Remember how Goldberg 
characterises KR-propositions: 
 
‘Suppose that conditions are, and seem to S to be, 
normal…… In these circumstances76, I submit, S … 
enjoys an unearned entitlement to the proposition that 
environmental conditions (which seem to her to be normal) 
are normal—call this the normal condition proposition. She 
enjoys an unearned entitlement to the proposition that her 
cognitive faculties (which seem to her to be functioning 
properly) are functioning properly—call this the proper 
cognitive functioning proposition. She enjoys an unearned 
entitlement to the proposition that her perceptual faculties 
are reliable when functioning properly in normal 
conditions—call this the reliability proposition.’ (Goldman 
2015: 282-283) 
 
It is obvious from this quotation that a subject’s enjoying entitlement to 
various KR-propositions is premised on her being in a normal condition, 
which requires a normal epistemological environment. This is 
understandable, because in an unfriendly epistemological environment, for 
example, an environment where the lighting is bad, the air is hazy, or there 
exists a lot of misleading distractions that could have easily lead the subject 
                                                          
75 In that case, the alleged virtue of Goldberg’s theory will not be that it is able to reconcile 
conflicting intuitions regarding whether environmental luck is incompatible with knowledge, 
but only that it can reconcile conflicting intuitions regarding whether knowledge occurs in the 
fake-barn-county-style cases. 
76 Emphasis mine. 
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to a false belief, it would be unreasonable to describe that subject as properly 
relying on a route to knowledge. Only when the conditions are normal, and 
the subject’s cognitive faculties are functioning well, the presumptive 
entitlement can be made that the subject is employing a method M that will 
reliably yield knowledge in the circumstance C. However, it is obvious that 
the epistemological environment of Barney does not fit the bill—her 
epistemological conditions are abnormal. That is to say, since the normal 
condition proposition is not entitled to Barney, she is not properly relying on a 
route to knowledge. Consequently, it will need further explanations on how it 
comes to pass that one forms a true belief by her improper reliance on a 
method M (in an abnormal circumstance like fake barn county). Barney’s 
epistemic success will fail to be adequately explained in terms of KR-
propositions if we apply the entitlement-based account of luck strictly to the 
fake-barn-county case.  
 
One might argue that the abnormal epistemological conditions will only 
deprive Barney of those unearned entitlements regarding her proper reliance 
on a route to knowledge, but she can still enjoy the earned entitlement to the 
proposition that there is a barn as her relevant belief is justified by her seeing 
that barn. But this cannot help to accommodate the knowledge-presence 
intuition, as merely the earned entitlement is not sufficient for adequately 
explaining one’s epistemic success. Otherwise, the entitlement-based 
account of luck would do no help to solve the Gettier problem. That is 
because a basic trait of Gettier counterexamples is that they are cases where 
the subject has a justified true belief but still fails to know. If the mere 
justification for one’s belief can suffice to constitute an adequate explanation 
for one’s epistemic success, then there would be totally no luck in Gettier 
cases. This would render the entitlement-based account of luck useless. 
 
Now we have seen that Goldberg’s entitlement-based account of epistemic 
luck cannot satisfactorily help anti-luck epistemology to reconcile the 
conflicting intuitions regarding whether environmental luck is incompatible 
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with knowledge. It is noteworthy that Goldberg’s strategy only explores two 
possibilities: 1) there is epistemic luck in the fake-barn-county case, and thus 
there is no knowledge; 2) there is no epistemic luck in the fake-barn-county 
case, and thus there is knowledge. Both situations seem to presume that 
veritic epistemic luck must be incompatible with knowledge. The result is, he 
would either reach a verdict, just like many other anti-luck epistemologists, 
that environmental luck prevents knowledge from being ascribed; or that 
there is no such thing as environmental luck. But there should have been a 
third possibility that we ought to explore: that there is environmental luck in 
the fake-barn-county case, yet there is also knowledge. To reconcile the two 
conflicting intuitions regarding Barney’s epistemic status, we have to be able 
to explain the intuition supporting the third possibility.   
 
1.3: Absolutism’s Aporia 
 
However, under an epistemic absolutist framework, it seems to be difficult for 
anti-luck epistemology to accommodate the third possibility. To reconcile 
intuitions supporting possibility one and possibility three, one has to reconcile 
the conclusion that environmental luck is incompatible with knowledge as 
well as the conclusion that environmental luck is compatible with knowledge. 
This seems to be a mission impossible if there is a threshold for knowledge. 
Given K-THRESHOLD, Barney’s environmentally lucky true belief would 
either reach the threshold or fail to reach the threshold—it is an absolute yes-
or-no affair. Consequently, we have to reject one of the two intuitions, which 
means the failure of reconcilement. This might also explain why Goldberg 
just analysed possibility one and two, as if the third possibility is to be taken 
into consideration, then there seems to be an irreconcilable contradiction: 
environmental luck is both compatible and incompatible with knowledge. Call 
this difficulty in accommodating the two conflicting intuitions about the 




There could be two ways for absolutism to solve this aporia. First, a steadfast 
absolutist solution to the problem of reconcilement can deny that it is worth 
our effort to reconcile the two intuitions. It can be argued that there is only 
one correct intuition regarding Barney’s epistemic status, and the opposite 
intuition is just an irrational hallucination that should be eliminated. Second, a 
more sophisticated absolutist solution can argue that the concept of 
environmental luck is not fine-grounded enough to address the Barney-style 
cases. We can break down the notion of environmental luck into more sub-
notions to the effect that some types of environmental luck are incompatible 
with knowledge but some are not. It can even be granted that environmental 
luck comes in different degrees—nevertheless, there is still a threshold that 
distinguishes knowledge-preventing luck from knowledge-compatible luck.  
 
Both absolutist solutions are defective. Consider the ‘FAKE RING 
COLLECTION’ case put forward by Gendler & Hawthorne (2005). Suppose 
that a lady has one genuine diamond ring and six indistinguishable 
facsimiles, and she alternates which ring (among the seven rings, genuine 
and fake) she wears every day. The traditional Goldman-style anti-luck 
intuition might arrive at a verdict that this lady’s friends will never know that 
she is wearing a diamond ring—after all, on any of the other six days, she 
would have been wearing one of the facsimiles, and her friends would be 
unable to tell the genuine one from the fakes. The anti-luck intuition 
supporting this ‘no-knowledge verdict’ seems to be strong. But now let us 
modify the case: 
 
FAKE RING COLLECTION II   A rich lady has six genuine 
diamond rings and one indistinguishable facsimile, and she 
alternates which ring (among the seven rings, genuine and 
fake) she wears every day. Unbeknownst to her friends, she 
only wears the fake ring every Sunday—and she just chooses 




Compared with the original case where the probability of the lady’s wearing a 
genuine diamond ring is only 1/7, in this modified case the probability rises to 
6/7—so does the probability of her friends’ belief’s being true. As these 
probabilities rise, I guess most of my readers would agree that the intuition 
supporting the no-knowledge verdict is weaken. This weakening will be more 
salient in this further modified case: 
 
FAKE RING COLLECTION III   An incredibly rich lady has 
364 genuine diamond rings and one indistinguishable 
facsimile, and she alternates which ring (among the 365 
rings, genuine and fake) she wears every day. 
Unbeknownst to her friends, she only wears the fake ring 
on the first Sunday of April every year—and she just 
chooses that date as the fake ring-day in a purely random 
way. Now the question is: one day (any day except for the 
randomly picked fake ring-day), her friend sees her 
wearing a diamond ring (as always) and thus forms the 
belief that ‘she is wearing a diamond ring’. Does her 
friend’s belief count as knowledge? 
 
For this further modified case, it would be more farfetched rather than 
intuitive to still insist that the ring-collector’s friends can never know that she 
is wearing a genuine ring77. The steadfast anti-luck epistemology might 
explain this decline of intuition in terms of the distance of possible worlds 
where the ring-collector wears her only facsimile. It might be argued that, 
compared to the actual world78 where her friends see her wearing a genuine 
ring, the only fake ring world is far from being a ‘close possible world’. Hence 
                                                          
77 If this change is not obvious enough, I invite readers to imagine the case where the ration 
of genuine rings to fake rings becomes 36500:1. In that case, it is fair to say that the lady 
might at most wear the facsimile once in her life.  
78 For the sake of argument, we can take one genuine-ring world to be the actual world, as if 
the actual world is the fake ring one then her friends would of cause fail to know due to the 
falsity, rather than the environmental luck, of their beliefs. 
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the safety account of knowledge can avoid making the counterintuitive verdict 
that knowledge is absent in the case of FAKE-COLLECTION III.  
 
However, the only reason for us to see the fake ring world as a distant world 
seems to be its small probability (only 1/365). If that is the case, then the 
safety account of knowledge would fail to explain why each other genuine-
possible world is not distant, as the probability of each world is equal, to wit, 
1/365. Moreover, if the fake ring world is distant due to its small probability, 
then think about the lottery puzzle where one’s belief that ‘my ticket will lose’ 
only has a much smaller chance (probably one of a million) to be false. When 
it comes to the lottery puzzle, advocates of safety theory such as Pritchard 
(2005) would directly refuse to exclude this ticket-winning-world from the 
category of ‘nearby possible worlds’ on the mere basis of the odds. That is 
because one alleged theoretical merit of Pritchard’s safety theory is that it 
can solve the lottery puzzle by explaining that the ticket-owner’s belief is 
unsafe given the existence of nearby worlds (despite its extremely low 
probability) where his ticket wins. Since his belief is unsafe, he does not 
know that his ticket will lose until he sees the result being revealed. The 
lottery case involves a nearby possible world because of how the ticket is 
chosen—it has nothing to do with the odds. The ticket is chosen randomly, so 
is the date when the lady decides to wear the fake ring. One can even 
impose one more stipulation to the story: the lady picked the date ‘the first 
Sunday of April’ by drawing lots, so the date is chosen as randomly as lottery 
tickets. Therefore, if the extremely unlikely (in a probabilistic sense) ticket-
winning world is also a nearby world, then there is no reason that the fake 
ring world should be seen as a distant. 
 
As a result, the steadfast absolutist solution to the problem reconcilement 
would be inclined to be farfetched and counterintuitive when it comes to 
cases like FAKE RING-COLLECTION III. Another case that might embarrass 
steadfast absolutists is the ALWAYS-WITH-SOMETIMES case (modified 
from a similar case from Gendler & Hawthorne 2005). Assume that the lady 
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in FAKE RING-COLLECTION III case is named as Ms. Sometimes. One day, 
in a mall, Ms. Sometimes, wearing one of her real diamond rings, walks with 
her friend Ms. Always who also has a same (real) ring and wears it every 
day. An observer by chance sees Ms. Always’ ring and believes it to be a real 
diamond ring. The question is: does the observer know that Ms. Always 
wears a real ring? If the steadfast absolutist solution concludes that the 
observer does not know in the FAKE RING-COLLECTION III case, then the 
same conclusion should also apply to this case. That is because the two 
ladies’ rings are indistinguishable from each other, and it is highly likely that 
the observer just casts his eyes to Ms. Sometimes’ ring. It is indeed lucky 
that the observer did not glimpse at Ms. Sometimes’ ring—even if he did, he 
would not have been able to tell anything different. Thus if environmental luck 
must be incompatible with knowledge, then it would have prevented the 
observer from gaining knowledge. However, it is even more counterintuitive 
to refuse to ascribe knowledge in the ALWAYS WITH SOMETIMES case, 
compared with FAKE RING COLLECTION III. After all, it is untenable to deny 
that we know that a reliable ring-wearer is wearing a ring just because she 
has a friend who sometimes wears facsimiles. While if the steadfast 
absolutism answers that knowledge exists in ALWAYS WITH SOMETIMES, 
but not in FAKE RING COLLECTION III, then this asymmetry is odd. The 
steadfast solution thus suffers from a dilemma. 
 
The sophisticated absolutist solution also has difficulty in explaining FAKE-
RING-COLLECTION-style cases. If we are committed to the intuition that in 
the original FAKE RING COLLECTION case, the collector’s friends do not 
have knowledge because of epistemic luck, then why is it much less intuitive 
that they still lack knowledge in the case of FAKE RING COLLECTION III? 
The only salient variable for these two cases seems to be the ratio of genuine 
rings to fake rings. If by our intuition that knowledge occurs in FAKE RING 
COLLECTION III, then from which point among the scale of genuine/fake 
rings ratio does knowledge start to emerge? How many real diamond rings 
should the lady own so that her friends can possess knowledge? How 
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frequent should the lady wear her fake ring so that her friends fail to know her 
wearing genuine rings? There does not seem to be a non-arbitrary cut-off 
point. This difficulty in drawing a threshold is intensified when it comes to a 
case as follows: 
 
‘FAKE BAR   Unbeknownst to its patrons, Awful Alvin’s 
Bar serves genuine gin six days per week - and an 
undetectable surrogate on Sundays. Tom goes out nearly 
every night; Dick drinks only after his seminar on 
Tuesdays; Harry is unpredictable but always spends 
Sundays at home with his family. The three of them gather 
at Awful Alvin’s on Tuesday night, and each of them 
orders a gin and tonic. Oscar walks in and asks each one 
what he is drinking. “That’s gin,” each replies. Does Tom 
know that he’s drinking gin? Does Dick? Does Harry? And 
does Oscar know that each is imbibing authentically?’ 
(Gendler & Hawthorne 2005: 338) 
 
The four subjects in this case, more or less, all suffer from environmental 
luck. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether all of them lack knowledge. 
Moreover, we find it obvious that our confidence in ascribing or dis-ascribing 
knowledge varies from person to person. For example, maybe for Tom, we 
will be more inclined to adjudicate that he lacks knowledge, while for Dick 
and Harry, we will be more willing to recognise them as knowing, because 
they enjoy the safer (though perhaps not really safe) epistemic environment. 
Now, how can the sophisticated absolutist solution draw a threshold of 
knowledge for the four persons? If we change the stipulations slightly, for 
example, Dick drinks once a week on a randomly-picked day rather than 
always on Tuesday, can the threshold still apply? I doubt that absolutists 
can locate such a threshold without being arbitrary. Even if there does exist 
such a threshold, the difficulty in finding out (or even just narrowing down 
the range) its location would be an extremely heavy burden of proof for 
absolutism. Absolutist solutions to the problem of reconcilement are thus 
severely undermined.  
 




So how can gradualism help to solve the problem of reconcilement? Before 
constructing the gradualist solution, let us review those intuition data that we 
are expected to accommodate. 
 
First, it is intuitive that knowledge cannot merely be a result of epistemic luck. 
It is also relatively uncontroversial that intervening luck is incompatible with 
knowledge. Hence a gradualist solution ought to capture this anti-luck 
intuition.  
 
Second, it is also relatively intuitive to conclude that knowledge is absent in 
the original FAKE RING COLLECTION case, while similar no-knowledge 
verdicts would be much more controversial when it comes to those modified 
FAKE RING COLLECTION cases. Also, in cases like FAKE BAR, the 
epistemic status seems to vary from person to person. Therefore, the 
gradualist solution is expected to be capable of explaining the changes of 
intuition, and manage to answer the four knowledge-ascription questions 
raised in the FAKE BAR case.  
 
Third, as we have seen in the last section, absolutism faces the difficulty in 
drawing a threshold that distinguishing knowledge-preventing luck and 
knowledge-compatible luck. While if there is no such a threshold, then how 
can we capture the anti-luck intuition meanwhile avoiding the absolutist 
aporia? It would be ideal if the gradualist solution can reach a balance. 
 
With these desiderata being said, now I propose to establish a gradualist 
account of anti-luck epistemology drawing on Goldberg’s entitlement-based 
version. Call this gradualist account of epistemic luck G-EL: 
 
G-EL   (1) S’s true belief that p (acquired through method M 
in circumstances C) suffers from knowledge-undermining 
epistemic luck iff there is no adequate explanation for the fact 
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in question—how it came to pass that S’s employment of M in 
C resulted in a belief that is true—in terms of S’s entitlement 
propositions (i.e., those propositions to which S has an 
earned entitlement, and those KR-propositions to which S is 
presumptively epistemically entitled in virtue of her reliance 
on M in C).  
(2) The less adequate the available explanation is, the more 
knowledge-underminingly lucky S’s belief is.  
(3) S suffers from knowledge-preventing epistemic luck iff the 
corresponding explanation is farfetched.  
 
Although G-EL largely inherits Goldberg’s characterisation of epistemic luck, 
there are still two salient differences. First, G-EL reads the notion ‘knowledge-
undermining’ in a way differing from Goldberg’s EL. For Goldberg, 
‘knowledge-undermining’ means ‘preventing knowledge from occurring’—if 
the quality of knowledge is undermined, then there is no knowledge. In 
contrast, G-EL distinguished ‘knowledge-undermining’ epistemic luck from the 
‘knowledge-preventing’ one. The latter refers to epistemic luck that is 
incompatible with knowledge and would always prevent knowledge from 
being ascribed; while the former refers to epistemic luck that would 
undermine the quality of one’s knowledge but without depriving the subject of 
knowledge. The difference between knowledge-undermining luck and 
knowledge-preventing luck is a matter of degrees—the degree to which one’s 
entitlement-based explanation for the veritic explanandum is adequate. An 
unacceptably inadequate explanation would be a farfetched explanation and 
thereby lead to knowledge-preventing luck. However, there is no cut-off point 
distinguishing the two types of epistemic luck from each other—the notion of 
epistemic luck is seen as a spectrum concept for G-EL. 
 
The second difference lies in that G-EL would not attempt to explain the 
knowledge-presence intuition in the fake-barn-county case by denying that 
Barney suffers from environmental luck. That is, as we have noted before, if 
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we apply the entitlement-based account of epistemic luck to the fake-barn-
county case strictly, then Barney’s entitlement propositions cannot adequately 
explain her epistemic success. After all, Barney barely enjoys any unearned 
epistemic entitlement due to her abnormal epistemological environment, while 
mere earned entitlements can hardly constitute an adequate explanation. The 
upshot is, Barney’s belief must suffer from environmental luck—the problem 
is just how damaging this luck is. G-EL consents the luckiness of Barney’s 
belief, and reconciles the disagreement between knowledge-presence 
intuition and the knowledge-absence intuition by diagnosing it as a 
disagreement on whether Barney’s luck is knowledge-preventing. G-EL will 
admit that, the fake-barn-county case is a borderline case that falls at the 
vague boundary area between knowledge-undermining luck and knowledge-
preventing luck. It is not a paradigmatic case for either type of luck. If one 
sees the fact that Barney happens to glimpse at the only real barn as an 
essential explanandum for explaining Barney’s epistemic success, then 
Barney’s entitlement propositions only provide a farfetched explanation as it 
fails to explain away an essential explanandum. If that is the case, then 
Barney’s luck is knowledge-preventing. On the contrary, if one does not 
regard Barney’s accidental glimpse at the real barn as an important 
explanandum related to her epistemic success, then Barney’s luck is just 
knowledge-undermining. In that case, Barney’s earned epistemic 
entitlements, i.e., her justified beliefs such as ‘I see a barn’, would only fail to 
explain away a relatively unimportant explanandum. Therefore, the 
corresponding explanation for her epistemic success is inadequate (after all, 
the occasionality of her glimpse is an unaddressed relevant explanandum), 
but not farfetched.  
 
In summary, for G-EL, the disagreement between the knowledge-presence 
intuition and the knowledge-absence intuition is a disagreement on the 
importance of the occasionality of Barney’s looking at the real barn qua an 
explanandum. Both intuitions are reasonable when it comes to a borderline 
case like Barney’s case. Moreover, there is no need to make a final verdict on 
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which side is correct, just like there is no need to make a final verdict on 
whether a shade of half-green-half-blue colour is green or blue. Green and 
blue are both spectrum concepts, just like knowledge-undermining luck and 
knowledge-preventing luck. G-EL can thus reconcile both intuitions. 
 
So what about the FAKE RING COLLECTION series? For the original FAKE 
RING COLLECTION case, G-EL can argue that the relevant entitlement-
based explanation would be farfetched as it is unexplained why the lady’s 
friends happen to see her only genuine ring on the only genuine-ring-wearing 
date—this unexplained explanandum is essential for the corresponding 
belief’s being true. While as the frequency of the lady’s wearing fake rings 
steps down, the abnormality of her wearing genuine rings decreases as well. 
The upshot is, we find the unexplained explanandum, viz, why her friends 
happen to see her wearing a genuine ring, becomes less and less relevant for 
comprehending why her friends’ beliefs are true. In particular, when it comes 
to FAKE RING COLLECTION III, it becomes counterintuitive to see her 
friends’ epistemic conditions as abnormal. Consider Martin Smith’s account of 
normality. According to Smith (2016), an abnormal occurrence calls for 
explanations, while a normal one does not. It is also arguable that likelihood 
is an important factor influencing the normality of an event79. In the case of 
FAKE RING COLLECTION III, what requires an explanation is ‘why does the 
lady wear her fake ring today’ rather than why she does not. Thus, G-EL can 
account for the case of FAKE RING COLLECTION III by diagnosing that the 
relevant veritic explanandum can be relatively adequately explained in terms 
of the lady’s friends’ corresponding entitlement propositions. Thus it is unclear 
whether her friends suffer from knowledge-undermining luck (let alone 
knowledge-preventing luck) or not. Anyhow, the relevant entitlement-based 
explanation is not farfetched.  
 
                                                          
79 Although Smith (2016) does not deny the connection between likelihood and normalcy, he 
holds that it is also normal for one to win the lottery despite the low probability of winning. I 
am not sure that I share the same intuition with Smith on this point. It strikes to me as 
plausible to claim that it is less normal to have a neighbour who won the lottery than to have 
one who never wins.  
196 
 
G-EL can also answer those problems raised in the FAKE BAR case. The Bar 
only sells surrogates on Sundays, thus it is certain that Dick and Harry would 
never have the chance to drink fake gins in the bar. We do not need to 
explain why they do not happen to imbibe the surrogates given the 
stipulations of the case—their drinking the surrogates would be abnormal. 
Hence, we are inclined to ascribe knowledge to Dick and Harry. On the 
contrary, since Tom goes out nearly every night, it is normal that he might 
have drunk the surrogate. In light of this, his corresponding entitlement-based 
explanation is less adequate—it strikes me that his corresponding 
explanation is as inadequate as Barney’s. Thus, Tom’s epistemic status falls 
at an intermediate range of scale that is borderline and equivocal.  
 
So what about Oscar? Everyone tells Oscar that ‘I’m drinking gin’, does 
Oscar obtain testimonial knowledge from everyone? By G-EL, it should be fair 
to conclude that the luckiness of Tom’s belief is transmitted to his testimony. 
Hence to account for the truth of Oscar’s testimonial belief, it needs to be 
explained why Tom happens to visit the bar on a genuine-gin-selling day—
Oscar’s corresponding entitlement propositions can hardly accomplish this. In 
addition, if Oscar does not know when Dick, Harry and Tom usually appear in 
the Bar (or when they do not), and he just takes their testimonies at face 
value, then there would be at least one more unexplained explanandum for 
Oscar’s relevant entitlement-based explanation. That is, why does Oscar 
happen to query Tom (rather than anybody else) on Tuesday (rather than any 
other day). This can be relevant to the explanation for Oscar’s epistemic 
status, as if he asked a different customer on a different date, he could have 
easily formed a false belief via the same method. Therefore, it less 
reasonable for us to ascribe knowledge to Oscar than to Tom regarding what 
Tom is drinking. Likewise, it is less intuitive (though overall, it might still be 
intuitive) that we should recognise Oscar as knowing what Dick and Harry are 
drinking compared with Dick and Harry themselves. To sum up, compared 
with Dick, Harry and Tom, the degree to which we are confident to ascribe 
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testimonial knowledge to Oscar should be downgraded in light of the extra 
unexplained explanandum.  
 
In summary, G-EL’s solution to the reconcilement problem differs from 
traditional absolutist approaches in that it does not aim to draw a threshold for 
knowledge or epistemic luck. For G-EL, what really matters is not making 
verdicts on Gettier-ed protagonists’ epistemic statuses and then justifying 
these verdicts. Rather, G-EL focuses on explaining disagreements on Gettier-
ed protagonists’ epistemic statuses and then justifying these explanations. 
According to G-EL, most disagreements on whether a Gettier-ed subject 
knows are disagreements on whether those explananda that cannot be 
adequately explained by one’s entitlement propositions are important. To be 
more specific, when assessing Barney’s epistemic status in the fake-barn 
case, people disagree on whether Barney knows that there is a real barn, 
because people disagree on to what degree the fact that she happens to 
glimpse at the only real barn is important. The more important the 
unexplained fact is for an assessor such that it must be taken seriously, the 
more likely an assessor would decline to ascribe knowledge to Barney. On 
the contrary, for an assessor who finds the occasionality of Barney’s glimpse 
unimportant or irrelevant, it is more intuitive that Barney possesses 
knowledge despite the unexplained environmental luck. The importance of 
the unexplained explananda, G-EL would be glad to admit that, is a matter of 
degrees and can often be subjective. There is no such a threshold for this 
kind of importance that can distinguish knowledge-undermining luck from 
knowledge-preventing luck. Also, G-EL can accommodate the intuition that, 
even for those who ascribe knowledge to Barney, Barney’s knowledge is not 
a paradigmatic case of knowledge—after all, it is clear that Barney’s belief at 
least suffers from knowledge-undermining luck. Hence, G-EL can solve the 
problem of reconcilement better without suffering from difficulties for both the 




Drawing inspiration from gradualism’s successful application in addressing 
the problem of environmental luck, we can also rethink the strategy that we 
should take to solve the Gettier problem. Traditionally, the original Gettier 
problem and subsequent Gettier-style counterexamples are seen as 
challenges to various analyses to the concept of knowledge (such as the 
long-held JTB account, and subsequent JTB+X account). However, once a 
new JTB+X analysis or a new XTB analysis was put forward, it seems that 
there could always be new corresponding Gettier-ed counterexamples to the 
new analysis. With K-SPECTRUM in play, the threshold paradigm of 
epistemological investigation (see Chapter 5) that attempts to come up with a 
un-Gettier-able analysis of knowledge is conducting a strategical mistake. 
Instead, the spectrum paradigm of epistemological investigation will suggest 
that perhaps epistemologists’ task is not to avoid Gettier-ed cases, but to 
raise more Gettier-ed cases and explain the intuitions behind those Gettier-
ed cases. For a spectrum paradigm of epistemology, to obtain a more 
advanced and fine-grounded understanding of the concept of knowledge, 
what we need is not a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
knowledge, but more conceptual indicators of knowledge and non-
knowledge. Non-knowledge indicators indicate the absence of knowledge. 
Some non-knowledge indicators are paradigmatic and uncontroversial, for 
example, falsity and disbelief. Some non-knowledge indicators are less 
salient but can be still seen as paradigmatic, for example, intervening luck. In 
contrast, there are conceptual indicators that are not paradigmatic and can 
invite controversy on whether they count as non-knowledge indicators—for 
example, environmental luck. The supplement of the list of paradigmatic non-
knowledge indicators and our discussions of controversial potential non-
knowledge indicators can both help us to boost our understandings of the 
extension of ‘knowledge’. These two types of boost can be archived by 
putting forwards and debating over more Gettier-ed cases.    
 




2.1: The Puzzle of Faultless Disagreement 
 
Disagreements are ubiquitous. Ordinarily, when two agents disagree with 
each other, one would turn out to be at fault. However, sometimes, when two 
competent epistemic peers disagree with each other, and both have equally 
good epistemic support, we do not think that any one of them is making a 
mistake or at fault. Call this type of disagreement faultless disagreement. 
Faultless disagreements are often seen on matters of taste (e.g., on whether 
a sculpture is well-carved), but most people agree that there are also 
faultless disagreements on knowledge ascriptions80. For example, many 
contextualists hold that the disagreement between an anti-sceptic and a 
sceptic (on, say, whether one knows that one has hands) is a paradigmatic 
case of faultless disagreement. They both are right in terms of their own 
epistemic standards respectively—the difference lies in that the standard is 
low for anti-sceptics, and high for sceptics. For readers who are not 
convinced by the contextualist solution to scepticism (like me), consider 
cases as follows: 
 
Bank Case   Keith and his wife are driving home on a 
Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way 
home to deposit their paychecks. But as they drive past 
the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, as 
they often are on Friday afternoons. Although they 
generally like to deposit their paychecks as soon as 
possible, it is not especially important in this case that they 
are deposited right away, so Keith suggests that they drive 
straight home and deposit their paychecks on Saturday 
morning. Keith’s wife says, ‘Maybe the bank won’t be open 
tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.’ Keith 
replies, ‘No, I know it’ll be open. I was just there two weeks 
                                                          
80 See Kölbel (2004) for an exception, where Kölbel presents an argument against the 




ago on Saturday. It’s open until noon.’ Keith’s wife replies, 
‘Banks do change their hours. You don’t know it’ll be open 
tomorrow.’ 
 
This is a case modified from the well-known bank case from DeRose (1992: 
913). Now in this modified case, Keith disagrees with his wife on whether he 
knows that the bank will be open tomorrow. Keith asserts that ‘yes’—this 
seems to be correct, as he has good evidence (he went to the bank on 
Saturday two weeks ago), and he knows that they are in a low stake context 
to the effect that it does not really matter even if the bank does not open 
tomorrow. So his epistemic standard operative in this case is relatively low. 
Keith’s wife asserts that ‘no’—this seems to be correct as well, as she also 
has a non-conclusive defeater (banks do change their opening hours) and 
she knows that Keith fails to rule out the relevant error possibility. So her 
epistemic standard is relatively high. Their assertions are seemingly 
contradictory, but no one seems to make a mistake in accordance with their 
own epistemic standard. 
 
There are many other cases of faultless disagreement on knowledge 
ascriptions. For example, disagreements on whether Barney knows in the 
fake-barn case, or whether Oscar knows in the fake-bar case. No matter what 
one’s position is, it does not seem to be at fault.  
 
Despite its widespread existence, the phenomenon of faultless disagreement 
is still puzzling. That is, when two agents disagree on the truth value of p, to 
wit, A asserts that p, and B asserts that not-p, it seems to be necessary that 
one agent’s assertion must be false. If that is the case, then why none of 
them is at fault? This puzzle is in particular salient when it comes to faultless 
disagreements on knowledge ascriptions, as a knowledge ascription 
proposition is ordinarily taken to be of one and only one truth value. One 
cannot both knows that p and fails to know that p. Call this puzzle the puzzle 
of faultless disagreement. The crux of this puzzle is to accommodate two 
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prima facie conflicting intuitions: when two agents A and B disagree on the 
truth value of a knowledge ascription proposition, 1) they are genuinely 
disagreeing with each other (call this intuition DISAGREEMENT); 2) none of 
them is genuinely making a mistake (call this intuition FAULTLESSNESS).  
 
There has been intense debate regarding the solution to the puzzle of 
faultless disagreement. Eminent candidates include indexical contextualism, 
non-indexical contextualism, and non-indexical relativism. Before we proceed 
to how gradualism can help to solve the puzzle, let us analyse the pros and 
cons of those extant candidates.  
 
2.2: Extant Proposals 
 
Indexical contextualism81 is a view that the semantic contents of assertions 
depend on the context of utterance. It sees ‘knows’ as an indexical term like 
‘I’ and ‘today’, of which the semantic meaning varies from context to context. 
Accordingly, the semantic contents of two assertions that constitute a 
faultless disagreement are incomplete. For example, in the bank case, what 
Keith really means is ‘I know that the bank will be open tomorrow in 
accordance with my epistemic standard’, and his wife actually conveys a 
message that ‘You do not know that the bank will be open tomorrow in 
accordance with my epistemic standard’. In this way, the two seemingly 
incompatible assertions are both true in terms of their own epistemic 
standard. As long as one endorses the contextualist semantics of ‘knows’, 
indexical contextualism can apparently succeed in explaining 
FAULTLESSNESS. 
                                                          
81 Indexical contextualism is sometimes also known as ‘indexical relativism’ (see Kölbel 
2003; Kompa 2015). It is ‘indexical’, because it consents that the contents of assertions are 
influenced. It is less easy to understand why this position is also seen to be ‘relativist’ by 
some philosophers. Here is my guess: Generally, the difference between contextualism and 
relativism lies in that the former claims that the truth-value of an assertion is determined by 
the context of utterance, while the latter focuses on the context of assessment. However, 
some times the distinction between the two types of context are too vague such that they 
seem to collapse into each other. For example, see Ian M. Church’s critique to McKenna 
(2012), where Church charges that McKenna’s indexical contextualism has no substantial 




The problem lies in DISAGREEMENT. A common criticism to indexical 
contextualism is that it fails to explain why two agents are genuinely 
disagreeing with each other rather than just talking past each other, if they 
are just asserting that one knows or does not know in terms of their own 
standards (see MacFarlane 2007; Kölbel 2004). After all, ‘By my epistemic 
standard A, S knows that p’ and ‘By my epistemic standard B, S does not 
know that p’ are not genuinely incompatible. By indexical contextualism, Keith 
and his wife are not even disagreeing on the same proposition. Some 
possible replies to this criticism are available for indexical contextualists. For 
example, Davis (2007) argues that speakers are often ‘semantically blind’ 
such that they are not aware that their unuttered/omitted epistemic standards 
are the real divergence. López de Sa (2008) proposes a ‘commonality 
presupposition’ account for DISAGREEMENT. That is, in a case of faultless 
disagreement, to two speakers’ assertions implies a ‘commonality 
presupposition’ that their epistemic standards are alike. Therefore they take 
themselves to be contradictory to each other. Neither replies are satisfactory, 
because they both admit that there is no genuine disagreement regarding the 
same proposition. For Davis, the two debating speakers blindly take their 
assertions to be incompatible due to their semantic blindness; for López de 
Sa, they mistakenly take their assertions to be incompatible because of the 
misleading commonality presupposition. Once the two debating speakers 
complete their assertions by indicating their personal epistemic standard, for 
example, by saying that ‘you do not know, by ‘know’ I mean that …’, both 
Davis and López de Sa should agree that the two speakers would stop taking 
themselves to contradict each other. Their replies might be plausible from a 
contextualist perspective, but at the cost of abandoning DISAGREEMENT.  
 
A more influential defence for indexical contextualism is Keith DeRose’s 
‘single scoreboard semantics’ (see DeRose 2004). DeRose argues that 
ordinary criticism to contextualism presumes that contextualism has to appeal 
to the semantics to the effect that there are multiple personal standards 
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determining the truth-condition of an assertion in a conversation. Inspired by 
the metaphor of ‘scoreboard’ in Lewis (1979), DeRose calls this multiple 
scoreboards semantics. By the multiple scoreboards semantics, in a 
conversation where faultless disagreement is involved, the two speakers 
assess knowledge ascription propositions by their personal scoreboards that 
do not overlap with each other. Consequently, they talk past each other. 
DeRose suggests that contextualists can avoid this issue by adopting a single 
scoreboard semantics, which argues that there is a shared single scoreboard 
in a given conversation that helps to determine the truth-condition of a 
proposition in question. Speakers can change the score by their 
conversational manoeuvers, but there is only a single score, at any given 
time, that governs the truth-conditions of all speakers’ uses of ‘knows’.  
 
But it is far from clear that what determines or counts as a score at a given 
time. Apart from this ambiguity, MacFarlane (2007) objects that the single 
scoreboard semantics fails to give us enough disagreement. He points out 
that in addition to intra-conversational disagreements that happen between 
two conversing speakers (e.g., Keith disagreeing with his wife), there is also 
another important type of disagreement independent of conversations (e.g., 
self-disagreements, or disagreements between two scientist groups that do 
not know the existence of each other). MacFarlane charges that DeRose only 
explains intra-conversational disagreements, leaving more inter-
conversational disagreements unaccounted for. The notion of ‘scoreboard’, 
by its inventor Lewis, is rooted in conversational language games. According 
to DeRose, the ‘score’ registered in the scoreboard is also determined by 
speakers’ conversational manoeuvers. While in situations where there are no 
genuine conversations between the two sides of a disagreement, especially 
in cases where the two sides do not even know each other, it seems to be fair 
to conclude that the single scoreboard semantics is not applicable.    
 
Instead, MacFarlane (2009) advocates a version of non-indexical 
contextualism (aka ‘moderate relativism’, see Kompa 2015; Recanati 2008). 
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Non-indexical contextualism holds that the truth-values of assertions vary with 
the contexts of utterance, but the contents do not. An utterance in a context C 
is true iff it is true as evaluated relative to the epistemic standard operative in 
the context of utterance. To put it more formally, 
 
‘NIC: An utterance of a sentence s (of the form ‘A knows 
that P’) in context c is true only if the proposition thereby 
expressed is true relative to circumstances (wc, ec), where 
wc is the world of c and ec is the epistemic standard 
operative in c.’ (Kompa 2015: 143) 
 
It differs from indexical contextualism in the sense that contexts only influence 
the truth-values, rather than the semantic contents, of assertions, and thus 
two disagreeing agents are disagreeing on the same proposition. However, 
by determining truth conditions of propositions by different epistemic 
standards, the same problem remains: why is there any genuine 
disagreement? As Kompa questions:  
 
‘We seem to disagree, yet on the assumption that truth is 
relative there is no longer any point in that. What you said 
may well be true relative to your standard while what I said 
may well be true relative to my standard. Who needs to 
disagree? If all disagreement were to be modelled along 
the nonindexicalist line, it would come out as mere 
perspectivalness, or so it seems.’ (Kompa 2015: 147) 
 
One may try to evade this criticism by arguing that we are actually 
disagreeing on which epistemic standard should be employed in this context 
of utterance. But this gives rise to another problem: Is there a single 
epistemic standard that best (or at least better) suits a given context c such 
that it should be the correct ec operative in c? If non-indexical contextualists’ 
answer is ‘yes’, then why it is not the case that the speaker who employs a 
wrong/improper epistemic standard that is making a mistake? For example, 
consider DeRose’s original bank case. When Keith and his wife is in a high-
stake epistemic context to the effect that they have to deposit their paychecks 
before Monday, it would be much more improper for Keith to insist that he 
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knows that the bank will be open on Saturday. His low epistemic standard is 
not suitable for the high-stake context, and thus he would be seen as at fault 
by ascribing knowledge to himself in terms of the low epistemic standard. 
Therefore, if there is a single correct/best epistemic standard for a given 
context, then non-indexical contextualism would fail to accommodate 
FAULTLESS. However, if non-indexical contextualism replies that there is no 
single best or correct ec operative in c, to wit, there is more than one proper 
epistemic standard for a given context, then the difficulty in addressing 
DISAGREEMENT would be waiting on the corner82. In summary, non-
indexical contextualism is subject to a dilemma: on the one hand, if there is a 
single correct epistemic standard that should be operative in a given context, 
then it will fail to explain FAULTLESS; on the other hand, if there is no such a 
single epistemic standard, then it will fail to explain DISAGREEMENT.  
 
The third option is non-indexical relativism (aka, ‘radical relativism’, see 
Kompa, 2015), which is a view that the truth-value of assertions vary with 
different standards of assessment. It agrees with non-indexical contextualism 
on the point that contexts only affect the truth-value, rather than the semantic 
content, of an assertion. It differs from non-indexical contextualism in the 
sense that it appeals to the epistemic standard operative in the context of 
assessment, rather than the context of utterance. Accordingly, when two 
assessors A and B dispute about whether Keith knows in the bank case, non-
indexical relativism would explain that A and B are both correct in making a 
                                                          
82 To address this issue, one might resort to the ‘metalinguistic negotiation’ account from 
Plunkett & Sundell (2013). The ‘metalinguistic negotiation’ account argues that when 
disagreeing on p’s truth value by employing different standards of ‘knows’, the two 
disagreeing speakers are actually conveying messages to the effect that ‘knows’ ought or 
ought not be used such that it applies to one speaker’s assertion. Their conveyed message 
are contradictory. This account can hardly help non-indexical contextualism. First, it also 
suffers from the same defect of DeRose’s single scoreboard semantics – it neglects non-
conversational disagreements. Second, it also neglects situations where the two sides of a 
debate take themselves to be using ‘knows’ in the same way, viz, situations where the two 
speakers hold that they are employing the same epistemic standard, but are only 
disagreeing on whether the same standard is met. Last but not least, it says nothing about 
whether one side of the disagreement is correct. To be more specific, whether is there a 
better way that ‘knows’ ought to be used in the given context? If yes, then why FAULTLESS? 
If no, then what is the point of the disagreement? Why it is not the case that both speakers 
are mistakenly insisting that their own epistemic standards are better?  
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judgment in terms of their own epistemic standards that operative in their own 
contexts of assessment (rather than Keith’s context of utterance). The 
divergence lies in their different standards of assessment. It seems to be able 
to avoid the defect of being limited to conversational disagreements, as no 
matter whether there is a conversation, when a disagreement occurs, it would 
always be a disagreement between two assessors who assess the truth value 
of a proposition.  
 
However, non-indexical relativism also faces widespread criticisms. Apart 
from general objections to the relativist semantics of ‘knows’ (see Boghossian 
2006; Zimmerman 2006; Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009; Seidel 2014; Carter 
2016, Ch. 7; etc.), Kompa (2015) also worries that non-indexical relativism is 
incompatible with the widely-accepted ‘norm of assertion’: one should only 
assert what is true. If relativism is right in that the truth-value of an assertion 
is determined by the context of assessment, then how can an utterer know 
what epistemic standards would assessors employ in different contexts of 
assessment? And, how can an utterer know what is true before (s)he asserts 
anything? If one cannot know all of these, then how can one obey the norm of 
assertion? Moreover, non-indexical relativism also seems to suffer from a 
similar dilemma that non-indexical contextualism is subject to. In many cases 
of faultless disagreement, the two sides of assessment seem to be in the 
same context of assessment. For example, Keith and his wife in the bank 
case, or two persons disputing about whether Barney knows in the fake barn 
case.  Now the question is: Is there a single correct/best epistemic standard 
that should be operative in a given context of utterance? If yes, then why 
FAULTLESS? If no, then why DISAGREEMENT? Transferring the focus from 
contexts of utterance to contexts of assessment seems to do no help to solve 
this dilemma. 
 




When disagreeing with others on knowledge ascriptions, e.g., ‘Barney knows 
that there is a barn in front of her’, we are disagreeing on the truth value of a 
given knowledge ascription proposition. Given the absolutist tradition, it is 
apparently intuitive that Barney either knows or does not know that there is a 
barn, to wit, the knowledge ascription proposition must be either true or false. 
The truth-condition of the proposition in question seems to be subject to the 
threshold of knowledge—if Barney’s epistemic status meets the threshold, 
then the knowledge-ascribing side wins; if it does not, then the knowledge-
denial side wins. Accordingly, the disagreement, in an absolutist picture, is a 
disagreement on the threshold of knowledge—whether the controversial case 
in question falls into the left or the right side of the threshold? Also, there can 
be two ways to interpret the relevant disagreement: 1) The two sides take 
themselves to be using different thresholds, and thereby disagree on which 
threshold should be applied to the given context83; 2) Both sides take 
themselves to be using the same threshold, and thus disagree on the 
assessment of details of Barney’s epistemic status. No matter which 
interpretation is endorsed, the aforementioned dilemma would follow: If there 
is a single correct threshold, then why FAULTLESS? After all, with the 
threshold in play, one side of the disagreement must have made a false 
verdict. If there is no such a threshold, then what is the point of 
DISAGREEMENT? The two sides can be compatible with each other by 
clarifying their own threshold. 
 
Under an absolutist framework, when accommodating FAULTLESS, extant 
proposals introduced before would find it difficult to reconcile K-THRESHOLD 
and FAULTLESS. There seems to be an intrinsic confliction between the two 
theses. If Tk exists and whether Tk is met is the essential divergence of the 
disagreement, then one side of the disagreement will perforce be at fault—
either be at fault for using the wrong Tk, or for using the correct Tk in a wrong 
way so that a false verdict is derived. Call this conundrum the problem of 
                                                          
83 As we have seen in Chapter 4, contextualism can also be compatible with K-THRESHOLD 
by holding that for any given context, there is a corresponding threshold for knowledge. 
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faulty verdict. While in explaining DISAGREEMENT, extant proposals would 
encounter difficulty in reconciling impurist K-THRESHOLD and the existence 
of genuine contradiction. To evade the problem of faulty verdict, 
contextualists or relativists are inclined to conclude that both sides of the 
disagreement are making a correct verdict within their own context using their 
own threshold. This gives rise to several defects: first, it fails to explain cases 
where both sides are in the same context using similar standards; second, if 
they are in two parallel contexts using two distinctly different standards, then 
they seem to be just talking past each other. Call this conundrum the problem 
of parallel contexts.  
 
A gradualist solution to the puzzle of faultless disagreement can avoid the two 
problems by replacing K-THRESHOLD with K-SPECTRUM. Consider 
situations where two persons disagree on whether a shade of colour among 
the spectrum is a colour of orange or red. The shade of colour in question 
falls right into the intermediate range between orange and red, so it is 
reasonable for both sides of the disagreement to argue for their own 
judgments. However, they are actually disagreeing with each other on the 
same topic (i.e., what colour it is) in the same context using two highly similar 
standards. They are not using the words ‘orange’ or ‘red’ in two distinct 
ways—they might understand the intensions of the two words in the same 
way, they would reach quick agreement on what is a paradigmatic instance of 
red (or orange)—they are just debating on the extensions of the two types of 
colour in a borderline case. Similarly, consider situations where two 
customers in a steakhouse arguing about whether a cut of steak is medium-
rare or rare. The doneness of the steak might just be between medium-rare 
and rare—if might be half-medium-rare and half-rare, so it is far from clear 
which degree of doneness the steak is of. In this case, none of the two 
customers is at fault for making their own verdicts, but they are genuinely 




Analogously, if knowledge is recognised as a spectrum concept, then cases 
of faultless disagreement on knowledge ascriptions can be seen as 
disagreement on borderline cases that falls into the intermediate range 
between knowledge and non-knowledge. When disagreeing on whether 
Barney has knowledge in the fake barn case, people are genuinely 
disagreeing with each other on the very same knowledge ascription 
proposition ‘Barney knows that there is a barn in front of her’. Gradualism 
does not need to adopt the indexical position that the semantic contents of 
the proposition in question are incomplete. Also, it does not need to appeal to 
different contexts of utterance or assessment to explain why neither side is 
making a mistake. To accommodate DISAGREEMENT, gradualism can 
explain that there is a genuine disagreement regarding whether the case 
under debate is a borderline case of knowledge or a borderline case of non-
knowledge. The two sides of the disagreement are in the same context of 
assessment, sharing highly similar understandings of what knowledge is, just 
like agents share similar understandings of what red is in the orange/red and 
customers share similar understandings of what a medium-rare steak 
typically be like. They are disagreeing on the vague boundary of the 
extension of ‘knows’, just like when people disagreeing on whether a half-
orange-half-red apple is a red apple or an orange apple. 
 
Therefore, gradualism can avoid the problem of parallel contexts—it is in the 
same context that the disagreement on the same proposition occurs. A 
genuine disagreement does not need to be hinged on ‘threshold’—there can 
be disagreements focusing on the intermediate range of a spectrum. 
Faultless disagreements on knowledge ascriptions are this type of 
disagreement.  
 
So how does gradualism accommodate FAULTLESS if the two speakers are 
disagreeing on the truth value of the same knowledge ascription proposition? 
How can gradualism avoid the problem of faulty verdict? Is there a single 
correct verdict to the truth value of the controversial knowledge ascription? 
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With K-SPECTRUM in play, gradualism’s reply is: no. In fact, when it comes 
to the intermediate range and borderline cases, there is no non-arbitrary 
criterion defining the truth-condition of a controversial knowledge ascription 
proposition. That is because, the truth-condition of ‘S knows that p’ depends 
on what the extensions of ‘knows’ are—while this is exactly what the two 
sides of the dispute are disagreeing on. There is not an objective and neutral 
third-party criterion that serves as the threshold helping us to determine the 
truth-conditions of propositions in controversy. We do not come to form the 
conception of knowledge by appealing to a presumptive threshold. The 
(vague) boundary of knowledge’s extensions is shaped by controversies and 
debates. When we reach controversies where faultless disagreements 
emerge, we know that we reach the boundary of knowledge. Therefore, it is 
natural that there would not be a presumptive single correct verdict for a 
sufficiently controversial borderline case. Just like there ought not to be a 
presumptive standard answer to whether a shade of borderline colour is red 
or orange. To be more specific, consider DeRose’s account of ‘gappy truth-
condition’: 
 
‘Suppose the person you’re talking with makes a statement 
with ‘gappy’ truth-conditions. Take, for example, a 
standard case of vagueness. She says ‘Frank is tall,’ 
where her claim is true if Frank’s height is in a certain 
range, is false where Frank’s height is in a certain lower 
range, and, we’ll suppose, is neither true nor false if 
Frank’s height is in an intermediate range.’ (DeRose 2004: 
16) 
 
Accordingly, DeRose introduces a trivalent system for assessing truth values 
of knowledge ascription propositions:  
 
P   It is true that P 
T            T 
F            F 




In the trivalent truth table above, ‘N’ refers to a proposition’s being gappy, i.e., 
neither true nor false. MacFarlane (2007) grants that this gap view can 
accommodate FAULTLESS properly (his main discontent is with DeRose’s 
explanation of DISAGREEMENT), but I worry that this trivalent system cannot 
be applied in an absolutist picture. That is because, with the threshold for 
knowledge in play, a controversial knowledge ascription proposition is either 
true or false, to wit, one either meets Tk or does not—this is an absolute yes-
or-no affair (recall the core thesis of intra-threshold absolutism that we noted 
in Chapter 3). There is not a third ‘gappy’ option. In contrast, within a 
gradualist framework, we can adopt a trivalent system by drawing on 
DeRose’s gap view: 
 
P   It is true that P    not-P    It is true that not-P 
T            T                   F                    F 
F             F                  T                    T 
B            B                  B                    B 
 
In this modified truth table, ‘B’ means being borderline. A proposition p’s truth 
value is B, iff, either (1) p conveys a knowledge ascription that makes a 
verdict one’s epistemic status in a borderline case that falls into the 
intermediate range in the spectrum of knowledge; or (2) p conveys a high-
order proposition evaluating the truth value of a knowledge ascription 
proposition whose truth value is B.  
 
With this trivalent system in play, neither party of a faultless disagreement is 
making a false verdict, and this system is compatible with K-SPECTRUM but 
not K-THRESHOLD. Gradualism can thus explain FAULTLESS without giving 
rise to the problem of fault verdict.  
 
In summary, a gradualist solution can better solve the puzzle of faultless 
disagreement by avoiding the problem of parallel contexts and the problem of 
fault verdict that trouble an absolutist solution. Another advantage of this 
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gradualist solution is that it does not need to be based on a controversial 
semantics foundation such as relativist semantics or contextualist semantics, 
and hence is less theory-laden. Therefore, gradualism can better 
accommodate both FAULTLESS and DISAGREEMENT without suffering 
from defects of extant proposals within an absolutist picture.  
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
So far, we have seen that gradualism enjoys stronger explanatory power 
when addressing the asymmetry problem, the reconcilement problem of 
environmental luck, and the puzzle of faultless disagreement. These 
advantages discussed might not be able to nail down the conclusion that 
gradualism is a better reading of knowledge than absolutism. But I hope that I 
have said enough to enable the readers to conceive the promising prospect 
of developing the spectrum paradigm of epistemological investigation, and to 
consider abandoning the equivocal attitude on the gradability problem of 
knowledge. The final chapter of this thesis will continue to explore 
gradualism’s application in solving another (perhaps the most) crucial 
















Chapter Six: Epistemic Gradualism and Scepticism 
 
Abstract:  This chapter aims to explore another theoretical 
merit of epistemic gradualism. I will demonstrate that if one is 
to solve the sceptical problem, then gradualism is preferable 
to absolutism. Influenced by the absolutist orthodoxy, we find 
the sceptical problem paradoxical because we are committed 
to a claim that one’s belief that ‘I am not a brain-in-a-vat’ 
does not meet the threshold for knowledge. An absolutist 
anti-sceptical approach rejects this claim by proving that 
there is a threshold that is met. I will prove that this absolutist 
approach would give rise to two problems: 1) absolutists can 
hardly locate such a threshold, because if there is a threshold 
for knowledge then it ought to be both less and more lenient 
than safety/sensitivity; 2) it risks begging the question qua an 
anti-sceptical approach. In contrast, gradualism denies the 
existence of knowledge’s threshold and thereby blocks the 
sceptical argument in a more undercutting manner. The 
conclusion is that gradualism enjoys advantages over 
absolutism, at least in terms of its application in solving the 
sceptical paradox. 
 
As we have noted before, one essential agenda for the debate between 
absolutism and gradualism is around the truth of K-THRESHOLD. Insofar as 
one grants gradualism, one should strive to reject or at least undermine K-
THRESHOLD. This is not an easy job for gradualists, given that talk of 
knowledge’s boundary is deeply entrenched in the orthodox epistemological 
discussion. Nonetheless, there are several potential argumentative strategies 
available for gradualists. For example, if it can be shown that rejecting K-
THRESHOLD would be helpful to solve important epistemological issues, 
then gradualism would be credited with good reasons to overthrow external 
absolutism. In this chapter, I will explore one possible argument for 
gradualism that takes this strategy. I will demonstrate how gradualism can be 
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applied to address the sceptical problem by rejecting K-THRESHOLD. I do 
not think that what my argument below will provide a robust reply to the 
sceptical problem. Rather, my focus is not solving the sceptical paradox, but 
showing why gradualism is preferable to absolutism when solving the 
sceptical paradox. By doing so, I hope to enable the reader to judge the 
plausibility of the general argumentative strategy that gradualism can adopt to 
eliminate the equivocal attitude towards the gradualism/absolutism debate.  
 
1. The Sceptical Paradox 
 
Radical scepticism purports to show that we do not possess any everyday 
knowledge that we take ourselves to possess. It is widely accepted that the 
sceptical problem, by its nature, is presenting a paradox for us to solve (see 
Pritchard 2009b & 2015b; Wright 2008; Byrne 2004; etc.). The sceptical 
paradox is constituted by a set of intuitively appealing while incompatible 
propositions that we are committed to, and aims to reveal the inconsistency 
within our fundamental epistemological commitments. For example, the 
most-discussed closure-based sceptical paradox runs as follows: 
 
[Closure-Based Radical Sceptical Paradox] 
(PC1) If one knows that p and that p entails q, then one 
knows that q. 
(PC2) I do not know that I am not a brain-in-a-vat 
(hereafter, BIV). 
(PC3) I have widespread everyday knowledge. 
 
PC3 is one of our most basic epistemological commitments. Rejecting PC3 
simply leads to an epistemic hazard. PC1 is a simple formulation of the 
closure principle, which is referred to as ‘known entailment closure’ (see 
Bernecker 2012: 368). Of course, there is more than one formulation of the 
closure principle (see Hawthorne 2004; Klein 2004; Dretske 2005; Pritchard 
2015b). However, for the sake of simplicity, focusing on this simple form of 
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closure will be enough for the purpose of this chapter84. Surely, there is a 
long-held contention over what the most reasonable formulation of closure is, 
but it is much less contentious that closure enjoys widespread successful 
applications in our daily epistemic practice. I know that I am sitting in front of 
my laptop, and I know that sitting is not standing, and thus by closure I know 
that I am not standing. In addition, closure is also essential for extending our 
knowledge by deduction from what we already know85. Given the remarkable 
epistemological importance of closure, closure-based scepticism also 
becomes ‘the most popular way of motivating radical scepticism in the 
contemporary literature’ (Schönbaumsfeld 2016: 7). There are anti-sceptical 
proposals in the literature that attempts to reject closure. For example, 
Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981) famously argue that closure should be 
abandoned due to its incompatibility with the sensibility condition of 
knowledge86. However, apart from extensive criticism of the sensitivity 
principle87, abandoning closure is also deemed as an unaffordable 
epistemological cost by many epistemologists (see Pritchard 2015b; Ashton 
2015; etc.). In addition, many have argued that the sceptical paradox can be 
constructed independently of the closure principle—for instance, the 
underdetermination principle and the indistinguishability principle can both 
serve as the replacement (see Vogel 1997; Schönbaumsfeld 2017; Pritchard 
2015b). In consideration of these, denying PC1 might not be a satisfactory 
resolution to the sceptical paradox. In contrast, no matter what epistemic 
principle sceptics employ to impose conditions to knowledge, they would 
always need a claim that those conditions are not met by our everyday 
beliefs—that is exactly the role that PC2 is supposed to play in the sceptical 
argument. Given that neither rejecting PC1 nor discarding PC3 is an 
                                                          
84 The reader is welcomed to substitute other reasonable forms of closure into PC1 – this 
would not affect my main argument, as I do not plan to put weight on closure to solve the 
sceptical paradox.  
85 This idea is typically reflected by a sophisticated formulation of closure, i.e., the competent 
deduction closure: if a subject S knows that p and comes to believe that q by completely 
deducing q from p, then S knows that q. 
86 Hetherington (2001; 2011) also proposes to reject closure. We will discuss his anti-closure 
arguments latter. 
87  For example, see Vogel (1987), Sosa (1999), and Pritchard (2008). 
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appropriate way to solve the sceptical paradox, there remains PC2. So why 
do we find PC2 appealing? 
 
PC2 involves a prima facie appealing sceptical hypothesis. The sceptical 
scenario stipulates that a BIV’s illusory perceptual experiences are 
introspectively indistinguishable from those of her non-envatted duplicate. 
Moreover, if one were a BIV, one would still believe the opposite. Thus, it 
seems that one is not able to distinguish a BIV-world from a not-BIV-world. 
To further motivate PC2, sceptics would ordinarily appeal to a certain 
epistemic principle (e.g., sensitivity, underdetermination, indistinguishability) 
to the effect that one’s belief of ‘I am not a BIV’ falls short of knowledge. For 
an external absolutist who advocates K-THRESHOLD, being committed to 
PC2 implies being committed to the following thesis: 
 
UNMET: My belief that ‘I am not a BIV’ does not meet Tk. 
 
As we have noted in Chapter 4, Tk can be formulated in terms of different 
relevant scales that can be used to evaluate one’s epistemic status. What is 
the most relevant scale that we should focus on in the present discussion? 
The answer relies on what sceptics actually doubt when they motivate 
UNMET. Ordinarily, sceptics do not doubt that you are genuinely believing 
that you are not a BIV. They could also concede that it might be true that you 
are not a BIV—the standard sceptical reasoning only doubt whether you 
know this to be true, given that you do not have stronger epistemic support 
enabling you to rule out the sceptical scenarios. They doubt that your 
evidence can ever sufficiently justify your belief; they doubt that you have 
better reasons to support that ~BIV rather than BIV; they doubt that you can 
discriminate the BIV-worlds from those non-BIV ones… What sceptics 
typically doubt by putting forward UNMET, so to speak, is the strength of 
epistemic support that your beliefs enjoy. Hence the form of Tk that I will be 
discussing in this chapter is one concerning the strength of epistemic 
support. Failing to reach this type of threshold for knowledge, our belief of the 
217 
 
denial of sceptical hypothesis, combined with the closure principle, would 
entail the sceptical conclusion by modus tollens. Consequently, influenced by 
the absolutist tradition, the sceptical paradox is apparently paradoxical for us, 
since the following three epistemological commitments of us are inconsistent: 
 
(1) CLOSURE: If one knows that p and that p entails 
q, then one knows that q. 
(2) UNMET: My belief that ‘I am not a BIV’ does not 
meet Tk. 
(3) EK: I have widespread everyday knowledge.  
 
Among the three claims, EK might be the most fundamental epistemological 
commitment underpinning our rational system. The truth of EK is ordinarily 
taken for granted when it does not encounter the challenge from the sceptical 
argument. The sceptical paradox brings a huge impact on our 
epistemological conception because it threatens the otherwise indubitable 
foundation of our rational system, i.e., EK. The closure-based sceptical 
argument threatens the truth of EK by employing CLOSURE and UNMET. It 
has been argued that abandoning CLOSURE is not an ideal choice, 
consequently, rejecting UNMET would be a natural anti-sceptical manoeuvre. 
If UNMET can be disproved, then there is no reason to deny that EK obtains.  
 
But wait! Cannot the sceptical paradox be constructed without appealing to 
the concept of ‘threshold for knowledge’, but by employing mere necessary 
conditions of knowledge? It seems that sceptics just need to impose a certain 
necessary condition Ck to knowledge (e.g., sensitivity or distinguishability) 
that one’s belief of the denial of the sceptical hypothesis fails to meet. Hence, 
there seems to be another apparently plausible diagnosis of the sceptical 
paradox: 
 
(1*) CLOSURE: If one knows that p and that p entails 
q, then one knows that q. 
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(2*) UNMET*: My belief that ‘I am not a BIV’ does not 
meet Ck. 
(3*) EK: I have widespread everyday knowledge.  
 
It looks like that UNMET* is obviously distinct from UNMET. However, the 
prima facie difference between the two claims could be revealed to be merely 
verbal and superficial by a more intensive analysis. As we have noted before, 
EK is our most fundamental epistemological commitment that would 
otherwise be taken for granted if the sceptical argument fails to provide 
sufficient reasons for us to doubt its truth. For a sceptical argument 
employing UNMET*, it is UNMET* that provides the ground of doubt as to 
EK’s truth. If UNMET* is falsified, then scepticism would fail to imperil EK. In 
another word, if one’s belief that ‘I am not a BIV’ is proven to be able to 
satisfy Ck, then there would be no reason to refuse to credit her with the 
relevant knowledge. Hence, it is plausible to conclude that, for whoever that 
attempts to get rid of scepticism, not-UNMET* entails EK. Likewise, as we 
have noted before, EK can also be entailed from not-UNMET for the same 
reason. Meanwhile, the sceptical paradox indicates that UNMET entails not-
EK, and UNMET* also entails not-EK. By contraposition, EK entails not-
UNMET, and EK entails not-UNMET*. Thus, we have ‘not-UNMET* → EK’, 
and ‘EK→ not-UNMET’. Also, ‘not-UNMET → EK’, and ‘EK→ not-UNMET*’. 
Combining these four conditionals, we have ‘UNMET ↔ UNMET*’. 
 
One might worry that: the derivation of the biconditional above is derived too 
quickly. After all, sceptics might argue that even if Ck is satisfied, there might 
be another higher condition for knowledge that we failed to meet. Thus one 
cannot conclude that not-UNMET* entails EK. In this case, the onus is on 
sceptics to put forward a new Ck to reconstruct the sceptical argument. But 
this does no help to reject our conclusion that once (the new) Ck is satisfied, 
there is no reason to ascribe knowledge. Sceptics can iterate this manoeuvre 
by keeping raising the epistemic standard delivered by Ck, but this would only 
make the Ck employed in UNMET* more and more akin to Tk per se. Think 
219 
 
about what we (qua anti-sceptics) should do if sceptics keep raising the 
epistemic standard conveyed by Ck. If we fail to satisfy the relatively lower-
standard Ck0 put forward by sceptics, then of course our everyday knowledge 
would be doomed. But if we prove that a low-standard Ck0 can be satisfied, 
then either sceptics have to admit that knowledge follows from the failure of 
UNMET*, or they could employ a higher-standard Ck1 to reformulate 
UNMET*. In any case, for this run-and-catch game, it is unchanged that once 
the currently highest Ckn at issue is meet, then before a higher Ckn+1 is 
advocated, everyday knowledge should be ascribed to us. Eventually, it 
would be the highest Ck that sceptics can reasonably88 employ that serves as 
the last barrier needing us to overcome. But now, what is the difference 
between this highest reasonable Ck and the threshold for knowledge? They 
both refer to a cut-off point where a piece of belief starts being counted as 
knowledge, a boundary between knowledge and not-knowledge. 
 
This can also explain why UNMET* and UNMET have no substantial 
argumentative difference. Remember that a threshold typically comes in the 
form of a necessary and sufficient condition. In UNMET*, Ck is claimed to be 
a mere necessary condition of knowledge. Sceptics use Ck as a barrier 
hindering knowledge from being obtained. Nonetheless, in light of EK’s great 
appeal, once Ck is satisfied, the barrier is hurdled, then knowledge would 
follow. This indicates that Ck is virtually constituting a not only necessary but 
also, ceteris paribus, sufficient condition for a true belief’s being knowledge—
at least, it is (provisionally) sufficient before sceptics put forward a more 
demanding Ck. For every given sceptical argument, the point where a piece 
of belief satisfies Ck, ceteris paribus, is exactly the point where we have no 
reason to refuse to recognise a piece of true belief as knowledge, to wit, the 
point where the piece of true belief starts counting as knowledge—that is 
exactly the definition of a ‘threshold’. For every given formulation of UNMET*, 
the corresponding Ck delimits an epistemic condition such that once this 
                                                          
88 If sceptics formulate Ck in an unreasonably over-demanding manner, then it would fail to 
constitute a paradox. We would not find UNMET* (so formulated) appealing at the first place 
if it involves an excessively high Ck.   
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condition is satisfied, then here comes knowledge, otherwise, ignorance—it 
divides beliefs that are qualified as knowledge from beliefs that are not 
qualified enough. An epistemic condition like this, is virtually a threshold for 
knowledge—it plays the exact role of Tk, viz, distinguishing knowledge from 
everything that falls short of knowledge. That is to say, before sceptics 
reformulate the sceptical argument by imposing a Ckn+1 that is more 
demanding while still reasonable, every given Ck employed by a given 
version of the sceptical argument is argumentatively equivalent to Tk. Surely, 
sceptics can try to formulate Ck in different ways and thereby construct 
different forms of sceptical argument. If the Ck employed is too permissive, 
then UNMET* can hardly follow; while if the Ck employed is too demanding, 
then it would hardly be seen as a reasonable necessary condition for 
knowledge which can make the sceptical argument appealing.  Therefore, 
eventually, the best-constructed sceptical argument should involve the 
optimal formulation of Ck, which is the most demanding Ck that still remains 
plausible. And this optimal formulation of Ck for sceptics, so described, is also 
identical with the most plausible formulation of Tk that one can ever conceive. 
In summary, for every given sceptical argument that appeals to UNMET*, Ck 
is dialectically identical with Tk; for the best-constructed (and thus most 
challenging and philosophically significant) sceptical argument, the best 
formulation of Ck that sceptics can utilise is identical with the most plausible 
formulation of Tk that absolutists can put forward. Hence, the difference 
between UNMET* and UNMET is far from being clear and substantial for 
both absolutists and gradualists. Being committed to UNMET* is dialectically 
tantamount to being committed to UNMET. 
 
With these being said, it should be fair to diagnose the paradoxical nature of 
scepticism as hinging on our commitment to UNMET. Refuting UNMET 
would be an ideal choice for resolving the sceptical paradox. Precisely put, 
UNMET can be spelt out as: there is a threshold for knowledge Tk, which my 
belief that ‘I am not a BIV’ fails to meet. Accordingly, there are two ways to 




Approach 1: Admitting the existence of Tk, and proving 
that our belief that ‘I am not a BIV’ meets Tk. 
Approach 2: Denying the existence of Tk. 
 
Given the distinction between K-THRESHOLD and K-SPECTRUM, it is not 
hard to see that Approach 1 is an absolutist approach, while Approach 2 is a 
gradualist one. In what follows, I will prove that Approach 2 is preferable to 
Approach 1. Therefore, rejecting external absolutism can provide us with a 
better solution to the sceptical paradox. 
 
 
2. Threshold and Scepticism 
 
I will develop two arguments to show why Approach 1 is not a preferable 
option for rejecting UNMET. The first argument will examine, if we grant that 
there is a Tk that can both falsify UNMET and serve as a reasonable 
necessary and sufficient condition of knowledge, then what this sort of Tk 
could be. The idea is, if we can find a candidate of Tk as a reference, and 
demonstrate that ‘if such a Tk exists, then it should be both more permissive 
and less permissive than the candidate’, then by reductio ad absurdum, we 
should deny the existence of such a Tk. Call this the argument from 
reference. The second argument will reveal the intrinsic dialectical defect of 
Approach 1 as an anti-sceptical manoeuvre. That is, by presupposing the 
existence of knowledge’s threshold, Approach 1, which typically comes in the 
form of a neo-Moorean anti-sceptical proposal, will inevitably presume the 
existence of knowledge. This kind of anti-sceptical manoeuver would be 
begging the question. Call this the argument from petitio principia.  
 
Let me start with the argument from reference. I will first choose two plausible 
candidate thresholds, namely, safety and sensitivity, as the references. A 
dilemma for absolutists will be revealed which shows that a satisfactory anti-
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sceptical Tk is impossible. After that, I will address two potential worries to 
this argument: that we ought to exam more plausible scales/dimensions, and 
that my argument is just a simple repeat of the Gettier problem. 
 
2.1: The Argument from Reference 
 
Safety and Sensitivity 
 
The Island of Pianosa is recruiting pilots. The recruitment requirements state 
that the candidates’ height should be not less than 6 feet, but less than the 
height of the Air Force General Dreedle. Question: what is the threshold for 
being a pilot in the Island of Pianosa? If it turns out that General Dreedle is 
exactly 6-foot tall, then we can conclude that such a threshold does not exist: 
no one can be both less and not less than 6-foot tall. The threshold itself is 
incoherent. We do not even need to try any other potential candidate of the 
threshold. We do not need to ask: What about 6.1 feet? What about 5.8 feet? 
Would 1.89 metres fit the bill? That is because we have already known that 
there is one reference—namely, 6 feet—that suffices to indicate the absurdity 
of the threshold.  
 
Analogously, we can consider the issue regarding knowledge’s threshold in 
the same vein. It is undeniably hard for absolutists to draw a clear threshold 
for knowledge, and they can reasonably argue that they do not need to find 
the exact location of the cut-off point distinguishing knowledge from 
ignorance in order for them to know the existence of such a cut-off point (this 
is the attitude of moderate K-THRESHOLD). Therefore, a charitable objection 
to absolutists should allow them to just provide some acceptable 
approximations. We could start figuring out the approximated Tk by appealing 
to some reasonable references. If it turns out that we find there is a reference 
Tr such that Tk should be both more permissive and less permissive than Tr, 
then we can conclude that Tk does not exist, without needing to exhaustively 
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examine all possible candidates for Tk. In that case, Tr is to Tk what ‘6 feet’ is 
to the regulated height of pivots in Island Pianosa.     
 
Assume that we are going to take approach 1 to reject UNMET. In that case, 
the essential task is to find out a threshold for knowledge (namely, Tk), which 
satisfies two conditions: 1) it is met by our belief that ‘I am not a BIV’, such 
that UNMET can be falsified; 2) it is qualified to provide us with a proper 
necessary and sufficient condition of knowledge, such that it can serve as a 
reasonable threshold. What would such a Tk be like? To narrow down the 
range where the threshold is located, we can choose a hopeful 
approximation as a reference. Name this reference Tr. We can analysis Tr by 
inspecting whether it satisfies the two conditions that Tk is expected to meet. 
If it is shown that Tr is too lenient to fit the bills, then we can conclude that Tk 
ought to be more demanding than Tr. On the contrary, if it turns out that Tr is 
unacceptably strict, then Tk should be more permissive than Tr. So what 
reference can we utilise? 
 
Tk can be defined in terms of various scales that are relevant to knowledge, 
so it can be formulated in numerous different ways. Which scale should we 
care about here? Now that we are examining the absolutist reply to 
scepticism, absolutists are expected to (at least approximately) provide a 
threshold for knowledge that can reject UNMET. By advocating UNMET, 
sceptics are questioning the strength of epistemic support for our beliefs that 
~BIV. Accordingly, absolutists should provide a Tk that can answer the 
question of how strong the epistemic support for a belief should be in order 
for that belief’s being knowledge. One important way to evaluate this kind of 
strength that epistemologists nowadays usually consider is to examine a 
belief’s fallibility or luckiness89. Epistemologists such as Hetherington believe 
that the less fallible one’s knowledge is, the stronger one’s epistemic support 
is. How fallible is one’s knowledge allowed to be? When does one’s true 
                                                          




belief start being too fallible to be counted as knowledge? A popular answer 
is: when it is merely luckily true. Pritchard (2007) famously defines epistemic 
luck in terms of safety: a belief is luckily true when it is unsafe. He delicately 
defines safety as follows: 
 
S’s belief is safe iff in most near-by possible worlds in 
which S continues to form her belief about the target 
proposition in the same way as in the actual world, and in 
all very close near-by possible worlds in which S continues 
to form her belief about the target proposition in the same 
way as in the actual world, the belief continues to be true. 
(Pritchard 2007: 292) 
  
So it seems that safe true belief (abbr. ‘SaTB’) will be a natural candidate of 
Tr that we can take into consideration. Another motivation for considering 
SaTB is its dialectical connection with UNMET. A classic sceptical reasoning 
supporting UNMET requires that in order for one to know ~BIV, one has to be 
able to discriminate ~BIV scenarios from BIV scenarios. Another way to put it 
is to require one’s belief that ~BIV to be sensitive: that is, if one were a BIV, 
one would stop believing that one is not a BIV via the same method M that 
one uses in the actual ~BIV world. Since one’s belief that ~BIV does not 
meet this requirement, UNMET obtains. The safety-based neo-Mooreanism 
famously attempts to block this sceptical reasoning by resorting to the safety 
condition for knowledge. The idea is, one’s true belief that one is not a victim 
of a sceptical hypothesis could be recognised as knowledge by virtue of its 
being safe—it does not need to be sensitive: 
 
‘One of the key issues facing neo-Mooreanism is how 
to explain how we can know the denials of radical 
sceptical hypotheses. The standard line in this regard 
usually adverts to some form of the safety principle for 
knowledge, as defended, for example, by Ernest Sosa 
(1999). This principle holds, roughly, that what is 
essential to knowledge is that one has a belief that 
could not have easily been false. The basic idea is that 
provided sceptical error-possibilities are indeed 
farfetched, then it follows that one’s true belief that one 
is not a victim of such an error-possibility will be such 
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that it couldn’t have easily been false, and so can 
count as knowledge.’ (Pritchard 2012b: 116) 
 
Hence it is natural to take SaTB as a considerable candidate of Tk that can 
falsify UNMET, and thereby PC2, so that the sceptical argument could be 
disarmed. Safety and sensitivity both evaluate the quality of knowledge along 
the scale of the strength of epistemic support (and fallibility as well). 
Admittedly, absolutists do not have to formulate Tk merely along this scale. 
But now that absolutists are to offer a robust anti-sceptical proposal on the 
basis of Tk, an ideal formulation of Tk should be able to meet the challenge 
that sceptics raise from perspectives where safety and sensitivity are 
relevant.   
 
With this being said, now let us examine SaTB qua a reference (Tr) for 
drawing Tk. Remember that an ideal Tk should meet two conditions: being 
able to falsify UNMET and being able to serve as a plausible necessary and 
sufficient condition for knowledge. By examining whether Tr (in this case, 
SaTB) meets the two conditions of Tk, we will able to figure out what an 
approximation of Tk should be like such that it can meet both conditions. The 
idea is, if we find that Tr fails to meet one or two of the condition(s), then we 
should ask what causes these failures. And then those reasons of failures 
can be seen as the defects of Tr that our Tk should ultimately avoid. However, 
if we find there are some failures that are inevitable—just like the 6-feet-
dilemma that we have seen at the start of this section—then it should be 
concluded that an ultimately satisfactory Tk is impossible. Let us start by 
examining whether SaTB, qua a Tr, meets the first condition.  
 
According to the safety condition of knowledge, one’s belief that ‘I am not a 
BIV’ would not have easily been false, given that in most near-by and all very 
close near-by possible worlds where one continues to believe so with the 
same method (e.g., ‘seeing that I have both hands and then inferring that I 
am not a BIV’), it won’t be the case that one is a BIV indeed. There are at 
least two ways to understand why: first, a neo-Moorean can argue that every 
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sceptical scenario world is an outlandish world, rather than a near-by world; 
second, in a world where one is a BIV, one would not be able to use the 
exact same method to form her relevant belief, as a BIV does not actually 
see that she has both hands (insofar as we endorse that ‘seeing-that-p 
implies p’). In conclusion, one’s belief that ‘I am not a BIV’ is not only true but 
also safely true, and hence ought to count as knowledge. It seems that 
safety, qua an example of Tr, can ideally protect our knowledge of the denial 
of sceptical hypotheses from being deprived by UNMET. So the first 
condition for a Tr to be a proper Tk is satisfied. But what about the second 
condition? Does safety constitute an acceptable threshold for knowledge? Is 
‘true and safe belief’ a proper necessary and sufficient condition of 
knowledge?  
 
Many would say ‘no’. Some argue that SaTB is too permissive for defining 
knowledge, as there are true beliefs that are safe but not knowledge. 
Consider E. J. Coffman’s PRESUMPTUOUS SECERTARY90:  
 
PRESUMPTUOUS SECRETARY:  An eminent historian, 
Hank, recently discovered that Abraham Lincoln was born 
not in 1809 (as most of us think) but in 1806. Hank writes a 
letter to his friend, Sandy, in which he asserts that Lincoln 
was born in 1806. When preparing the letter to be sent, 
Hank’s presumptuous new secretary assumes he made a 
careless mistake about Lincoln’s date of birth, and changes 
the text so that it says Lincoln was born in 1809. 
Unbeknownst to all, the secretary’s printer has just 
developed the following glitch: when directed to print a ‘9’, 
some other numeral besides ‘9’ is randomly selected and 
printed instead. As luck would have it, Hank’s letter gets 
printed as stating that Lincoln was born in 1806. When 
                                                          
90 Another type cases of safe non-knowledge involve knowledge of necessary truths. Since in 
no possible world would a necessarily true proposition (e.g., mathematical truths) be false, 
one’s true belief of these propositions will never violate the safety condition of knowledge. 
However, one can still form a true belief of necessary truths by virtue of mere luck, for 
example, one can luckily form a true belief that ‘12 × 13 = 156’ by trusting a broken 
calculator that accidentally generated the correct answer. Pritchard (2009, 2012a) address 
this issue by extending the account of safety to the effect that it covers similar beliefs that 
one forms via the same method in similar circumstances, rather than just being limited on the 
single particular belief that the subject forms in the actual world. However, it is unclear what 
counts as a similar belief and a similar circumstance. 
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Sandy receives the letter, she consults it for the answer to 
the question of when Lincoln was born. Sandy comes to 
believe, justifiedly and truly, that Lincoln was born in 1806. 
(Coffman 2010: 246) 
 
Intuitively, Sandy does not know that Lincoln was born in 1806, as there is 
something that lucky significantly undermines her knowledge. However, her 
true belief is safe, as while reading Hank’s letter, she could not have easily 
formed (via the same method, namely, reading Hank’s letter) a false belief. 
The letter’s text has been settled and is now stable; also, Sandy’s cognitive 
faculties are working properly. So in most nearby possible worlds where 
Sandy continues to form the belief that Lincoln was born in 1806 by reading 
Hank’s letter, her belief would continue to be true. Her belief is a case of safe 
non-knowledge.  
 
Grundmann (2018) objects to this case by arguing that although Sandy’s 
belief is certainly Gettier-ed, it is not safe. Grundmann describes Sandy’s 
method of forming beliefs as ‘believing whatever he reads in Hank’s letter’, 
which is an unsafe method that could have easily generated false beliefs: 
 
 ‘But now consider the relevant modal environment. In some 
nearby possible worlds the printer is directed to print “9” but 
randomly prints some other numeral, e.g. “8” or “7”. So it 
might easily have printed “1808” or “1807”. In these cases, 
Sandy would have acquired a false belief about when Lincoln 
was born, namely that Lincoln was born in 1808 or that he 
was born in 1807.’ (2018: 8)  
 
Goldberg (2015) also reads Coffman’s case in a similar manner. He remarks 
that: 
 
‘Coffman’s example succeeds against SM only on a 
somewhat contentious construal of the method involved in 
cases of relying on written testimony. If the method is 
characterized in such a way that it does not initiate with the 
written report itself, but instead begins with those processes 
that produced the written product, those processes (it would 
seem) could easily have produced a false belief—as would 
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have been the case had there been no glitch in the printer.’ 
(2015: 277) 
 
I think neither Grundmann nor Goldberg substantially undermines Coffman’s 
case. It is not hard for Coffman to slightly modify his case such that Sandy 
forms her belief via a less fishy method. For example, the printer’s glitch can 
be described as “when directed to print a ‘9’, the numeral ‘6’ will be randomly 
selected and printed instead”91. More importantly, even if we keep the 
original stipulated descriptions in the case of PRESUMPTUOUS 
SECRETARY, Grundmann and Goldberg fail to show that Sandy’s belief in 
the original case is unsafe in accordance with Pritchard’s delicate definition of 
safety. According to Pritchard’s definition of safety, in most nearby and all 
very close possible worlds where Sandy continues to form a belief of the 
target proposition (in this case, ‘Lincoln was born in 1806’) with the same 
method (in this case—presumptively Grundmann and Goldberg are right—
‘believing whatever Hank wrote in the letter’—and we read this method as 
initiating with those processes that produced the written product), her belief 
(i.e., ‘Lincoln was born in 1806’) would still be true. So this satisfies 
Pritchard’s classic definition of ‘safety’. Grundmann and Goldberg at most 
show that Sandy’s belief-forming method is unsafe—in the sense that is 
could have easily produced beliefs of some false propositions other than the 
target proposition—but the genuine central problem here is whether Sandy’s 
belief of the target proposition is safe. They fail to show that Sandy’s belief is 
unsafe. 
 
                                                          
91 Some may then argue that in this revised case, the intuitive verdict is Sandy knows that Lincoln 
was born in 1807. I do not find this verdict intuitive. Consider Pritchard’s case of TEMP (see Pritchard 
2012a). In the case of TEMP, Temp forms true beliefs about the temperature in the room by 
consulting a thermometer, which is in fact broken and controlled by a hidden agent who ensures 
that every time Temp consults the thermometer, the reading is always correct. It is widely accepted 
that Temp lacks of knowledge. And I do not see substantial difference between the way in which 
Temp’s beliefs are lucky and the way in which Sandy’s belief is lucky -- the former is by virtue of a 
hidden agent, while the latter is by virtue of an odd glitch. They both ensure that the protagonists’ 




So, if SaTB is too lenient for drawing an ideal threshold for knowledge, then 
we should expect Tk to be less permissive than SaTB. One way is to impose 
more conditions to knowledge such that we can raise the threshold for the 
strength of epistemic support. For example, in order to account for cases 
such as TEMP (another case where one’s belief is safely true but fails to be 
knowledge, see Pritchard 2012a) and DEMON (a case where one’s belief is 
not only safely true but also manifests one’s cognitive competence but still 
fails to be knowledge, see Pritchard 2015a), Pritchard (2015a) argues that 
the simple conjunction of a true belief’s being safe and manifesting the 
cognitive competence is not sufficient to guarantee knowledge if the former 
has nothing to do with the latter. Instead, he suggests that we should also 
require the safety of one’s true belief is sufficiently attributable to the 
manifestation of one’s cognitive competence. This is also the gist of his anti-
luck virtue epistemology. Does this constitute an ideal Tk this time? I’m afraid 
that the answer is still ‘no’92. One important reason that I want to emphasise 
here is: there are also reasonable grounds for us to think that safety is not 
necessary at all for knowledge. Thus in whatever way anti-luck virtue 
epistemologists formulate Tk, it will always contain an unnecessary condition 
imposed to knowledge, namely, safety, that makes the proposed Tk too 
demanding. If that is the case, then absolutists will face a dilemma: on the 
one hand, Tk should be less permissive than SaTB; on the other hand, Tk 
should be more permissive than SaTB.   
 
SaTB is also taken to be not lenient enough, as some argue that the safety 
conditions would preclude some intuitively appealing cases of (unsafe) 
knowledge. For example, Chris Kelp (2009: 20) raises a case against the 
safety condition of knowledge: 
 
ARCH-NEMESIS:  Suppose Russell’s arch-nemesis 
has an interest that Russell forms a belief (no matter 
                                                          
92 For other criticisms of anti-luck virtue epistemology, see Kelp (2013), Carter (2013), 
Broncano-Berrocal (2014), Zhao (2018), etc. 
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whether true or not) that it’s 8:22 by looking at the 
grandfather clock when he comes down the stairs. 
Russell’s arch-nemesis is prepared to do whatever it 
may take in order to ensure that Russell acquires a 
belief that it’s 8:22 by looking at the grandfather clock 
when he comes down the stairs. (Since we are 
concerned with a conceptual claim here, Russell’s arch-
nemesis may have means available to do so that we 
can imagine only in our wildest dreams. For instance, he 
may be an evil-demon who can set the clock to 8:22 
with his invisible hand a second before Russell looks at 
it.) However, Russell’s arch-nemesis is also lazy. He will 
act only if Russell does not come down the stairs at 8:22 
of his own accord. Suppose, as it so happens, Russell 
does come down the stairs at 8:22. Russell’s arch-
nemesis remains inactive. Russell forms a belief that it’s 
8:22. It is 8:22. The grandfather clock is working reliably 
as always.93 
 
Kelp argues that, albeit unsafe, Russell’s belief that ‘it is 8:22 now’ still counts 
as knowledge. Bogardus (2012) argues that Kelp’s counterexample does not 
successfully present us with a case of unsafe knowledge. The idea, succinctly 
put, is that Russell was in epistemic danger before he decided to walk down 
the stairs at 8:22, but once he decided to come down the stairs at 8:22, the 
danger dissipated and his belief was formed safely. For Bogardus, S was at 
epistemic risk just before forming her belief does not imply that S’s belief was 
formed unsafely. The real counterexample to the safety condition in 
Bogardus’s mind goes as follows: 
 
ATOMIC CLOCK   The world’s most accurate atomic clock 
hangs in Smith’s office. The clock is accurate by virtue of 
                                                          
93 For a similar case, see Bogardus (2012). 
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its sensitive radiation sensor, which, however, could easily 
malfunction if a radioactive isotope were to decay in the 
vicinity. Today, unbeknownst to Smith, a radioactive 
isotope was accidentally left on the table near-by the clock. 
The isotope could decay at any moment, but luckily, it 
didn’t start to decay when Smith entered the office and 
looked at the normally running clock that read ‘8:22 am’. 
Smith thus formed the true belief that he entered the office 
at 8:22 am. (See Bogardus 2012: 300-301.) 
 
Bogardus holds that, Smith’s belief is obviously unsafe even after he decided 
to enter the office at 8:22, as the radioactive isotope still could have easily 
decayed and thus the clock’s reading could have easily been false. 
Nevertheless, it is intuitive that Smith still knew that he entered the office at 
8:22 am. The lack of safety does not entail the lack of knowledge. Bogardus 
diagnoses that ‘safety at a time depends counterfactually on what would likely 
happen at that time or soon after in a way that knowledge does not. That, 
ultimately, is why knowledge need not be safe.’ (2012: 305). Bogardus’s 
ATOMIC CLOCK was challenged by Broncano-Berrocal (2014). Broncano-
Berrocal argues that Smith’s belief is actually safe, because in a near-by 
world where the clock malfunction, Smith would be forming the belief via a 
different method. Broncano-Berrocal’s objection is essentially rest on a highly 
questionable distinction: in the actual world, the method m1 that Smith uses to 
form the belief is ‘looking at the working clock’; while in the near-by possible 
world, the method m2 that Smith uses is ‘looking at the stopped clock’ (see 
Broncano-Berrocal 2014: 77). The two methods, so defined, are surely 
different. However, this way of characterising belief-forming method looks ad 
hoc and excludes many paradigmatic cases of unsafe belief, for example, 
Russell’s original STOPPED CLOCK case, and Goldman’s FAKE BARN 
COUNTY case. Take the latter as example, in accordance with Broncano-
Berrocal’s taxonomy, Barney’s belief is also safe, because if she happens to 
glimpse at a fake barn, her belief-forming method would be ‘looking at a fake 
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barn’, differing from that in the actual world, i.e., ‘looking at a real barn’. In 
light of this, Broncano-Berrocal’s requirement for ‘same method’ is 
unreasonably demanding. For a full reply to Broncano-Berrocal’s objection, 
see Bogardus & Marxen (2013). 
 
Now it seems that Broncano-Berrocal’s objection to Bogardus’s ATOMIC 
CLOCK is not very successful. At the meantime, one might find Bogardus’s 
criticism of Kelp’s ARCH-NEMESIS kind of odd. After all, in ARCH-NEMESIS, 
Russell could have easily decided not to walk down at 8:22 (alternatively, he 
might not make any relevant decision on purpose at all, but just randomly 
come down to the stairs at a random time), why cannot these close possible 
worlds threaten the safety of his belief? If they can, then it seems like both 
Kelp’s and Bogardus’s cases serve as cases of unsafe knowledge.  
 
However, proponents of safety have another more steadfast response to the 
two cases. Pritchard (2009b) replies to Kelp’s case by claiming that he does 
not share the intuition that Russell really have knowledge. He argues that 
Russell’s true belief is just a cognitive achievement that falls short of 
knowledge because of its unsafety. For Pritchard, the distinction between 
cognitive achievement and knowledge is reflected clearly in the case of FAKE 
BARN COUNTY. That is, Barney’s cognitive success is sufficiently 
attributable to her cognitive agency and thus counts as her cognitive 
achievement. Nevertheless, Barney lacks knowledge because her belief 
suffers from environmental luck. Kelp also admits that any version of safety 
that renders Barney’s belief unsafe would also render Russell’s belief unsafe. 
So now the crux seems to lie at whether Barney knows or not. This is a knotty 
issue that we have discussed in the previous chapter. The underlying 
question here is whether FAKE-BARN-COUNTY-style environmental luck is 
incompatible with knowledge or not. As we have noted, there are two 
conflicting intuitions regarding whether Barney lacks knowledge in the fake 
barn county. I will keep my stance on this issue neutral (as I did in Chapter 5), 
and turn to show that if one is to defend SaTB by this steadfast response, 
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then this will perforce yield another dilemma for absolutists—there will be a 
new Tr that is both too lenient and too demanding indicating the impossibility 
of Tk. This time, the new Tr will be one that is closely connected to SaTB, 
namely, sensitive true belief (SeTB).    
 
Before we look more closely at how SeTB can be involved in our argument, 
let us take stock of what has been achieved. We have seen that, in order to 
provide a robust reply to scepticism by taking Approach 1, absolutists are 
expected to find a Tk that can meet sceptics’ challenge from the perspective 
of the strength of epistemic support for one’s belief that ~BIV. So 
fallibility/luckiness will be a relevant scale in this context, and SaTB is a 
natural choice of Tr, i.e., a reference that helps us to carve out an ultimately 
satisfactory Tk. With SaTB in play, we find a dilemma for absolutists. For the 
first horn, if there is a Tk, then it should be less permissive than SaTB (given 
cases of safe non-knowledge such as PRESUMPTUOUS SECRETARY and 
TEMP). For the second horn, if there is a Tk, then it should also be more 
permissive than SaTB (given cases of unsafe knowledge such as ARCH-
NEMESIS and ATOMIC CLOCK). One steadfast way to evade the second 
horn is to insist that in those putative cases of unsafe knowledge, the 
protagonists lack knowledge for the same reason that Barney lacks 
knowledge in FAKE BARN COUNTY. Therefore, for those who do not share 
the intuition that Barney lacks knowledge, this response does not hold water, 
and SaTB will suffice to show that it is impossible to have a Tk that is both 
less permissive and more permissive than SaTB. For those who share the 
intuition that knowledge is absent in FAKE-BARN-COUNTY-style cases, now 
I invite them to consider sensitive true belief as an alternative reference Tr.  
 
When seeing SeTB as a new Tr, we will expect it to play the same role that 
SaTB did in our previous arguments. That is, if it turns out that a satisfactory 
Tk ought to be both less permissive and more permissive than SeTB, then we 
can conclude that Tk does not exist. The sensitivity condition of knowledge 




A subject S’s true belief p is sensitive, iff, in the closest 
possible worlds where p is false, S would not believe that p 
via the same method M (see Nozick 1981; Pritchard 2008; 
etc.). 
 
Sensitivity is famously advocated by Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981). It is 
argued that, to constitute knowledge, a belief has to be not only true, but also 
sensitive. However, many have demonstrated that the sensitivity-based 
account of knowledge is not sufficient. Accordingly, by employing sensitivity 
as a reference for locating Tk, we would have: if there is a Tk, then it should 
be less lenient than sensitivity. Why is sensitivity too lenient? Consider Saul 
Kripke’s RED BARN: 
 
RED BARN: Rob visited a fake barn county full of 
papier-mâché barns that are indistinguishable from 
genuine barns. There is only one genuine barn in the 
county, which is red. Unbeknownst to Rob, every fake 
barn is green. Rob happened to look at the only real 
barn and thus formed the true belief that ‘there is a red 
barn in front of me’. (see Kripke 2011: 186) 
 
Did Rob know that there was a red (real) barn in front of him? If one holds 
that Barney lacks knowledge in the original FAKE BARN COUNTY case, one 
can hardly consistently credit Rob with knowledge in this RED BARN case. 
After all, Rob suffered from the same environmental luck as Barney does. If 
Barney does not know that ‘there is a barn’, so does not Rob. If Rob does not 
know that ‘there is a barn’, he also does not know that ‘there is a red barn’. 
But was Rob’s belief sensitive? Yes. That is because, Rob formed his belief 
by looking at the object and judging its colour. In most near-by possible 
worlds where Rob happened to see a papier-mâché barn instead, he would 
not believe that ‘there is a red barn’, as all fake barns are green. Thus, Rob’s 
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true belief meets the requirement of sensitivity, but still fails to count as 
knowledge. 
 
Likewise, many cases showing safety’s insufficiency can also be used to 
reveal that sensitivity is too permissive. For example, it can be argued that in 
TEMP and DEMON, both protagonists have a sensitive true belief. 
Nevertheless, since sensitivity (as well as safety) fails to capture the sense 
that knowledge is a type of cognitive achievement, it is too lenient to be a 
proper threshold for knowledge.  
 
On another hand, there is also a common worry that sensitivity might be too 
demanding a condition for a belief’s being knowledge. A straightforward 
concern is that sensitivity implies PC2 and thus supports UNMET. One’s 
belief that ‘I am not a BIV’ is insensitive as if one were a BIV, one would still 
believe that she is not regardless. In light of this, many have employed 
sensitivity to construct the sceptical argument (see DeRose 1995; Lehrer 
2000; Sosa 2004; Leite 2004; Immerman 2016). So sensitivity, qua a Tr, does 
not meet the first condition of a proper Tk, namely, being able to falsify 
UNMET. Apart from this, Sosa’s TRASH BAG case is also widely accepted 
as a counterexample towards the sensitivity condition: 
 
TRASH BAG:  On his way to the elevator Ernie releases a 
trash bag down the chute from his high rise condo. 
Presumably he knows the bag will soon be in the 
basement. But what if, having been released, the trash bag 
had been snagged somehow in the chute on the way down 
(an incredibly rare occurrence), or some such 
happenstance? None such could affect Ernie’s predictive 
belief as he releases it, so he would still predict that the 





Arguably, Ernie knows that the bag will soon be in the basement, despite the 
insensitivity of his belief. Therefore, we have cases indicating that sensitivity 
is unnecessary for knowledge—sensitivity is too demanding. The upshot is, if 
there is a Tk, then it should be more lenient than sensitivity.  
 
Now we have seen the whole picture of my argument from reference. It 
consists of two parts. The first part of my argument shows that, by using 
SaTB as a reference for Tk, we have:  
 
(AFR 1): If there is a Tk, then it should be less permissive 
than SaTB, as there are cases of safe true beliefs 
that do not qualify as knowledge. 
(AFR 2): If there is a Tk, then it should be more permissive 
than SaTB, as there are cases of unsafe knowledge. 
(AFR 3): It is impossible for a threshold to be located at a 
point that is both higher and lower than SaTB along 
the scale of the strength of epistemic support.  
(AFR 4): By modus tollens, the previous three premises 
show that the antecedent of AFR 1 and 2 should be 
rejected, that is to say, there is no Tk.  
 
The second part of my argument considers a steadfast objection to AFR 2 
insisting that as long as one’s true belief is influenced by the environmental 
epistemic luck, one would always lack knowledge. I have argued that, if one 
is committed to this steadfast response, then one should also endorse that 
the protagonist in the case of RED FAKE BARN lacks knowledge for the 
same reason. Hence, the second part of my argument employs SeTB as a 
new reference Tr, which yields a new dilemma: 
 
(AFR 5): If there is a Tk, then it should be less permissive 
than SeTB, as there are cases of sensitive true 
beliefs that do not qualify as knowledge. 
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(AFR 6): If there is a Tk, then it should be more permissive 
than SeTB, as there are cases of insensitive 
knowledge. 
(AFR 7): It is impossible for a threshold to be located at a 
point that is both higher and lower than SeTB along 
the scale of the strength of epistemic support.  
(AFR 8): By modus tollens, the previous three premises 
show that the antecedent of AFR 5 and 6 should be 
rejected, that is to say, there is no Tk.  
 
Undeniably, one might find SaTB and SeTB unattractive as candidates of Tk. 
I do not deny that there are some seemingly more promising candidates 
other than SaTB and SeTB. However, notice that, if my argument above 
succeeds, then we do not even need to consider any other candidate of Tk, 
as SaTB and SeTB would already suffice to reveal the incoherence within the 
idea of there exists a Tk. Just like we do not need to ask whether 6.1 feet or 
6.13 feet or 5.98 feet would be a proper threshold for the height of pilots in 
Island Pianosa. To comprehend why, let us take a closer look at some 




One might argue that this only shows that SaTB is not a suitable candidate of 
Tk, rather than that Tk does not exist. For example, not all men can be 
employed as pilots in the USA; also, some female candidates can be 
employed as pilots in the USA. Hence, so to speak, ‘being male’ is both too 
strong and too weak for the threshold for being a pilot. But this does not 
indicate that the threshold for being a pilot in the USA does not exist. Instead, 
this just shows that ‘being male’ is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition. However, this is an improper analogy. In the USA-pilot case, 
gender is not a relevant scale for being a pilot—it is not something that we 
care about for the purpose of recruiting excellent pilots. However, when it 
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comes to the case of anti-scepticism, as we have noted, the strength of 
epistemic support is one essential relevant scale for finding a Tk that can 
reject UNMET. SaTB (as well as SeTB) falls at this essential scale and yields 
a dilemma to the effect that no Tk that it is both less permissive and more 
permissive than SaTB can be located along this scale. A more proper 
analogy should be pilot recruitment in the Island Pianosa, where the height of 
candidates is stipulated as an essential scale for drawing the threshold for 
recruiting pilots. ‘Six-foot-tall’ falls at this essential scale, and yields a 
dilemma to the effect that no threshold can be both more lenient and less 
lenient than ‘six-foot-tall’. SaTB is to knowledge what ‘six-foot-tall’ to Island 
Pianosa’s pilots.     
 
The worry that we did not exhaust all possibilities of Tk for absolutists might 
be rooted in an idea as follows:  
 
Even if we accept your readings of those Gettier-cases, what 
they would seem to show is just that any Tk must be less 
permissive than SaTB/SeTB in some respects and that any 
Tk must be more permissive than SaTB/SeTB in some 
respects from which it doesn’t follow that there is no 
Tk. Obviously, there couldn’t be a necessary and sufficient 
condition for knowledge that is both logically 
stronger and logically weaker than safety—but there could 
perfectly well be a logically independent condition that is 
weaker than safety in some ways and stronger in others. You 
seem to assume that any other candidate condition must be 
located on a one-dimensional scale where safety/sensitivity 
falls at. However, Tk can consist of various conditions that 
are located on multi-dimensional scales. 
 
Name this the multi-dimension worry. As I have stated, Tk can be formulated 
in terms of various relevant scales, to wit, be constructed in a multi-
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dimensional manner. What I aim to show is that the scale where SaTB and 
SeTB are located on is an essential scale that absolutists cannot evade when 
we are examining the absolutist anti-sceptical approach. That is to say, no 
matter how many other dimensions/scales that absolutists might appeal to in 
order to put forward a satisfactory Tk, the scale where SaTB and SeTB are 
involved is one that absolutists have to accommodate if they are to reject 
UNMET. I interpreted this scale as one concerning the strength of epistemic 
support. This scale/dimension of Tk asks: How strong does one’s epistemic 
support need to be in order to yield knowledge? At the beginning of this 
section, we have seen that this question is very important for absolutist’s 
finding a proper Tk because one’s strength of epistemic support is exactly 
what UNMET doubts about. Another way to ask this question that 
Hetherington usually uses (when he talks about ‘the boundary problem of 
knowledge’) is: How fallible is one’s true belief allowed to be? SaTB/SeTB 
answers that: ‘To the extent that it is safe/sensitive’.  
 
Still, one might further question that fallibility/luckiness is not the only 
dimension for absolutists to analyse ‘the strength of epistemic support’, and 
thus SaTB/SeTB is not the only way to answer this question about the 
strength of epistemic support. Of course, there can be many other ways to 
answer this question, but the answer offered by SaTB/SeTB has already 
indicated that none of them will succeed in providing us with a Tk that can 
address this question. Just like there are many ways to answer the question: 
How strong is a wrestler required to be in order to be signed by WWE? One 
might answer by ‘being able to powerslam the Big Show’, ‘being able to 
deadlift 600 pounds’, ‘being stronger than Steve Austin’, and so on. However, 
none of them can be true if it is known that ‘any wrestler who wants to work 
for WWE has to be both more muscular and less muscular than John Cena’. 
Surely, ‘being more/less muscular than John Cena’ is just one way to answer 
the question; ‘muscularity’ is just one dimension to evaluate how strong an 
athlete is. But as long as it is true that ‘any wrestler who wants to work for 
WWE has to be both more muscular and less muscular than John Cena’, 
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then any other candidate answer/dimension would be meaningless—it has 
been shown that no matter how strong one is, one can never work for WWE, 
as no one can be both more and less muscular than John Cena. It is the 
same with the strength of epistemic support. SaTB/SeTB serves as an 
answer just like ‘being as muscular as John Cena’. As long as we 
acknowledge fallibility/luckiness as one proper dimension to evaluate one’s 
strength of epistemic support (among many other proper dimensions)—just 
like muscularity is one proper dimension to evaluate how strong a wrestler 
is—then the impossibility of Tk revealed by SaTB/SeTB also applies to any 
other candidate answer. So why is fallibility/luckiness a proper dimension? 
One reason, as we have noted before, is the dialectical connection between 
this dimension and UNMET. Another reason that I take to be plausible is: if 
absolutists are to put forward an ultimately satisfactory threshold for 
knowledge, then this ultimate threshold should capture the prevalent intuition 
that knowledge cannot merely be a result of luck. Of course, this intuition is 
not agreed by all epistemologists (Hetherington is exactly such an exception), 
but it should at least serve as a conditional motivation for acknowledging the 
dimension concerning safety/sensitivity: if you accept that knowledge is 
incompatible with epistemic luck, then a robust formulation of Tk should be 
able to capture this intuition. And the antecedent, I believe, will obtain for 
many people.   
 
To put it formally, these are my claims: 
 
Let the scale where SaTB and SeTB are located on be S0. 
Let the scale of the strength of epistemic support be Ssep. I 
leave open whether Ssep is identical with S0; I leave open 
whether Ssep consists of more dimensions apart from S0. My 
point is that S0 is a both dialectically and conceptually 
important dimension for analysing Ssep—S0 is one proper 
dimension (just like other proper dimensions, if any) that one 
can appeal to when evaluating the strength of epistemic 
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support. I also concede that it might be possible that ‘a 
putative Tk is logically stronger than SaTB/SeTB along a 
scale S1, and logically weaker than SaTB/SeTB along 
another scale S2, as long as S1 and S2 are two different 
scales, and they are not identical with Ssep or S0’. It cannot be 
the case that ‘a putative Tk is both logically stronger and 
weaker than SaTB/SeTB along the scale Ssep or S0’. 
Absolutists propose to reject UNMET by coming up with an 
anti-sceptical Tk. SaTB and SeTB have shown that it is 
impossible for any anti-sceptical Tk to hold water on the scale 
S0, and thus Ssep. Given that Ssep is an essential scale that an 
anti-sceptical Tk has to accommodate, it is impossible for any 
Tk to hold water regardless of any other scale Sn. 
 
With these being said, now it should be clear why my argument is not 
threatened by the multi-dimension worry. This also, again, explains why we 
do not need to examine more candidate forms of Tk.94 Also notice that if my 
argument from reference succeeds, then it can be seen as not only criticism 
of the absolutist anti-sceptical approach but also a direct objection to K-
THRESHOLD. The idea is, Tk cannot exist, as nothing can be both less 
permissive and more permissive than SaTB/SeTB. Hence we shall not see 
knowledge as a threshold concept. 
 
The Gettier Problem 
                                                          
94 To hammer home this point, we can try to consider some other analyses of knowledge that might 
be deemed more plausible than SaTB or SeTB, for example, Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue 
epistemology (2012a), or Chris Kelp’s knowledge first virtue epistemology (2017, 2018). Both 
analyses absorb Sosa’s AAA account of knowledge as an addition to other elements (for the former, 
the anti-luck conditions; for the latter, the knowledge-first spirit). Neither analyses can evade the 
scale which SaTB and SeTB are located on. This is obvious for Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue 
epistemology, as it explicitly includes the anti-luck condition for knowledge. It is the same with Kelp’s 
knowledge first virtue epistemology. That is because, being based on Sosa’s virtue epistemology 
model, it also needs to answer what a ‘competent belief’ (in a terminology that Sosa uses more 
frequently, ‘adroit belief’) is, which also addressed the problem regarding the strength of epistemic 
support. Besides, it is also noteworthy that Sosa’s own account of ‘adroitness’ adopts a reliabilist 




Now it seems like my argument from reference is just simply a repeat of the 
point that absolutists need to respond to the Gettier problem, rather than an 
objection to the absolutist anti-sceptical approach. In fact, I will admit that if 
one is to adopt Approach 1 to argue against scepticism, then one is subject 
to the Gettier problem. One standard way to solve the Gettier problem is to 
figure out what is the non-Gettier factor X that complements the traditional 
JTB tripartite analysis of knowledge such that we can give knowledge a 
proper set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Notice just how 
similar a work this is to absolutists’ task when locating a threshold for 
knowledge. If absolutists are able to provide a Tk that meets the two anti-
sceptical conditions that we emphasise in this chapter, then this would 
thereby enable absolutist to give the Gettier problem an ideal solution in a 
sense. Correspondingly, if the Gettier problem is left unsolved due to 
absolutists’ inability to find the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
knowledge, then absolutists would also fail to defend their anti-sceptical 
approach. That is the price of choosing Approach 1. The real key problem 
that we should ask is: Why won’t the gradualist anti-sceptical proposal be 
plagued by the Gettier problem as well? That is because gradualists never 
promise to refute sceptics by defending a Tk. Quite the contrary, they never 
admit the existence of such a Tk. So they do not need to solve the sceptical 
problem or the Gettier problem by looking for the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for knowledge. Therefore, even though the Gettier problem might 
vex gradualists as well for some other independent reasons (remember that, 
however, in Chapter 5 we have also seen how gradualism can help us to do 
justice to the Gettier problem—the Gettier problem can be resolved without 
needing to find a Tk), it does not vex gradualists when gradualism is applied 
to solve the sceptical problem. In solving the sceptical problem by taking 





Another question is, does this mean that if absolutists could come up with a 
condition that solves the Gettier problem, then they would also be able to 
respond to my argument from reference? No. I admit that if they succeed in 
finding an ultimately satisfactory Tk, then they might be able to also give the 
Gettier problem one solution by finding the X factor. But not vice versa. That 
is because there is more than one approach to solving the Gettier problem—
other than coming up with a Tk. This opens up room for absolutists to solve 
the Gettier problem without thereby disarming my argument from reference. 
For example, absolutists can put knowledge first95 and give the Gettier 
problem a Williamsonian reply—but this job has nothing to do with 
articulating what Tk is. Also, an absolutist can appeal to Sosa’s AAA account 
of knowledge to address the Gettier problem. In this case, it is unclear how 
this approach can respond to my argument from reference—the idea of 
‘adroitness’ and ‘aptness’ would still need to answer the question regarding 
the strength of epistemic support, and thus would also encounter the 
dilemma revealed by SaTB/SeTB. The apt belief account of knowledge might 
be sufficient for addressing the Gettier problem (I am not claiming that it 
actually is), but it is not fine-grained enough for offering us a Tk that can block 
my argument from reference. 
 
I hope to have said enough to show that the argument from reference is not a 
simple repeat of the Gettier problem. In contrast, it is an independent 
challenge to the absolutist anti-sceptical approach. 
  
2.2: The Argument from Petitio Principia 
 
One might find my argument from reference essentially hinge on one’s 
intuition about whether a case counts as a counterexample to safety or 
sensitivity. Is there anything else that gradualists can do if one holds an 
intuition contradicting mine? I believe that there is a more intrinsic defect of 
                                                          
95 In this case, I think a knowledge-first absolutist might need to accept moderate K-THRESHOLD, as 
they give up analysing knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. The idea here 
might be, we do not know where the threshold is, but there must be one. 
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anti-sceptical proposals that take Approach 1—they are risking of begging the 
question.  
 
Anti-sceptical proposals embracing Approach 1 typically come in the form of 
neo-Mooreanism. Neo-Mooreans attempt to reject PC2 by arguing that a 
satisfactory epistemic standard that can best capture the nature of knowledge 
should be like such and such, and then proving that, in accordance with this 
epistemic standard, we know that we are not victims of sceptical hypotheses. 
Now the question is: can they propose such a reasonable epistemic standard 
without presuming our possession of widespread everyday knowledge? Take 
one of the most influential neo-Moorean proposals, viz, Sosa’s safety-based 
proposal, as an example. How did Sosa motivate safety and show its 
advantage over sensitivity? The main method that Sosa (1999) took was to 
illustrate counterexamples to sensitivity that safety can properly avoid, e.g., 
the TRASH BAG case. This method can work, significantly by virtue of our 
epistemic intuition that: according to our ordinary understanding of what 
knowledge is, Ernie can be seen as knowing that the bag will soon be in the 
basement—otherwise, many intuitive cases of knowledge would be excluded 
from the market of knowledge as well, which is an unpalatable upshot. 
Safety’s plausibility is based on our epistemic intuition that safety can better 
reflect our ordinary understanding of knowledge. And this epistemic intuition 
is essentially grounded in our possession of widespread everyday knowledge. 
One finds safety more appealing than sensitivity, because the former can 
save knowledge that we ordinarily take ourselves to have (e.g., predictive 
knowledge, as TRASH BAG shows) from being denied by sensitivity. If one is 
not committed to our possession of widespread everyday knowledge, how 
can epistemic intuition as such be grounded? With these being said, it should 
be more evident why a neo-Moorean anti-sceptical proposal that takes 
Approach 1 succumbs to the problem of petitio principia: If a neo-Moorean 
epistemic standard is at all plausible to us, then it must accord with our 
understandings of knowledge that we think we possess—that is the 
foundation of its plausibility. However, what the sceptical paradox imperils is 
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exactly this foundation. Hence, it is unclear how neo-Mooreanism can refute 
scepticism in a non-circular manner.  
 
It is noteworthy that there are also some philosophers holding that the neo-
Moorean reasoning is not begging the question. A prominent example is 
James Pryor (2004, 2012), whose view is also echoed by philosophers such 
as Allan Hazlett (2014). Pryor’s argument is based on an account of 
perceptual justification that he calls ‘dogmatism’, as opposed to the 
‘conservative’ view that can be found in Wright (1985), Cohen (2002), and 
White (2006), etc. Dogmatism denies that having prima facie perceptual 
justification to believe that ‘here are two hands’ requires one to have 
antecedent justification to believe that ~BIV. Hence it is not the case that 
Moore’s proof of the external world succumbs to the transmission failure of 
warrant. One can acquire justification to believe that there is an external world 
by having experiences of hands. Moore’s proof is not begging the question as 
having justification to believe Moore’s conclusion is not among the conditions 
that make one has the justification that one purports to have for the premises. 
Indeed, there is a sort of epistemic dependence between Moore’s conclusion 
and the premises, but Pryor argues that it is not a vicious one. 
 
I do not plan to dive into the ongoing debate between dogmatism and 
conservatism as this will be far beyond our purpose here. However, there are 
two points that I would like to emphasise. 
 
First, the form of neo-Moorean reasoning that Pryor discussed was based on 
Moore’s proof, which was formulated as follows: 
 
(M1) Here are two hands. 
(M2) If hands exist, then there is an external world. 




This is manifestly distinct from the form of neo-Moorean argument that I am 
analysing here: 
 
(N1) I know that I am not a BIV, because my relevant belief 
meets Tk. 
(N2) If I know that I am not a BIV, then the sceptical 
argument fails. 




(N1*) I know that I have hands, because my relevant belief 
meets Tk. 
(N2*) If I know that I have hands, then I know that I am not a 
BIV. 
(N3*) So, I know that I am not a BIV.  
 
It might be true that one does not need to have antecedent justification to 
believe M3 for one’s having justification to believe M1. Nevertheless, it is far 
from clear how one can have justification to believe N1 or N1* if one does not 
already presume N3 or N3*. Dogmatism of perceptual justification might be 
able to explain why M1’s being justified does not require one to have 
antecedent justification of M3. But it is unclear how this view can explain the 
source of plausibility of the Tk employed in N1 and N1* can be gained 
independently of one’s possession of everyday knowledge. We will probe into 
this point more deeply later. 
 
The second point is, while Pryor argues that Moore’s argument is not begging 
the question, he admits that it is dialectically ineffective against the sceptics in 
the sense that anyone who had doubts about its conclusion could not use the 
argument to rationally overcome those doubts. Pryor’s attitude is—that is 
okay, as there is nothing wrong with the justificatory structure of Moore’s 
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proof—what’s wrong is that the sceptic has doubts that he ought not to have. 
A dialectically ineffective argument is sufficient for solving the sceptical 
problem as long as it can transmit warrant from the premises to the anti-
sceptical conclusion. This attitude is named ‘unambitious epistemology’ by 
Michael Veber, who recently provided a cogent criticism of this unambitious 
anti-sceptical attitude (see Veber 2019). I shall not repeat Veber’s objections 
here. Instead, my point is that, even Pryor cannot deny that dialectical 
ineffectiveness is indeed a deficiency of Moore’s proof (though Pryor holds 
that it is not a fatal one). Thus, if the gradualist anti-sceptical approach can 
overcome this deficiency, then this is sufficient for our purpose to show the 
theoretical advantage of gradualism. 
 
One might still argue that neo-Mooreanism does not need to be formulated in 
the way I formulate it above; nor is neo-Mooreanism the only choice for 
absolutists. So, can anti-sceptics adopt Approach 1 without presuming that 
we have widespread knowledge? No. Remember that any anti-sceptical 
proposal taking Approach 1 is expected to complete two missions: 1) finding 
a satisfactory threshold Tk for knowledge; 2) using Tk to reject UNMET. A 
threshold Tk that is compatible with our lacking everyday knowledge can 
never be deemed ‘satisfactory’, insofar as we do not plan to surrender to 
scepticism. It is not only unconvincing but also inconsistent for an absolutist 
who chooses Approach 1 to say something like: ‘it is possible that we do not 
have any knowledge at all, but we will still find out a satisfactory threshold for 
knowledge anyway’.  
 
Notice that I am not saying that our lack of everyday knowledge is 
incompatible with the possibility that Tk exists—after all, absolutists can argue 
that it is a priori true that knowledge entails Tk (although I am curious about 
how such an argument would be like), but it is still possible that we lack the 
widespread empirical knowledge that we take ourselves to have. Instead, 
what I am emphasising is the inconsistence between our lack of everyday 
knowledge and the alleged Tk’s being satisfactory. The achievability of the 
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first mission of Approach 1 is incompatible with the possibility that we lack 
everyday knowledge. Precisely put, let L be ‘we lack widespread everyday 
knowledge’, and S be ‘the threshold for knowledge, Tk, is satisfactory’. The 
statement ‘◇(~K˄S)’ is false, because a threshold is necessarily 
unsatisfactory if it allows the sceptical conclusion to obtain. Therefore, it is 
infeasible for absolutists to adopt Approach 1 without presuming the denial of 
the sceptical conclusion. The upshot is, any absolutist anti-sceptical proposal 
taking Approach 1 will either fail to offer a proper threshold for knowledge, or 
give rise to petitio principia. If it begs the question, it cannot reject scepticism 
appropriately; while if a proper threshold for knowledge can impossibly be 
given, then what is the point of choosing Approach 1? In any case, Approach 
1 is not preferable. This reveals a more fundamental difficulty for any 
absolutist (not only neo-Mooreanists) who sticks to Approach 1.  
 
One might object that, even if knowledge is taken to be gradable, scepticism 
can still argue that there are some necessary conditions for (even the most 
borderline cases of) knowledge that one’s beliefs cannot meet. And thus the 
shadow of scepticism still remains within a gradualist picture. This objection is 
de facto proposing to save the sceptical argument by replacing UNMET with 
UNMET*. However, in section 2 we have seen that the equation between 
UNMET and UNMET* also obtains within a gradualist framework. Therefore, 
a sceptical argument based on UNMET* would fail as well if the one based on 
UNMET cannot succeed. 
 
Another worry can be: Approach 2 implies gradualism, but is not gradualism 
also an epistemological theory about the nature of our knowledge? How can 
approach 2 work without presuming our possession of knowledge and thus 
begging the question or being dialectically ineffective? My reply is: Approach 
2 can avoid petitio principia as it has no burden of proof for providing a 
satisfactory Tk, and thus it does not need to presume our possession of 
widespread knowledge. Gradualism blocks the sceptical argument by 
rejecting UNMET in a less theory-laden but more straightforward manner. 
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Once UNMET is rejected, then sceptics would have no reason to doubt our 
possession of everyday knowledge, as the standard sceptical reasoning 
hinges on the truth of UNMET. Moreover, unlike absolutist neo-Mooreanism, 
the plausibility of Approach 2 does not have to be premised on our having 
everyday knowledge. It is even consistent for gradualism to presume that 
‘◇(~K˄G)’, where G means ‘knowledge has no threshold’, without preventing 
gradualists from rejecting UNMET (and, of course, this does not imply that 
gradualism concedes that scepticism is right). Therefore, Approach 2 is 
neither begging the question nor being subject to dialectical ineffectiveness. 






Does not your argument from reference also imply that knowledge has no 
necessary condition? Is not this corollary too radical? 
 
Reply 1 
My argument does not entail this unacceptable corollary. Remember that the 
argument from reference constructs a dilemma for absolutism: if there is a 
threshold for knowledge, then on the one hand, it must be more lenient than 
SaTB/SeTB; on the other hand, it must be also less lenient than SaTB/SeTB. 
The second horn holds water when our target is Tk, because Tk ought to also 
serve as a sufficient condition for knowledge, but neither SaTB nor SeTB is 
sufficient. However, if our target is merely ‘necessary condition of knowledge’ 
in general, then the second horn would not exist, because we do not expect 
every necessary condition to be also sufficient for knowledge. Therefore, my 
argument at most implies that: 1) knowledge does not have a certain type of 
necessary condition (the type that serves as a threshold; and 2) if knowledge 
has a necessary condition, it should be more lenient than SaTB and SeTB. 





But you also argued that being committed to UNMET which involves Tk is 
equivalent to being committed to UNMET* which involves Ck. Now that you 
deny the existence of Tk, is not you also denying the existence of Ck? Does 
this still imply that knowledge has no necessary condition? 
 
Reply 2 
No. That is because, as we have noted before, the Ck in UNMET* is not a 
variable referring to any arbitrary necessary condition of knowledge. Instead, 
it is a very specific kind of necessary condition such that 1) sceptics can use 
it to deny EK, and 2) however, once it is meet, then sceptics have no reason 
to doubt one’s possession of knowledge. It serves as the last barrier that 
sceptics put between us and everyday knowledge. A random necessary 
condition of knowledge, e.g., the doxastic condition, does not fit this bill—it 
does not have the two aforesaid traits of Ck. For example, it is not the case 
that once we have beliefs, then the sceptical argument is blocked; on the 
other hand, sceptics can hardly deny that we have everyday knowledge by 
arguing that we do not have beliefs at all. Hence, rejecting knowledge’s 
having Ck is significantly distinct from rejecting knowledge’s having 
necessary conditions in general. 
 
Objection 3 
But how does it help to reject scepticism by simply arguing that knowledge 
has no threshold? ‘That there is no threshold for judging whether one knows’ 
and ‘that one has widespread everyday knowledge’ seem to be two irrelevant 
claims.   
 
Reply 3 
The focus of this chapter is the sceptical paradox. The theoretical merit of 
gradualism is not to entail EK from K-THRESHOLD directly. Instead, it 
benefits the solution to the sceptical paradox. The sceptical paradox is rooted 
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in the seeming contradiction between our otherwise undisputed possession of 
widespread everyday knowledge and the prima facie plausible sceptical 
argument. These are the two conflicting intuitions underpinning the sceptical 
paradox. The paradoxical-ness is manifested by our unwillingness to 
abandon either intuition given that the two intuitions are appealing. EK might 
be one of the most plausible claims that can function as the foundation of our 
epistemic conception. Hence, it is essential for the sceptical argument to be 
credited with adequate plausibility such that it is not too less plausible than 
EK to pose a paradox. In order to achieve this, sceptics need a ‘scaffold’ to 
reach the sceptical conclusion. UNMET serves as the ‘scaffold’ for the 
sceptical argument. UNMET argues that there is a Tk for knowledge, which 
one’s belief that one is not the victim of sceptical hypotheses fails to meet. By 
denying the existence of Tk, gradualism rejects UNMET in an undercutting 
manner, as it dismantles sceptics’ scaffold for reaching the sceptical 
conclusion. With UNMET being disproved, the sceptical argument can hardly 
attain sufficient plausibility to make us unwilling to abandon it easily when it 
contradicts EK. The sceptical paradox is thus resolved as there is no more 
hard choice for us.  
 
Objection 4 
Hetherington (2001; 2011) has already provided some gradualist anti-
sceptical proposals. They look simpler than yours. So why is your anti-
sceptical proposal still needed? 
 
Reply 4 
First of all, a small point: I do not think that my anti-sceptical proposal is 
obviously more complex than Hetherington’s. The structures of our proposals 
are similar, though the differences between our arguments are salient as well. 
Both of our proposals target at one essential premise of the standard 
sceptical argument—I attempt to reject UNMET, while Hetherington mainly96 
                                                          
96 As we will see later, Hetherington (2001) also mentions the possibility of UNMET’s failure. 
At least, if Hetherington’s gradualist account of knowledge succeeds, then we have 
seemingly adequate reasons to believe that we know that we are not BIVs.  
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proposes to reject CLOSURE. Besides, both of our anti-sceptical proposals 
are accompanied by a background theory—mine appeals to K-SPECTRUM, 
while Hetherington’s relies on minimalism (for his 2001 version of anti-
scepticism) and H (for his 2011 version of anti-scepticism). It is hard to say 
which background theory is more complicated. In any case, my anti-sceptical 
proposal is fundamentally distinct from his, as I reject K-THRESHOLD while 
Hetherington accepts it.  
 
With these being said, now let me explain why I think Hetherington’s 
gradualist solutions to the sceptical argument are unsuccessful. Hetherington 
has put forward two versions of anti-sceptical proposals along with his two 
versions of gradualism. Both proposals attempt to reject closure. According to 
the closure principle, if S knows that she is seeing zebras, then S knows that 
she is not dreaming of seeing zebras. Hetherington (2001) claims that this 
conditional is false—the antecedent’s obtaining is compatible with the 
consequent’s being false. The idea is, one’s knowing poorly that one is 
seeing zebras is sufficient for satisfying the antecedent. Satisfying the 
consequent is just a way for one to have much better knowledge that one is 
seeing zebras. Therefore, to know (poorly) that one’s seeing zebras—which 
is sufficient for one’s knowing that one is seeing zebras—one is not required 
to know that one is not dreaming seeing zebras. The latter knowledge is only 
required when one is to know very well that one is seeing zebras.  
 
So far so good. However, the genuine key problem here is: why is one’s 
knowledge that one is not dreaming only needed if one is to know very well 
that p? Why is it not the case that one’s knowing one is not dreaming is 
needed for one to know even poorly that one is seeing zebras? After all, what 
sceptics call into question is exactly whether one is able to know even poorly 
that one is seeing zebras without being able to know that one is not 
dreaming. Hetherington did not explicitly prove why. Rather, he just assumed 
that one’s having justified true belief that p is enough for one’s knowing that 
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p97. Why assume so? Hetherington (2001) provides at least two 
motivations—a negative one and a positive one.  
 
The negative motivation is that sceptics have no reasonable ground for 
doubting this assumption. Hetherington (2001, Chap 2) diagnoses the 
sceptical reasoning as requiring you to know that you are not merely seeming 
not to be dreaming seeing zebras if you are to know that you are not 
dreaming seeing zebras. Your not merely seeming not to be dreaming seeing 
zebras includes two possibilities: ‘you are not seeming not to be dreaming 
seeing zebras, or you are not dreaming seeing zebras’ (2001: 38). 
Hetherington names this disjunction as d. Given that the standard sceptical 
reasoning also accepts that you are seeming not to be dreaming, the first 
disjunct is ruled out; and hence sceptics are expecting you to know the 
second disjunct of d. Hetherington then argues that what sceptics actually 
require is: you have to know that you are not dreaming seeing zebras if you 
are to know that you are not dreaming seeing zebras. This requirement, 
according to Hetherington, is both trivial and incoherent. It is trivial because 
surely anything is known if it is known; it is incoherent because nothing can 
be known before it is known. In conclusion, the sceptics’ requirement is 
unreasonable.    
 
I do not think Hetherington gave scepticism a fair run here. First of all, one 
thing that we can make sure is that sceptics are not merely trivially requiring 
one to know the denial of sceptical hypotheses in order for one to know the 
denial of sceptical hypotheses. They require more substantial conditions for 
one to possess knowledge, for example, the sensitivity of one’s beliefs or 
one’s having better evidence to support that one is not merely dreaming. 
Hetherington’s diagnosis neglects these independent sceptical requirements 
that are far more substantial than d. Hence, it is also not the case that 
                                                          
97 Accordingly, Hetherington (2001) also argues that we can know that we are not dreaming 
seeing zebras, and thus, UNMET fails. ‘I will assume that your having this justified true belief 
is enough for your knowing—at least in a normal, everyday way—that you are not dreaming 
seeing zebras’ (Hetherington 2001: 37). 
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sceptics trivially conclude that one cannot know that one is merely dreaming 
just because one cannot know it before it is known. There are more 
substantial reasons that sceptics typically advocate: one’s belief is 
insensitive; one cannot distinguish the dreaming scenarios from those not-
dreaming ones; one has no better epistemic support favouring that one is not 
dreaming; etc. Therefore, it is unfair to accuse the sceptical reasoning of 
being trivial and incoherent—at least it is unfair to do so with the reasons that 
Hetherington (2001) provided.       
 
The positive motivation, as Hetherington articulated in Chapter 3 & 4 of his 
2001 book, was based on his commitment to minimalism. As we have noted 
before, Hetherington (2001) claims that one’s true belief that p is sufficient for 
constituting one’s minimal knowledge that p. This idea is inherited by 
Hetherington (2006; 2011, Ch. 2), where he interprets his minimalism in 
terms of his practicalism—that is, by accurately believing that p, we have 
already possessed the minimal knowledge that p. So scepticism can at most 
show that we do not know that we are not dreaming very well, but it cannot 
show that we do not know that we are not dreaming at all. The theoretical 
drawbacks of Hetherington’s minimalism have been discussed in my Chapter 
3. Apart from that, an additional qualm that I have for this anti-sceptical 
strategy is that it seems to be at odds with Hetherington’s attempt to reject 
closure. To falsify closure, Hetherington has to prove that it is the case that 
the antecedent is true while the consequent is false. That is to say, 
Hetherington has to show that we do not know that we are not dreaming of 
seeing zebras when we know that we are seeing zebras. However, given 
Hetherington’s minimalism, it is unclear how can we fail to know (very poorly) 
that we are not dreaming seeing zebras. After all, it seems that in every 
relevant case where we are able to know that we are seeing zebras, we 
would also accurately believe that we are not dreaming seeing zebras, and 
this should suffice to credit us with minimal knowledge that we are not 
dreaming seeing zebras. So it is unclear how closure’s consequent can fail to 
be met given Hetherington’s definitions of minimal knowledge.  
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Now we have seen that Hetherington’s first version of anti-scepticism lacks 
proper explanations for why closure should be discarded. What about his 
second version of anti-sceptical proposal? In the fifth chapter of his 2011 
book, Hetherington attempts to reject closure by appealing to new conceptual 
resources, i.e., the proposed equation between knowledge that p and how-
knowledge that p (which can be formulated as the biconditional ‘H’). 
Hetherington argues that, given the gradualist reading of knowledge, we 
should also reformulate the closure principle in a more delicate way so that it 
can accommodate knowledge’s different degrees. Closure is reformulated as 
follows: 
 
‘If you know g-well that you are looking at a goldfinch, and 
you know perfectly well98 that your seeing a goldfinch entails 
your not being a brain in a vat, then you know g-well that you 
are not a brain in a vat.’ (2011: 196) 
  
Anti-sceptics hold that one can know that one is looking at a goldfinch. Also, 
most of them would accept that, ordinarily, this knowledge is not perfect. In 
other words, one only knows g-well (g<1; where ‘g=1’ means ‘knows perfectly 
well’) that one is looking at a goldfinch. However, Hetherington argues that it 
is not the case that one would also know g-well that one is not a BIV. Instead, 
he holds that we do not know that we are not BIVs. His argument can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
C1:   If I know less than perfectly that I am seeing a 
goldfinch, then I know less than perfectly that I am not a 
BIV. 
C2:   My knowledge that I am seeing a goldfinch is less than 
perfect, because I do not know at least one aspect of 
how it is that I am seeing a goldfinch—and that I am not 
a BIV can be this unknown aspect. 
C3:   Therefore, C1 is false. My knowing I am seeing a 
goldfinch is compatible with my not knowing that I am 
not a BIV. 
                                                          
98 Hetherington (2011: fn 45) admits that he uses ‘perfectly well’ here just in order to prevent 




C1 is an application of the reformulated closure (assuming that I know 
perfectly well that my seeing a goldfinch entails that I am not a BIV). C2 
explains why my everyday knowledge is imperfect—it might be because I do 
not know that I am not a BIV. Therefore, C3 follows in that it can be the case 
that the antecedent of C1 is true while its consequent is false. Hetherington 
then proposes to generalise this reasoning such that it can be applied to 
disarm more forms of scepticism that do not employ the closure principle. He 
constructs a dilemma for sceptics: 
 
For horn 1, which assumes that ~BIV is a part of a minimal truthmaker for ‘I 
am seeing a goldfinch’, Hetherington argues that ‘there can be parts of a 
minimal truthmaker for p that are not known, even as p itself is known — 
hence, even as a minimal truthmaker for p is known’ (2011: 197). This 
explains why one’s knowledge that p is imperfect. Therefore, ~BIV can be 
such an unknown part of a minimal truthmaker for ‘I am seeing a goldfinch’. It 
is only needed when one is to know perfectly well that one is seeing a 
goldfinch. Knowing ~BIV can indeed improve my knowledge that I am seeing 
a goldfinch, while failing to have the former knowledge does not deprive me 
of my latter knowledge. 
 
For horn 2, which assumes that ~BIV is not a part of a minimal truthmaker for 
‘I’m seeing a goldfinch’, Hetherington asserts that ‘[k]nowledge that p need 
not include knowledge of anything that is not part of a minimal truthmaker for 
p’ (2011: 200). Therefore, one’s knowledge that ~BIV is still not required for 
one’s knowing that ‘I’m seeing a goldfinch’.  
 
There are three reasons why I find Hetherington’s second gradualist solution 
to the sceptical problem is also unsuccessful. First, it is obvious that this 
proposal hinges essentially on his analysis of knowledge that p in terms of 
how-knowledge that p. As we have seen in Chapter 3, his argument for ‘H’ 
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is problematic. Consequently, the corresponding anti-sceptical proposal is ill-
grounded.  
 
Second, I am afraid that the argument against closure is dialectically 
ineffective. C2 is logically equivalent to ‘I know less than perfectly that I am 
seeing a goldfinch, and I do not know that I am not a BIV’—which is simply 
the negation of C1, not to mention that the first conjunct just assumes the 
failure of the sceptical conclusion. The key explanandum here is why I can 
know a minimal truthmaker for ‘I am seeing a goldfinch’ without knowing that 
‘I am not a BIV’, if the latter is a part of the former. Hetherington seems to 
imply that there is at least one minimal truthmaker99 for ‘I am seeing a 
goldfinch’ that does not involve ~BIV as an indispensable part. But he does 
not articulate what this minimal truthmaker is, or why such a minimal 
truthmaker exists. To explain this point, what Hetherington (2011: 198) uses 
is an analogy that your knowledge of there being something physical in front 
of you is not required as part of knowing that there is a frog there. However, 
notice that champions of closure do not need to hold that the former 
knowledge is a part of the latter knowledge. They do not need to presume 
any inclusion relation between the two items of knowledge. They just need to 
show that if one possesses the latter knowledge, then one should also 
possess the former one. Accordingly, proponents of competent deduction 
closure (see fotenote 85, p. 213) would object that it is unclear how one can 
know that ‘there is a frog in front of me’ without thereby knowing that ‘there is 
something physical in front of me’ if one can competently deduce the latter 
from the former.  
 
Last but not least, similar to his first version of gradualist anti-sceptical 
proposal, Hetherington’s second proposal also gives rise to a potential 
incoherence. Given that one’s knowing a minimal truthmaker for p is sufficient 
for one to know that p, it seems that we do know that we are not BIVs. That is 
                                                          
99 Hetherington suggests that a proposition can have more than one minimal truthmaker, and 
one only needs to know a minimal truthmaker for p in order to possess the minimal 
knowledge that p. 
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because if I know that I am seeing a goldfinch and that my seeing a goldfinch 
entails that I am not a BIV (as the antecedent of closure requires), then at 
least I know that ‘I am seeing a goldfinch’ obtains, and that ‘if I am seeing a 
goldfinch, then I am not a BIV’ obtains—remember that Hetherington 
suggests that the minimal aspect of how it is p is ‘that p obtains’ (see 
Hetherington 2011: 174). ‘If I am seeing a goldfinch, then I am not a BIV’ is 
identical with a disjunction ‘I am not seeing a goldfinch, or I am not a BIV’. 
Now that I know that the negation of the first disjunct obtains, I should also 
know that the second disjunct obtains. Therefore, I should know a minimal 
truthmaker for ‘I am not a BIV’, and thus, according to Hetherington’s 
minimalism, know that I am not a BIV. If that is the case, then C2 is 
incompatible with its background theory, to wit, Hetherington’s gradualist 
account of knowledge that p in terms of how-knowledge that p. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The debate between epistemic absolutism and gradualism is meaningful, and 
research on that debate can be fruitful. This chapter illustrates how 
gradualism can prevail over absolutism in terms of its application in solving 
the sceptical paradox. Within the orthodox absolutist picture, the sceptical 
paradox is premised on an intuitively appealing claim that one’s belief that ‘I 
am not a BIV’ does not meet the threshold for knowledge. An absolutist anti-
sceptical approach rejects this claim by proving that there is a threshold that 
is met, while a gradualist approach straightforwardly denies that knowledge 
has a threshold. It has been shown that the absolutist approach succumbs to 
the problem of reference and the problem of petitio principia and thus ought 
to be discarded. In contrast, by interpreting knowledge as a spectrum 
concept, gradualism can block the sceptical argument in a more undercutting 
way without giving rise to those problems that absolutism is subject to. In 
light of this, gradualism enjoys advantages over absolutism when it comes to 




Conclusion: Towards the Concept of Gradable 
Knowledge 
 
A key mission of epistemology is to research into the properties of 
knowledge, in particular, propositional knowledge. The gradability is an 
important property that worthy of discussions. The standard view, namely, 
epistemic absolutism, holds that to know a proposition is an absolute yes-or-
no affair. In other words, propositional knowledge is ungradable. The main 
reason for accepting absolutism is that we usually do not use ‘knows’ as a 
gradable predicate in the ordinary language. In addition, some advocates of 
absolutism treat propositional knowledge as an ungradable concept because 
its putative object, viz, the truth of a proposition, is ungradable. Besides, 
some people refuse to view knowledge as gradable because they hold that 
this would perforce lead to contextualism, which is an epistemological theory 
that they find independently implausible. 
 
This thesis starts with a thorough objection to this long-held absolutist view. It 
has been revealed that epistemic absolutism is not as well supported by 
arguments as orthodoxy has it:  
 
Firstly, the linguistic argument for absolutism has been debunked by both the 
internal criticism and the external criticism. The internal criticism shows that 
linguistic data against epistemic absolutism can also be found in both English 
and non-English languages, and thus it is unfair to assert that linguistic 
evidence favours absolutism. The external criticism calls into question the 
linguistic methodology employed by absolutists. It has been shown that if our 
linguistic usages of ‘knows that’ in the ordinary language determine the 
conceptual nature of knowledge per se, then knowledge should also be non-
factive given that we sometimes use knowledge in a non-factive manner. An 
analysis of a non-doxical account of knowledge and hinge epistemology also 
illustrates that there is a gap between the linguistic usages of ‘knows’ and the 




Secondly, the argument from object has been proven to be untenable as it is 
premised on the problematic KT-schema, i.e., to know that p is just to know 
that p is true. By revealing a paradox that KT-schema would give rise to and 
providing counterexamples to KT-schema, I have demonstrated that the 
object of knowledge-that-p is more than the truth of p. It has to at least 
include an adequate degree of understanding of p’s semantic meaning. Apart 
from this, even if one granted KT-schema, it would be a non sequitur to entail 
the ungradability of an epistemic concept from the ungradability of its object. 
Otherwise, it would follow that some paradigmatic gradable concepts such as 
‘belief’ and ‘remember’ are also ungradable.  
 
Finally, it has been argued that we do not need to endorse contextualism to 
see knowledge as gradable. Hence the opponents of contextualism do not 
need to be committed to absolutism. 
 
So, if epistemic absolutism is ill-grounded, what kind of view shall we 
embrace instead? The answer given by this thesis is epistemic gradualism, a 
view that propositional knowledge is gradable. The most prominent advocate 
of this view is Stephen Hetherington. He developed two gradualist proposals, 
the first one is based on his anti-justificationism (a view that justification is not 
necessary for knowledge), the second one hinges on his how-knowledge 
theory. According to Hetherington, the central divergence between 
gradualism and absolutism is whether one can be recognised as knowing 
that p better by virtue of better justification. He holds that absolutists would 
refuse to admit that one’s knowledge can be improved by better epistemic 
support, and hence absolutism is obviously implausible. But he grants that 
there is a clear cut-off point distinguishing knowledge from everything that 
falls short of knowledge. In other words, he grants that there is a threshold 
dividing knowledge and ignorance. In summary, Hetherington is advocating a 
version of local gradualism. That is, he supports beyond-threshold 




It has been shown that Hetherington’s characterisation of the 
gradualism/absolutism debate is problematic. First, it misdiagnoses the key 
divergence between gradualism and absolutism and thus gives rise to an 
equivocal attitude towards knowledge’s gradability. In fact, many absolutists 
would be glad to endorse beyond-threshold gradualism, to wit, knowledge 
can be seen as gradable in the sense that it can be improved by virtue of 
better justification. The problem lies in that people do not therefore treat 
knowledge as an overall gradable concept. The idea is, for the equivocal 
attitude, knowledge is gradable in the beyond-threshold sense, but it is 
ungradable in a more general sense. The second defect of the present model 
of the debate between gradualism and absolutism is that Hetherington’s 
gradualist proposals are not appealing enough to constitute a balanced 
debate. The anti-justificationist ground of his first gradualist proposal invites 
an unnecessarily heavy burden of proof for gradualism, and his second 
proposal is based on an invalid argument equating knowledge that p to how-
knowledge that p.   
 
This thesis has remodelled the debate between gradualism and absolutism. It 
has been argued that the central divergence of the two views should be 




Knowledge is a threshold concept in the sense that there is 
a threshold Tk, which distinguishes knowledge from 
everything that falls short of knowledge. 
 
[K-SPECTRUM] 
Knowledge is a spectrum concept in the sense that there is 
not a threshold Tk distinguishing knowledge from 
everything that falls short of knowledge, but only better or 
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worse instances of knowledge that can be graded into 
different degrees on the relevant scale S. 
 
By endorsing K-SPECTRUM, one rejects both beyond-threshold absolutism 
and, more importantly, threshold absolutism (which can be further subdivided 
into trans-threshold absolutism and intra-threshold absolutism, see Chapter 
Three). The reconstructed model of the debate depicts the genuine 
divergence between gradualism and absolutism more accurately and more 
explicitly. In addition, it can avoid the defects of Hetherington’s gradualism 
and thereby yield a more balanced and attractive debate.  
 
Being based on K-SPECTRUM, the reconstructed framework of gradualism 
is also of greater flexibility. The gradability of knowledge can be interpreted 
from various perspectives in terms of different relevant scales. By way of 
illustration, drawing on Sosa’s virtue epistemology, one can account for 
knowledge’s gradability in terms of the degrees of accuracy (for example, by 
employing a fuzzy logic), adroitness (to what degree one’s true belief 
manifests one’s cognitive competence), and adptness (to what degree one’s 
belief’s being true is attributable to the manifestation of one’s relevant 
cognitive competence) of one’s belief. The upshot is, gradualism does not 
need to be bound by any specific account of knowledge. Instead, any full 
account of knowledge would need to register how propositional knowledge is 
a matter of degree. 
  
One significant goal of this thesis is to overcome the equivocal attitude 
towards knowledge’s gradability. The strategy that I took consists of two 
steps. First, to undermine absolutism, as noted before, this thesis scrutinised 
the arguments for absolutism from three perspectives. It has been shown that 
all three mainstream arguments for absolutism are untenable. Second, to 
motivate gradualism, it has been demonstrated that gradualism would enable 
us to solve many epistemological issues that absolutism cannot properly 
address. I have demonstrated several theoretical advantages that gradualism 
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enjoys over absolutism. These include gradualism’s application in providing a 
unified account of different varieties of knowledge, which eliminates the 
putative asymmetry problem (see Chapter Four). Besides, it has been shown 
that gradualism performs better when it comes to the reconcilement of the 
two conflicting intuitions about knowledge’s compatibility of environmental 
luck, and accounting for the puzzling phenomena of faultless disagreements 
(see Chapter Five). In closing, the last chapter has explored epistemic 
gradualism’s application in resolving the sceptical paradox. It has been 
concluded that knowledge is best to be viewed as a spectrum concept, which 
enables a more satisfactory reply to scepticism. Therefore, gradualism ought 
to be seen as preferable to absolutism, and there would be no reason to stick 
to the absolutist orthodoxy.  
 
Albeit currently underexplored, the debate between absolutism and 
gradualism is epistemologically valuable. However, the extant model of the 
debate interprets the core divergence of gradualism and absolutism in a 
problematic way, and thus might give rise to the equivocal attitude. This 
thesis suggests that we should remodel the debate by focusing on the 
competition between the threshold reading and the spectrum reading of 
knowledge. This can help us to construct a more philosophically meaningful 
and fruitful debate. I believe that the application of gradualism is not limited to 
aforementioned issues that have been discussed in this thesis. Some other 
relevant questions worth exploring include: How can gradualism be 
integrated with the extended knowledge theory? Would the genealogy of 
knowledge favour gradualism over absolutism? If we reject the idea of 
minimal knowledge, is there maximal knowledge? Which extant account of 
knowledge best tallies with gradualism?  
 
Interesting as these questions are, this thesis can only leave them open for 
now due to the limit of space. Also, I am far from believing that this thesis has 
made a conclusive case for defending gradualism and rejecting absolutism. 
Instead, I prefer to see this thesis as reopening rather than concluding the 
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gradualism/absolutism debate. Further discussion on this debate will have a 
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